[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND REBUILDING: LESSONS FROM THE 2017 DISASTERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-53
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Nydia Velazquez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 33
The Honorable Stacey Plaskett, a Delegate in Congress From the
U.S. Virgin Islands............................................ 34
The Honorable Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, Resident Comissioner,
Puerto Rico.................................................... 39
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. William B. ``Brock'' Long, Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Major General Donald E. ``Ed'' Jackson, Jr., Deputy Commanding
General, Civil and Emergency Operations, United States Army
Corps of Engineers, Department of The Army, U.S. Department of
Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. John V. Kelly, Acting Inspector General, Office of The
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Panel II
Mr. Reed Clay, Chief Operating Officer, Office of The Governor,
State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 70
Prepared Statement............................................. 72
Mr. Wesley Maul, Director, Division of Emergency Management,
State of Florida:
Oral Statement................................................. 81
Prepared Statement............................................. 83
Mr. Jose Melendez-Ortiz, Vice Chairman, Committee on Federal and
International Relations, and Status, Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico:
Oral Statement................................................. 88
Prepared Statement............................................. 89
Ms. Jeanne-Aimee De Marrais, Senior Director, Save the Children:
Oral Statement................................................. 92
Prepared Statement............................................. 93
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Stacey Plaskett, a Delegate in Congress From the
U.S. Virgin Islands:
Letters........................................................ 35
The Honorable Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, Resident Comissioner,
Puerto Rico:
Letter......................................................... 40
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
List........................................................... 44
APPENDIX I
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Map............................................................ 109
APPENDIX II
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Donald E.
``Ed'' Jackson, Jr............................................. 111
Question From Honorable Nydia M. Velazquez for Donald E. ``Ed''
Jackson, Jr.................................................... 113
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John V. Kelly...... 114
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John V.
Kelly.......................................................... 116
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Reed Clay.......... 117
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND REBUILDING: LESSONS FROM THE 2017 DISASTERS
----------
Thursday, March 15, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
(Chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Rogers, Perry, Ratcliffe,
Donovan, Higgins, Rutherford, Estes, Bacon, Thompson, Jackson
Lee, Langevin, Richmond, Keating, Payne, Vela, Watson Coleman,
and Demings.
Also present: Representative Velazquez; Delegate Plaskett;
Resident Commissioner, Puerto Rico, Gonzalez-Colon.
Chairman McCaul. Committee on Homeland Security will come
to order. The committee is meeting today to examine the lessons
learned from last year's disasters, including the preparedness
response and recovery efforts for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria, in order to better prepare for future disasters. This is
also Administrator Long's first appearance before the Homeland
Security Committee. Welcome, sir.
I welcome the opportunity to learn more about your
priorities and vision for the future of FEMA. I also see that
we have members joining us today that are not on the committee.
I ask unanimous consent that Resident Commissioner Gonzalez-
Colon, Congresswoman Velazquez, and Delegate Stacey Plaskett be
allowed to sit at the dais and participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
This morning our committee has gathered to review our
ability to prepare, respond, and rebuild, in the wake of the
natural disasters of 2017.
Before we begin, I would like to extend my heartfelt
condolences to the victims of the recent bombings in my home
city of Austin. These heinous attacks need to stop. No one
should ever be afraid to open their front door and pick up a
package. We will find out who is responsible for these murders
and make sure they are brought to justice.
While they are constant targets of foreign and domestic
terrorists, cybercriminal gangs like MS-13 and human
trafficking, today's hearing will focus on the dangers of
natural disasters.
In 2017, there were 65 major disasters declared. They
included hurricanes that hit my home State of Texas, Florida,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. We also saw dozens of
wildfires burn through thousands of acres and destroy
everything in their path.
After Hurricane Harvey hit Texas, I personally toured the
devastated communities in my district, as well as the city of
Houston. Days of punishing rain, rising rivers, and overflowing
bayous wreaked havoc on much of the State.
This destruction was horrifying. Roads were flooded, many
homes were obliterated, and sadly, many people lost their
lives. But as I witnessed the strength of the Texas spirit that
was the positive. Many volunteers hopped into their boats to
rescue people who were stranded on the rooftops or trapped in a
vehicle. Others waded out into the murky waters filled with
snakes and fire ants to save their loved ones or even to help a
stranger.
Texans helping Texans rose to the challenge and assisted
one another during a very tough time. Strong coordination at
the local, State, and Federal levels with FEMA and Army Corps
of Engineers played a key role as well. I commend the efforts
of the response in Hurricane Harvey.
This kind of teamwork was also evident in Florida after
Hurricane Irma. Unfortunately, Hurricane Maria completely
shattered Puerto Rico. Even today much of the island is still
struggling to recover. It is important that we learn from the
lessons of each of these storms, so we are better prepared in
the future.
Natural disasters bring a lot of harm, but they also
provide an opportunity to put our differences aside and work
together. I am proud to say that both parties came together to
pass a supplemental relief package that provided billions of
dollars to the Disaster Relief Fund and the National Flood
Insurance Program. It is always our goal to make sure FEMA has
the resources and capabilities it needs before it is called
into action.
The first-ever comprehensive reauthorization of DHS that
passed the House in July will strengthen our first responders
and front-line defenders. I am encouraged that the Senate has
finally taken action on this reauthorization bill, and I hope
to have that passed soon and sent to the President.
I would also like to personally thank each of today's
witnesses for being with us here this morning. Shortly after
Hurricane Harvey, I met with Administrator Long at FEMA's
headquarters to receive a briefing during the initial recovery.
While there I could see first-hand the dedication and
professionalism of the men and women who sprung into action
during that time of crisis.
I am very grateful for their service and for the efforts
and all of our partners at the Federal, State, and local level.
With that I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
March 15, 2018
This morning our committee has gathered to review our ability to
prepare, respond, and rebuild, in the wake of the natural disasters of
2017.
Before we begin, I would like to extend my heartfelt condolences to
the victims of the recent bombings in my home city of Austin.
These heinous attacks need to stop. No one should ever be afraid to
open their front door and pick up a package.
We will find out who is responsible for these murders and make sure
they are brought to justice.
While the American people are constant targets of foreign and
domestic terrorists, cyber criminals, gangs like MS-13, and human
traffickers, today's hearing will focus on the dangers of natural
disasters.
In 2017 there were 65 major disasters declared. They included
hurricanes that hit my home State of Texas, Florida, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and Puerto Rico. We also saw dozens of wildfires burn through
thousands of acres and destroy everything in their path.
After Hurricane Harvey hit Texas, I personally toured the
devastated communities in my district, as well as the city of Houston.
Days of punishing rain, rising rivers, and overflowing bayous
wreaked havoc on much of the State. The destruction was horrifying.
Roads were flooded and many homes were obliterated. Sadly, many people
lost their lives.
But I also witnessed the strength of the Texas spirit. Many
volunteers hopped into their boats to rescue people who were stranded
on their roof or trapped in a vehicle.
Others waded out into murky waters filled with snakes and fire ants
to save their loved ones or even a complete stranger.
Texans helping Texans rose to the challenge and assisted one
another during a very tough time.
Strong coordination on the local, State, and Federal levels with
FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers played a key role as well. This
kind of teamwork was also evident in Florida after Hurricane Irma.
Unfortunately, Hurricane Maria completely shattered Puerto Rico.
Even today much of the island is still struggling to recover.
It's important that we learn from the lessons of each of these
storms so we are better prepared in the future.
Natural disasters bring a lot of harm, but they also provide an
opportunity to put our differences aside and work together.
I am proud to say that both parties came together to pass
supplemental relief packages that provide billions of dollars to the
Disaster Relief Fund and the National Flood Insurance Program.
It is always our goal to make sure FEMA has the resources and
capabilities it needs before it is called into action.
The first-ever, comprehensive reauthorization of DHS that passed
the House in July strengthens our first responders and front-line
defenders.
I am encouraged that the Senate has finally started to take action
on this and I am hopeful a reauthorization of DHS will be sent to the
President soon.
I'd like to personally thank each of today's witnesses for being
with us this morning. Shortly after Hurricane Harvey, I met with
Administrator Long at FEMA's headquarters to receive a briefing during
the initial recovery.
While there I could see first-hand, the dedication and
professionalism of the men and women who spring into action during a
natural disaster.
I am very grateful for their service and for the efforts of all of
our partners at the Federal, State, and local level.
I now recognize Ranking Member Thompson for an opening statement.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To begin,
today I would also like to express my condolences to the
families of the victims of the recent Austin packaging
bombings. My thoughts and prayers are with those who lost their
lives, as well as the survivors.
Turning to today's hearing, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we
were originally scheduled to have FEMA Administrator Brock Long
before this committee in November of last year. Unfortunately,
you abruptly canceled the hearing after the Democrats invited
the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico to testify about the effects
of Hurricane Maria on her community.
That troubling turn of events occurred shortly after
Administrator Long publicly stated that he had filtered out the
mayor a long time ago. I am not sure when it becomes acceptable
to be dismissive of an official representing an American city
devastated by a natural disaster.
Next week marks 6 months since Hurricane Maria made
landfall on Puerto Rico, sending the island into darkness and
changing life for nearly 3.3 million Americans. Still today,
thousands of Puerto Ricans, or 10 percent of the population,
have yet to have power restored.
The Puerto Rican economy continues to struggle as a result
of the devastation to infrastructure, homes, and businesses.
Hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans have moved to the
mainland in the wake of the storm, perhaps never to return.
So while I am pleased the committee is finally holding this
important hearing, to say it is long overdue would be an
understatement.
The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was among the most
active on record with 17 named storms. Three major storms
caused devastation in Texas, Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
and Puerto Rico. The response to those storms by the Trump
administration was a study in contrast.
After Harvey, President Trump tweeted, Texas, we are with
you today. We are with you tomorrow, and we will be with you
every single day after to restore, recover, and rebuild.
President later visited the affected area just 4 days later.
This is what Americans expect from the President and their
Federal Government in the wake of disaster.
Similarly, after Hurricane Irma struck Florida, President
Trump tweeted, Just like Texas, we are with you today. We are
with you tomorrow and we will be with you every single day
after to restore, recover, and rebuild. Again, the President
visited 4 days later, as it should be.
But after Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico and parts
of the U.S. Virgin Islands, President Trump's words and actions
were decidedly different. He tweeted: We cannot keep FEMA, the
military, and the first responders who have been amazing under
the most difficult circumstances in Puerto Rico forever.
The President also said the government of Puerto Rico
wanted everything to be done for them and accused officials of
poor leadership. When he finally showed up in Puerto Rico 2
weeks after the storm made landfall, he chucked rolls of paper
towels at survivors.
President Trump did not even bother to visit the U.S.
Virgin Islands. For an American President to behave in such a
way is beyond the pale. Keeping with the President's action,
the Federal Government's response was decidedly different after
each storm.
FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before
Hurricane Harvey made landfall on August 25 and shortly
thereafter the Federal Government had more than 31,000 of
Federal employees on the ground in support of the response.
FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3 million liters of
water for Harvey survivors.
Likewise for Irma, there were more than 40,000 Federal
personnel, including 2,600 FEMA staff, on the ground just
before the storm struck on September 10. FEMA also provided 6.6
million meals and 4.7 million liters of water to the region in
the days just after Irma made landfall.
The Trump administration's response to Maria was far slower
and smaller. Even weeks after the storm, there were only a
fraction of the Federal personnel on the ground in Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands as has been deployed to Texas and
Florida.
Food and water were in short supply. The Federal contracts
to provide essentials like tarps and meals were botched,
further slowing the response. Electrical outages to critical
facilities like hospitals required doctors in Puerto Rico to
perform life-saving surgery using the light of their cell
phones.
Doctors in the U.S. Virgin Islands saw the only hospital on
St. Thomas badly damaged, rendering its medical floor and
cancer treatment facility unusable. Despite the devastation, it
took 43 days for President Trump to approve public assistance
program disaster aid to Puerto Rico, quadruple the amount of
time it took to approve such assistance to Texas and Florida.
I understand the delay was due to the Trump
administration's imposing conditions on this aid never before
required of any community, a deal some have called the Puerto
Rico Special.
Meanwhile, the President found the time to spend several
days at his Trump properties golfing, holding multiple
fundraisers, fighting with NFL players about taking a knee
during a game, and tweet about everything from fake news to the
Russian hoax. That is not the kind of leadership the people of
Puerto Rico or any American affected by disasters expect or
deserve.
Today I hope to hear from our first panel of witnesses
about how the Federal Government is using funding approved by
Congress to support response and recovery in communities hit by
hurricanes, wildfires, and other recent disasters.
I am particularly interested in hearing from Administrator
Long about the lessons learned from these disasters and how
FEMA can be a better prepared to respond in the future. For the
witnesses on our second panel, I hope to hear your perspective
on the Federal response and what we can do to support your
recovery going forward.
FEMA's mission is supposed to be helping people before,
during, and after disasters. It is our job to conduct the
oversight necessary to ensure the agency fulfills that mission,
so I look forward to our discussion today.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 15, 2018
We were originally scheduled to have FEMA Administrator Brock Long
before this committee in November of last year. Unfortunately, you
abruptly canceled the hearing after the Democrats invited the Mayor of
San Juan, Puerto Rico to testify about the effects of Hurricane Maria
on her community. That troubling turn of events occurred shortly after
Administrator Long publicly stated that he had ``filtered out the Mayor
a long time ago.'' I am not sure when it became acceptable to be
dismissive of an official representing an American city devastated by a
natural disaster.
Next week marks 6 months since Hurricane Maria made landfall on
Puerto Rico, sending the island into darkness and changing life for
nearly 3.3 million Americans. Still today, thousands of Puerto Ricans,
or 10 percent of the population, have yet to have their power restored.
The Puerto Rican economy continues to struggle as a result of the
devastation to infrastructure, homes, and businesses. Hundreds of
thousands of Puerto Ricans have moved to the mainland in the wake of
the storm, perhaps never to return.
So, while I am pleased the committee is finally holding this
important hearing, to say it is long overdue would be an
understatement. The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was among the most
active on record, with 17 named storms. Three major storms caused
destruction in Texas, Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto
Rico. The response to those storms by the Trump administration was a
study in contrasts.
After Harvey, President Trump tweeted, ``Texas: We are with you
today, we are with you tomorrow, and we will be with you EVERY SINGLE
DAY AFTER, to restore, recover, and REBUILD.'' President Trump visited
the affected area just 4 days later. This is what Americans expect from
the President and their Federal Government in the wake of disaster.
Similarly, after Hurricane Irma struck Florida, President Trump
tweeted, ``Just like TX, WE are w/you today, we are w/you tomorrow, &
we will be w/you EVERY SINGLE DAY AFTER, to RESTORE, RECOVER, and
REBUILD.'' Again, the President visited 4 days later, as it should be.
But after Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico and part of the
U.S. Virgin Islands, President Trump's words and actions were decidedly
different. He tweeted, ``We cannot keep FEMA, the Military & the First
Responders, who have been amazing (under the most difficult
circumstances) in P.R. forever!''
The President also said the government of Puerto Rico wanted
``everything to be done for them'' and accused officials of ``poor
leadership.'' When he finally showed up in Puerto Rico 2 weeks after
the storm made landfall, he chucked rolls of paper towels at survivors.
President Trump did not even bother to visit the U.S. Virgin Islands.
For an American president to behave in such a way is beyond the pale.
In keeping with the President's actions, the Federal Government's
response was decidedly different after each storm. FEMA had supplies
and personnel pre-positioned before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on
August 25 and, shortly thereafter, the Federal Government had more than
31,000 of Federal employees on the ground in support of the response.
FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3 million liters of water for
Harvey survivors. Likewise, for Irma, there were more than 40,000
Federal personnel, including 2,650 FEMA staff, on the ground just days
after the storm struck on September 10. FEMA also provided 6.6 million
meals and 4.7 million liters of water to the region in the days just
after Irma made landfall.
The Trump administration's response to Maria was far slower and
smaller. Even weeks after the storm, there were only a fraction of the
Federal personnel on the ground in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as had been deployed to Texas and Florida. Food and water were
in short supply, and Federal contracts to provide essentials like tarps
and meals were botched, further slowing the response.
Electrical outages to critical facilities like hospitals required
doctors in Puerto Rico to perform lifesaving surgery using the light of
their cell phones. Doctors in the U.S. Virgin Islands saw the only
hospital on St. Thomas badly damaged, rendering its medical floor and
cancer treatment facility unusable.
Despite the devastation, it took 43 DAYS for President Trump to
approve Public Assistance Program disaster aid to Puerto Rico,
quadruple the amount of time it took to approve such assistance to
Texas and Florida. I understand the delay was due to the Trump
administration imposing conditions on this aid never before required of
any other community, a deal some have called the ``Puerto Rico
special.''
Meanwhile, the President found the time to spend several days at
his Trump properties golfing, hold multiple fundraisers, fight with NFL
players about taking a knee during games, and tweet about everything
from ``fake news'' to the ``Russia hoax.'' That is not the kind of
leadership the people of Puerto Rico, or any Americans affected by
disasters, expect or deserve.
Today, I hope to hear from our first panel of witnesses about how
the Federal Government is using funding approved by Congress to support
response and recovery in communities hit by hurricanes, wildfires, and
other recent disasters. I am particularly interested in hearing from
Administrator Long about the lessons learned from these disasters and
how FEMA can be better prepared to respond in the future. For the
witnesses on our second panel, I hope to hear your perspectives on the
Federal response and what we can do to support your recovery going
forward.
FEMA's mission is supposed to be ``helping people before, during,
and after disasters.'' It is our job to conduct the oversight necessary
to ensure the agency fulfills that mission, so I look forward to our
discussion today.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, you recognized two Members who
are here, Ms. Plaskett and Ms. Velazquez, and I ask unanimous
consent that they be allowed to give their statement at this
time.
Chairman McCaul. Yes. Yes, Without objection, so ordered.
Other Members are reminded that statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
March 15, 2018
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for this
hearing that will engage Federal, State, and local witnesses regarding
FEMA's disaster preparedness and response capabilities during the
historic events of Hurricane Season 2017.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.
Panel I, The Honorable William B. ``Brock'' Long, Administrator,
FEMA, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Major General Donald E.
``Ed'' Jackson, Jr., Deputy Commanding General for Civil and Emergency
Operations, United States Army Corps of Engineers; and The Honorable
John V. Kelly, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security (Democratic Witness).
Panel II, Mr. Wesley Maul, Director, Division of Emergency
Management, State of Florida; The Honorable Jose E. Melendez-Ortiz,
Vice-Chairman, House Committee on Federal and International Relations,
and Status, Puerto Rico House of Representatives; Mr. Reed Clay,
Counselor and Chief Operating Officer, the Office of Governor Greg
Abbott, State of Texas; and The Honorable Carmen Yulin Cruz Soto,
Mayor, San Juan, Puerto Rico (Democratic Witness).
The Hurricane Season of 2017 was both historic and horrific for
residents of Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
Harvey, Irma, Jose, and Maria took lives, damaged communities.
Our National resolve must be firm in staying the course on the
necessary work to rebuild and restore communities completely.
I will speak on the needs and experiences of my Houston District
and surrounding area, but I first want to speak to the tragic situation
that occurred when our Nation failed to respond to the imminent and
articulable threat posed by Hurricane Maria to the Island of Puerto
Rico.
Hurricane Maria slammed into Puerto Rico with 155 miles-per-hour
winds with predictable catastrophic results that were compounded by a
lack of follow-up work that should have considered the logistics of
delivery of prepositioned supplies on the island being delivered to
hard-hit areas in rural and mountain regions.
There was not a resident on the island of Puerto Rico who was not a
storm survivor and for this reason alone any plan to depend on local
drivers to drive tractor trailers over damaged roads and failing
infrastructure was not realistic.
The delay in bringing in the military, which is the go-to agency
for large-scale events, was too slow for the scope of Maria's damage to
the island.
The lack of planning to get to people who were without power and
likely in danger of succumbing to illness and medication-dependent
treatments like diabetes.
The controversy over not having accurate official reports of storm-
related deaths, which are reported as 66, but credible investigations
in to deaths put the figures on the death over 1,000 from Hurricane
Maria.
Following Hurricane Maria and the island-wide disruption in
electric power led to granting a $20 million contract to a electric
utility company that reportedly employed 3 employees in its small
Colorado office, but later was dropped when it became public.
Puerto Rico has the Nation's largest manufacturer of saline
solution that is used routinely in hospitals around the Nation was shut
down due to storm damage.
A National shortage of saline was caused by the Hurricane Maria
damage at the beginning of a peak in flu around the Nation.
Hurricane Harvey left the Texas coast struggling with recovery
following the largest housing disaster in our Nation's history.
hurricane harvey by the numbers
Hurricane Harvey was a Category 4 storm that hit Texas on August
25, 2017.
Harvey made landfall along the Texas coast three separate times in
6 days.
The nine-county Houston metro area impacted by Hurricane Harvey
covers 9,444 square miles, an area larger than five States, including
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
Harris County, Texas covers 1,778 square miles, enough space to fit
New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Seattle, Austin, and
Dallas, with room still to spare.
There was over 41,500 square miles of land mass impacted by
Hurricane Harvey and the subsequent flooding that covered an area
larger than the States of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont combined.
Hurricane Harvey dropped 21 trillion gallons of rainfall on Texas
and Louisiana, most of it on the Houston Metroplex.
In September 2017, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory reported that
Hurricane Harvey's rainfall created 275 trillion pounds of water, which
caused the crust in and around Houston to deform and sink nearly 2
inches because of the weight.
Harvey dropped 51.88 inches of rain near Cedar Bayou, the highest
total ever recorded for a single U.S. weather event.
At its peak on September 1, 2017, one-third of Houston was under
water.
At the peak on August 31, there were 34,575 evacuees in shelters
across Texas.
Hurricane Harvey is the largest housing disaster to strike the
United States in our Nation's history.
Hurricane Harvey damaged 203,000 homes, of which 12,700 were
destroyed.
In November 18,292 hotel rooms in over 1,500 hotels where still
occupied by persons displaced by Hurricane Harvey.
Thousands of others with severe damage to their homes are living
with family or friends.
A 889,425 people have registered for assistance with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
In October 2017, I requested and received a status report on
Housing Assistance Claims from FEMA.
At that time there were 270,000 applications for Housing Assistance
in Houston and the surrounding area.
There were systemic problems with:
staffing up with sufficient numbers of FEMA Claim
Inspectors;
insufficient notice to residents of storm damaged homes to
be able to meet FEMA Claim Inspectors at their property for an
assessment;
No use of social media to keep property owners informed
regarding progress to reach them for an inspection.
No ability to use housing options like Air-BNB, which could
accommodate Harvey-displaced persons who found shelter with
family members, friends, or strangers.
No ability to accept requests for assistance from more than
one claimant for each address--ignoring those multi-
generational homes are a reality in Houston.
No grant program for small businesses who may not qualify
for a SBA Loan.
On March 5, 2018, I held a Road to Recovery Town Hall meeting at
Kashmere High School located in the 18th Congressional District.
I thank you Administrator Long for providing FEMA participation in
that important Town Hall meeting, FEMA Claims Experts to work one-on-
one with residents who were in need of assistance regarding claims
denials or who may be in housing that is transitional, or temporary
such as the case if you are living with family, friends, or in hotels.
The Red Cross also participated in this important Town Hall to
share their experience with working victims of Hurricane Katrina and
Sandy during the long-term recoveries that took place following those
disasters.
Over 300 people attending that Town Hall to seek assistance in
resolving FEMA claim application denials.
This was only one neighborhood of the hundreds of neighborhoods
impacted by Hurricane Harvey.
We need to do more events of this nature to get help to those who
are in need of assistance.
In October 2017, there were 164,253 who were ineligible for
assistance; 116,214 had claims denied because of insufficient damage;
19,962 were ineligible because of possible duplication; 1,298 missed
inspections, and 8,229 had not contact information on their FEMA
Application.
In Texas FEMA's role in disaster preparedness, and response was
effective, but the long-term recovery is not moving at a pace that
would assure that we are meeting the true need that exists.
congresswoman jackson lee's efforts post-hurricane harvey
Ten days following Hurricane Harvey, I introduced H.R. 3686, the
Hurricane Harvey Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2017, that would
provide nearly $174 billion to help those impacted by the storm and
their communities to recover.
H.R. 3686 was introduced with 44 original sponsors, who joined me
in supporting funding for Texas Hurricane Harvey Recovery.
The bill's $174 billion in funding provided by H.R. 3686 represents
a comprehensive response commensurate to the challenge; specifically my
legislation provides relief in the following amounts:
1. Housing and Community Development Fund: $50 billion
2. FEMA Disaster Relief Fund: $35 billion
3. Army Corps of Engineers--Construction: $15 billion
4. Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies: $13 billion
5. Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program: $33 billion
6. Small Business Disaster Loans Program: $2 billion
7. Emergency Conservation Activities: $650 million
8. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: $321 million
9. National Aeronautics and Space Administration: $50 million
10. Legal Services Corporation: $10 million
11. Army National Guard: $10 million
12. Army Corps of Engineers--Civil Investigations: $150 million
13. Coast Guard: $450 million
14. National Park Service Historic Preservation Fund: $800 million
15. EPA Environmental Programs and Management: $2.5 billion
16. EPA Hazardous Substance Superfund: $7 million
17. Leaking Underground Storage Tank Fund: $15 million
18. State and Tribal Assistance Grants: $600 million
19. Employment and Training Services: $100 million
20. Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund: $2.5 billion
21. Airport and Airway Trust Fund: $90 million
22. Federal-Aid Highways Emergency Relief Program: $6.5 billion
I also introduce H.R. 3990, the Small Business Hurricane Harvey
Recovery Grants bill to assist small businesses in their recovery
following the storm to make sure that neighborhood businesses are able
to recover along with the entire community.
a new jackson lee bill to address fema disaster long-term recovery
Administrator Long, I want to thank your staff for working with my
Policy Director on the initial phase of my outline of a bill to address
FEMA Disaster Long-Term Recovery, while ensuring that the important
work of disaster response is improved upon.
I will be introducing a comprehensive FEMA Disaster Recovery bill
to address post-disaster long-term recovery challenges faced by
individuals, families, business owners, as well as local and State
governments.
FEMA has done an exemplary job at disaster response.
FEMA is invaluable for is ability to plan, coordinate, and execute
very complex plans to meet the disaster response and mitigation needs
of local and State governments through collaboration and cooperation
among a broad range of Federal Government agencies.
However, there is room for improvement in the area of long-term
recovery.
I have listened, and watched as thousands of residents, business
owners, families, schools, and local governments have struggled to make
it back from this disaster and I am committed to making sure that you
have a partner for the long haul.
My bill will address the need for councilors and advisors to
support individuals, families, and small businesses through the use of
a casework structure that seeks collaborations with State and local
government offices, as well as, nonprofits to make sure that each
survivor or victim of a designated Federal long-term disaster recovery
effort as determined under the perimeters of my bill will be assigned a
counselor who will work with them from the moment they seek assistance
through each stage of the recovery process until they are back in their
home or secure long-term housing after the storm or have been
resettled.
After all, we are all individuals, with unique disaster
experiences, challenges, strengthens, and opportunities that makes
recovery a collective and individual journey.
My bill will use quantifiable measures to determine when a
``Federal Declared Disaster Long-Term Recovery Project'' would be
triggered.
The bill would establish a means for local and State governments to
be central to the decision-making process regarding the recovery of
areas under their jurisdiction.
Finally, my bill will assure that long-term recovery projects
established under this FEMA Reform bill will have strict sunset
provisions that are linked to the work related to long-term recovery.
The big lesson from disasters that occurred in 2017 is that the
Nation must be able to manage multiple catastrophic events at a single
time.
The bill that I will be introducing will speak to the experiences
that many of you have shared with me.
other efforts to aid recovery
I worked with the Chair and Ranking Member of the House
Appropriations Committee to get funding to support a strong Texas
Recovery effort at every opportunity.
As the House considered Supplemental Appropriations bills H.R. 2266
and H.R. 1892, I focused on making sure key provisions that would help
those recovering from Hurricane Harvey were included.
house supplemental appropriations bills
In September 2017, the House passed a bill providing relief for
Hurricane Harvey, H.R. 2266, the Additional Supplemental Appropriations
for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017.
That bill provides:
FEMA: $18.67 billion to replenish the Disaster Relief Fund
(DRF) and assist the on-going Federal response to hurricanes;
$4.9 billion of this total is authorized for transfer to the
Community Disaster Loan program;
Flood Insurance: Cancels $16 billion in existing National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) debt, which will soon exhaust
all financial resources;
SNAP: Allows up to $1.27 billion in previously-appropriated
funding to be available for disaster-related nutrition
assistance in Puerto Rico; and
Wildfires: Provides $576.5 million for Federal wildfire
suppression.
h.r. 1892 emergency disaster relief funding
In February 2018, the House passed H.R. 1892, to provide additional
appropriations of $89.3 billion in emergency supplemental
appropriations to help States, communities, businesses, and individuals
respond and recover from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the
California wildfires.
I worked to make sure that key provisions were included in H.R.
1892, which were as follows:
1. Authority to establish and implement a $1 billion pilot program
to provide small business disaster recovery grants, modeled on
H.R. 3930, the ``Hurricane Harvey Small Business Recovery
Grants Act,'' legislation I introduced on October 3, 2017 and
is co-sponsored by 16 Members of the House of Representatives.
2. $75 million for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Investigations
account, which is to be used in areas affected by Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and can be used to finance the $3
million Houston-Area Watershed Assessment Study.
3. This is a highly successful conclusion to the multi-year
struggle I waged to secure House approval of this project and
funding with the Jackson Lee Amendments to the Energy and Water
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Years 2016, 2017, and 2018.
4. The bill also includes helpful legislative language to ensure
that in awarding CDBG-Disaster Relief funds to States, the
Secretary of HUD should to the maximum extent practicable award
grants to units of local government and public housing
authorities that have the financial and administrative capacity
to manage a grant awarded under the program.
5. The bill also includes a provision for which I advocated
expressly providing that religious nonprofit organizations and
houses of worship have the same opportunity to qualify for
disaster assistance as their secular counterparts.
role of the federal government
The Federal Government should not run every aspect of our lives--
but it is an umbrella on a rainy day--it is a shelter in a powerful
storm.
The Federal Government is help when no other source of help can
meet the challenges of long-term recovery we may be facing is
sufficient.
Hurricane Harvey meets this test.
I look forward to today's hearing.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Just for the record, for the Members, the
mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico was invited to attend this
hearing and unfortunately she could not make it today.
Mr. Thompson. Well, she is actually in the hospital.
Chairman McCaul. Yes, and that is why I said unfortunately.
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have two distinguished
panels of witnesses before us today on this important topic.
Our first includes the Honorable Brock Long, the administrator
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Next we have Major-General Donald Jackson, deputy
commanding general of the Civil and Emergency Operations at the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, and finally, Mr. John
Kelly, not the chief of staff but rather then-acting inspector
general of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
The witness' full written statements will be included in
the record.
The Chair now recognizes Administrator Long for his opening
statement. Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. ``BROCK'' LONG, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Long. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson,
distinguished Members of the committee, it is an honor to be
here before you in the spirit of improvement. I am here to talk
about FEMA's I believe Herculean efforts to put forward
response and recovery efforts to help millions of Americans.
There is always room for improvement. I am the agency's worst
critic by all means.
I have been in this job 9 months and I realize that we have
a long way to go, not just as FEMA but as a whole community. It
is going to--disaster response and recovery the proper way has
to be Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-executed,
and that is the model that we have got to put forward.
I hope today to unveil a new strategic plan right here in
this committee, not only to you but to the public today. I know
that we have a slide that I would like to display, if possible,
that I will break down here in a minute.
To put this season into context by numbers is nearly
impossible. The numbers are huge. What we went through, if you
look at just Harvey, Irma, Maria, and the California wildfires,
each one of these events could have been catastrophic in their
own right, much less happening weeks, you know, in rapid
succession.
We estimate that roughly 47 million people were impacted by
these events. That is 15 percent, 16 percent of the United
States population. You know, 47 million people were forced to
act to take a protective action, whether they were asked to
shelter in place, evacuate, or whether they lost their home.
It is a tremendous effort to help that amount of people in
this country, and we have got a long way to go to improve.
On the response side, the Federal Government's efforts to
coordinate search-and-rescue teams can be credited with saving
9,000 lives. There were thousands and thousands more saved at
the local level by first responders and State responders and
neighbor helping neighbor.
On the recovery side, just to put this into context, we
registered 4.7 million people into our individual assistance
processes to help kickstart recovery. I can't make people
whole, but what we can do is put forward an assistance to help
kickstart their recovery.
That number is more than Hurricane Katrina, Sandy, Wilma,
and Rita combined and packed into 3, 4, or 5 months in that
time period. Today, we still get 13,000 calls a day for
assistance that this agency is trying to work through and
process.
We learned a lot of lessons. We learned that we have got to
work with our private-sector partners to build redundant and
resilient communications backbones so that we don't lose
communications and the ability to communicate with one another,
not only as responders but to our citizens during the response.
We have got to streamline a Federal Government-fragmented
recovery process. Aid comes down from 17 different agencies. It
is confusing. Governors and mayors don't know what they are
entitled to and how to use it for the greatest good. I am
willing to take the approach to help Congress formulate a more
streamlined approach.
We also have to fix the housing. I am going to ask you for
support to help me fix housing and give more granting
authorities to Governors going forward to give Governors to put
them in this--to give them more control to understand how to
help their communities recover from housing missions and not
just have it solely on FEMA's shoulders.
There is nothing more important than the trained emergency
manager. We have implemented 4,700, roughly, local hires. We
have hired roughly 1,300 of the best and brightest Puerto
Ricans to help us go through the response and recovery.
Technically I might be one of the largest employers over the
next couple months within the commonwealth.
We are training them to be emergency managers. We are
creating a backbone of emergency management that did not exist
before the storm, not only for the commonwealth but for the 78
municipalities. The same thing is being done for the Virgin
Islands and other States as well.
We have to invest more in pre-disaster mitigation to reduce
the impacts of what we just saw. We have got to put more money
up front rather than on the back end. It makes no sense the way
we do that in this country.
We have to simplify processes. I have had numerous
conversations with many of you about things that get in the
way. This agency had to perform 2.3 million home inspections.
Put your mind around that for a minute. It takes a lot of
people to perform that many. It is a slow, cumbersome process
that slows recovery down.
I am asking to do away with the majority of the inspection
process and use technology and trust the disaster survivor
rather than set up risk-averse systems to protect solely for
fraud that draws the system out.
Going forward, the strategic plan, we asked our
constituents to--and I asked specifically what do you want FEMA
to be good at? Where do you want us to be? What do we need to
do? How do we need to get there?
We reached out to our State and local partners. We reached
out to nongovernmental organizations. We got 2,300 comments
back. As a result, we did a trend analysis and we developed
three major goals that my agency is going to strive for going
forward. We are asking other agencies involved at the State and
local levels to also embrace this as a unified approach.
We have to have a unified approach going forward in
disaster response and recovery. The three goals are: One, we
don't have a true culture of preparedness in this country. Our
citizens are not prepared. We have to realistically design
approaches to get them to be financially ready. We have to get
them to be--we have got to teach them tangible skills like CPR
again, and go back to the old civil defense days of being
ready.
We also have to do more pre-disaster mitigation. We have to
close the insurance gap. Far too many people are uninsured or
underinsured and that is not right. Those who are insured will
recover a lot quicker than those that are not. Help me overcome
this problem.
The second goal is ready the Nation for catastrophic
disasters. We are not ready for the load and no-notice big
events like the New Madrid earthquakes or nation-state threat.
We have a lot of work to do. I am asking for help.
What I am going to be asking for is we have to have
commodity contracts, for example, the ability to do water,
food, and MREs or hygiene kits in place at all levels of
government. If you are expecting FEMA to do it, that is not a
sound plan.
I am wanting to move my staff out of the agency offices in
our regional offices and headquarters and I want to put them
and embed them every day with State and local agencies and move
out so that I can be part of the conversation every day.
Not just being seen in the response and the recovery round,
but I want to be seen every day planning, training, exercising,
and executing together.
Finally, the third goal, reduce the complexity of FEMA. As
I said, I am my own worst critic. I know we have to to
streamline some processes, specifically we have got to
streamline the disaster survivor process. We have to streamline
the disaster grantee and subgrantee process, and that takes a
lot of work.
Ultimately, I am asking for your help. I am committed to
leading FEMA to ultimately help prepare this Nation and make it
more resilient. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]
Prepared Statement of William B. ``Brock'' Long
March 15, 2018
introduction
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members
of the Committee. My name is Brock Long, and I am the administrator of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I'd like to thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the historic disaster season of 2017,
the lessons we've learned, and my plans for the future of FEMA.
I have been in office for just over 8 months, and I am proud to be
part of an agency that, every day, is helping communities reduce the
risks associated with future disasters, as well as assisting disaster
survivors all across the country. Shortly after I was sworn in,
Hurricane Harvey struck Texas and Louisiana. Then, Hurricane Irma swept
through the Caribbean, striking the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico,
Georgia, South Carolina, the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and the entire
State of Florida. Hurricane Maria followed, striking a devastating blow
to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. These hurricanes were
followed by devastating wildfires and mudslides in California.
My team at FEMA has been working around the clock for more than 6
months to support the needs of the survivors of these disasters. We
have worked tirelessly to support State, local, Tribal, and territorial
(SLTT) partners to respond to and recover from disasters, and to
mitigate against future disasters. We have faced and overcome many
challenges, but we have a long way to go in some areas. In my testimony
today, I would like to share with you some of our experiences in recent
months, the lessons we are learning in this historic time, my strategic
vision for the future of FEMA, as well as the next steps FEMA is taking
to prepare for disasters.
2017 hurricane season review
Last year's historic hurricane season was a true test of the
Nation's ability to respond to and recover from multiple concurrent
disasters. Three major hurricanes--Harvey, Irma, and Maria--made
landfall along the Gulf Coast, in the Southeast, and in Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. The impacts of these storms, in addition to
the California wildfires, cannot be overstated. Roughly 47 million
people were affected by these events--roughly 15 percent of the entire
U.S. population.
In order to deliver disaster assistance to such a large and
dispersed number of survivors, FEMA worked in concert with our Federal
partner agencies, SLTT governments, and also non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and the private sector to ensure a unity of effort
that serves the needs of disaster survivors.
In disaster response operations, FEMA's sole focus is saving lives
and protecting property. We train, exercise, and evaluate our planning
assumptions with our SLTT partners. We make plans based on the best
information we can gather from the public and private sectors about the
impacts that different types of threats may have on a community or
region. We know that no disaster ever goes according to our plans, so
we must adapt to the circumstances as they develop. It is not possible
to successfully respond to the impact of a major hurricane without
errors. But our goal is to ensure that any errors that occur are a
result of overestimating need, not underestimating it. It is easy to
forget that in addition to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, we also
had two other major hurricanes threaten our Nation--Hurricanes Jose and
Nate. While Jose never made landfall, we had to plan and prepare for it
in case it did. Nate did make landfall, striking Alabama and
Mississippi in the Gulf Coast resulting in Major Disaster Declarations
in each State.
At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery,
decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we improve,
minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their worst day. We also
are eager to work with Congress and this committee in its oversight
capacity to determine if legislative changes are required, and to
ensure that we are executing our programs consistent with Congressional
intent. We have learned, and will continue to learn, from this historic
disaster season.
lessons learned
Federally-Supported, State-Managed, Locally-Executed
Some lessons we learn are not new to us, but an affirmation of
lessons learned in the past. For example, the optimal disaster response
is Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-executed. This
concept is well-known throughout the emergency management community,
but this season provided a good case study in why this is important.
All disasters are local, and local governments respond to an untold
number of disasters every year. When the resources required to respond
to a disaster exceed local capacity, the local government will call
upon neighboring jurisdictions to bring in the additional resources
needed. Local governments can, and periodically do, turn to county or
State governments for additional resources.
When a Governor or Tribal leader turns to the President requesting
Federal assistance, and the President agrees to activate Federal
resources to support a disaster-stricken State, Tribe, or territory,
the Governor or Tribal leader continues to support the local
governments impacted by the disaster. Congress has provided FEMA
authorities and resources to support Governors and Tribal leaders, but
not to supplant them or the local leaders.
FEMA's ability to provide support in disasters builds on, and is
subject to, the capacity of State, territorial, Tribal, and local
governments. This is not a new lesson or challenge, but one that we are
constantly reminded of. If the State, territorial, Tribal, and local
governments are well-resourced, well-trained, and well-organized, the
effectiveness of FEMA's assistance is great. If, on the other hand, a
State, territorial, Tribal, or local government is not well-resourced,
well-trained, and well-organized--either due to ineffective
preparations or due to the significance of the disaster itself--FEMA
can help, but the response may not be as quick or as effective as we
would like it to be.
Survivable and Redundant Communications
In order for FEMA to support the needs of any Governor effectively,
the capability gaps at all levels of government must be communicated
effectively to FEMA. We saw in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria that
their communications infrastructure was so completely devastated that
assessing the needs and the capability of the Commonwealth and local
governments was extremely difficult.
In Puerto Rico, little of the communications infrastructure
survived the hurricane. FEMA quickly worked to ensure that each of the
78 municipalities in Puerto Rico got access to satellite phones so that
they could communicate with the Commonwealth that was co-located with
FEMA. Communication with satellite phones has limitations, so FEMA
began placing personnel in each of the municipalities to further
enhance communications between the Commonwealth, local governments, and
FEMA.
While these communications challenges were the result of a major
hurricane, we need to plan for what survivable communications look like
in the context of the potential for a Cascadia or New Madrid earthquake
scenario, or other catastrophic events. We, as a Nation, have more work
to do in this area.
Disaster Sheltering and Housing
The aftermath of the 2017 hurricane season leaves no doubt that
survivor housing is a major challenge. Regardless of the readiness of a
State, territorial, Tribal, or local government, when dealing with the
displacement of tens of thousands of survivors from their homes, there
is no easy or one-size-fits-all solution.
There are many community-based and National non-profit
organizations that do outstanding work in providing temporary
sheltering options for survivors, in order to help survivors have a
safe place to stay while they catch their breath and consider next
steps in the recovery process. Additionally, FEMA has authorities to
provide for sheltering options including the Transitional Sheltering
Assistance (TSA) program that pays for survivors to stay in hotel
rooms, as well as a program that provides for basic and temporary home
repairs to make a home safe and habitable while the survivor makes
arrangements for more permanent repairs. Any sheltering option is, by
design, a temporary, short-term solution, designed to be a bridge to
middle- and longer-term solutions.
We have other programs and authorities that assist with temporary
housing: Rental assistance, multi-family lease program, mobile housing
units, and others. Additionally, we provide survivors assistance with
repairing a damaged home including financial assistance for repair, and
direct assistance for temporary repairs that help return survivors to
their homes.
With all of these options, we partner with our SLTT stakeholder to
identify the sheltering and housing solutions that make most sense for
each State, each event, each community, and each survivor. The State of
Texas, for example, is taking a very hands-on approach to managing
housing solutions for their residents after Hurricane Harvey. States
have a much better familiarity with the needs of their residents, the
local laws and ordinances that can impact some of the FEMA housing
options, and are much better situated to design and administer to the
survivors in their communities. The provision of shelter and temporary
housing is a complicated and difficult process that needs more work.
Regardless of the tools we are able to provide, however, permanent
housing solutions are best addressed by insurance. As we know, though,
there are too many people in our Nation that are underinsured or not
insured at all.
strategic priorities
Throughout this challenging hurricane and wildfire season, I have
seen many practices, programs, and ideas put to test that no intra-
agency brainstorming session could accomplish. These experiences have
informed my Strategic Plan moving forward, to: (1) Build a Culture of
Preparedness; (2) Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters; and (3)
Reduce the Complexity of FEMA.
Build a Culture of Preparedness
FEMA is just one part of the team. During a disaster, citizens in
the impacted communities also become the ``first responders.'' We need
to empower individuals with life skills to help speed the response and
recovery efforts.
Do they know how to shut off water and gas? Do they check on their
neighbors? Do they know CPR? Are they financially prepared to deal with
the impacts of disasters in their communities, including having the
right insurance for the disasters they face--be they flood,
earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.? Do they have some modest level of savings
to allow them to miss a few days of work without ending up in financial
ruin?
Developing resilient communities ahead of an incident reduces loss
of life and economic disruption. When communities are impacted, they
should ensure that they rebuild infrastructure better, tougher, and
stronger to protect taxpayer investment and promote economic stability.
FEMA is exploring ways to encourage additional investments in
mitigation that reduce risk, including pre-disaster mitigation, to help
reduce disaster costs at all levels.
While we'll never be able to eliminate risk, we must mitigate risk.
FEMA will work with communities and insurers to close the insurance gap
across the Nation. Managing risk through insurance, including the
National Flood Insurance Program, helps communities to recover faster
following disasters and reduces costs for taxpayers.
Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters
We can't just continue to plan, train, and exercise for what's
easy. We need to prepare for catastrophic events that stress our
logistics, supply chain, continuity of operations, communications, and
staffing capacities--just to name a few.
Meanwhile, communities must increase their capacity to respond to
smaller-scale disasters--locally. We will continue to work with our
State, territorial, Tribal, and local partners to increase their
capacities to respond and recover from smaller-scale disasters so FEMA
and its Federal partners can focus some more on readiness for
catastrophic events. We need to ensure we're not just ready for
catastrophic hurricanes, but also for other natural disasters and
hybrid threats.
I am placing members of the FEMA team in State emergency operations
centers to jointly plan with States to build this catastrophic
capability.
Reduce the Complexity of FEMA
FEMA is committed to simplifying our processes and putting
survivors first. We must look at ways we can streamline our assistance
programs to make FEMA's programs as clear and easy as possible for
survivors and grantees to navigate.
I have charged my staff with reducing administrative and
bureaucratic burdens, so that survivors and communities receive
assistance more quickly. Throughout the Federal Government, there are a
number of programs that offer assistance to survivors. We are working
with our partners to streamline and consolidate some of these
activities to ensure survivors can better navigate our various
programs.
FEMA employees must have transparency and clarity in the processes
and resources they deal with. We can't implement any of these
priorities and initiatives without ensuring that they meet the needs of
our survivors. We also need to make sure that we continue to capture
lessons learned by FEMA and our partners to meet the needs of survivors
with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.
These are my priorities, and this is my vision. As we examine and
develop these priorities, we will find that some can be accomplished by
existing authorities Congress has already provided to us. There will be
some challenges, however, that cannot be solved by administrative
action alone. As we identify those, we will work closely with this
committee and the rest of Congress to ensure we move forward in close
partnership. All of you have constituents that may one day need FEMA
assistance. I look forward to working with you on our shared goal to
help people before, during, and after disasters.
next steps
As we continue with recovery operations resulting from recent
disasters, FEMA is also focused on making sure we are as prepared as
possible for the upcoming hurricane season. For example, the National
Level Exercise (NLE) 2018 will occur in May. This exercise will examine
the ability of all levels of government, private industry, non-
governmental organizations, communities, and individuals to respond to
and recover from a major hurricane with localized catastrophic impacts.
A series of seminars, workshops, and tabletop exercises are being
developed to address key functional topics. Recent real-world events
will help make NLE 2018 a more realistic, relevant exercise, and help
ensure we are well-prepared for the 2018 hurricane season, and beyond.
NLE 2018 consists of four overarching exercise objectives: Pre-
landfall protective actions; sustained response in parallel with
recovery planning; continuity in a natural disaster; and power outages
and critical interdependencies.
As we do before every hurricane season, we are reviewing our
hurricane response plans and procedures, updating our high-priority
National-level contracts, and enhancing our disaster response
capabilities (for example, FEMA is adding 300 new emergency generators
to our inventory).
Also, thanks to action taken by Congress, FEMA now has new
authorities given to us in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 to further
support the Nation's response and recovery efforts prior to the
upcoming hurricane season.
For example, in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, FEMA may
provide Public Assistance funding for critical services to replace or
restore systems to industry standards without restrictions based on
their pre-disaster condition. The law further allows FEMA to provide
assistance for critical services to replace or restore components of
the facility or system that are not damaged by the disaster when it is
necessary to fully effectuate the replacement or restoration of
disaster-damaged components to restore the function of the facility or
system to industry standards.
Recognizing the importance of mitigation, Congress also included a
provision that directs FEMA to provide hazard mitigation assistance for
recipients of Fire Management Assistance Grants in Fiscal Years 2017
and 2018. The law also codified FEMA's recent policy change to make
houses of worship eligible for Public Assistance repair and replacement
assistance.
conclusion
This last year's hurricane and wildfire season was and is historic,
and is shaping the future of FEMA and emergency management. My
priorities are to build a culture of preparedness, ready the Nation for
catastrophic events, and reduce the complexity of FEMA. I ask this
committee and Congress for your continued support as we undertake these
efforts.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Administrator.
The Chair now recognizes Major General Jackson.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL DONALD E. ``ED'' JACKSON, JR.,
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, CIVIL AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS,
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Jackson. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson,
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
The Corps conducts emergency response activities under two
basic authorities: The Stafford Act and Public Law 84-99. Under
the Stafford Act, we support FEMA under the National response
framework as the lead Federal agency for emergency support
function through a public works and engineering.
ESF-3 provides temporary emergency power, temporary
roofing, debris management, infrastructure assessment, critical
public facility restoration, and temporary housing. Under Pub.
L. 84-99, we plan, prepare for, and recover from disasters in
coordination with local, State, and Federal partners.
When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are
mobilized from across the command to assist local offices with
their response to the event. As part of this mission, the Corps
has more than 50 specially-trained teams supported by emergency
contracts which perform the wide range of ESF-3 support
missions.
The Corps uses pre-awarded contracts that can be quickly
activated for missions, such as debris removal, temporary
roofing, and generator installation.
This year, the Corps has supported FEMA-led Federal
response and recovery operations in support of multiple events,
including wildfires in California and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma,
and Maria. Two of our divisions are currently fighting seasonal
flooding along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers today and their
tributaries.
The Corps was given three mission assignments by FEMA in
support of southern California wildfires and mudslides. Debris
removal is complete in 10 of 11 debris basins and channel
reaches across six cities. We expect this to be complete by the
end of April.
The Corps was given 7 mission assignments by FEMA in
support of northern California wildfires. Eigty-five percent of
private property debris removal and remediation is complete in
Lake, Mendocino, Napa, and Sonoma Counties. We expect this to
be complete by the end of March.
The Corps was given 27 mission assignments by FEMA in
support of Hurricane Harvey response and recovery. This
includes missions in all six ESF-3 mission areas, to include
navigation restoration under our Pub. L. 84-99 authority.
Temporary housing, critical public facilities, and debris
management support is on-going.
The Corps was given 46 Irma-related mission assignments and
39 Maria-related mission assignments by FEMA. This included
missions, again, in all 6 ESF-3 mission areas, to include
navigation restoration, levee and dam safety under our 84-99
authority.
As of this morning, the Corps has completed over 2,100
temporary generator installations in the Caribbean, including
180 in the U.S. Virgin Islands and over 1,900 in Puerto Rico.
The mission is complete in the U.S. Virgin Islands with 890
generators still installed at critical facilities across Puerto
Rico. Under FEMA authority, we continue to assist Puerto Rico
with operation and maintenance of critical non-Federal
generators across the island.
And 5 of 9 1-2 megawatt microgrids installed in support of
power grid restoration in Puerto Rico remain in service today.
This includes one in Vieques. We expect the temporary power
mission to end mid-May.
The Corps has completed over 78,000 temporary roofing
installations, including over 13,000 in Florida, over 3,600 in
the U.S. Virgin Islands and over 59,000 in Puerto Rico.
Missions in Florida and the U.S. Virgin Islands are complete
and we have less than 300 remaining to complete in Puerto Rico.
We expect to be complete by the first week of April.
Corps debris subject-matter experts provided technical
assistance to Florida and Georgia in response to Hurricane
Irma. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, debris removal is 94 percent
complete with final pickup scheduled today for St. Thomas and
St. John.
In Puerto Rico, debris removal is 92 percent complete. Our
debris teams are actively working in 38 municipalities with
debris removal complete in 17 municipalities. We expect to be
complete with all debris removal and disposal by mid-June.
The Corps worked closely with officials in Texas and
Florida to manage local flood control reservoirs during periods
of unprecedented rainfall. In Puerto Rico, Corps dam and levee
teams inspected 17 priority dams and worked closely with the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, or PREPA, to stabilize a
spillway failure at the Guajataca dam.
On 30 September the Corps was given a FEMA mission
assignment under Stafford Act authority to assist the
commonwealth in conducting emergency repairs to the power gird
itself. Unlike our ESF-3 mission areas, the Corps did not have
pre-awarded contracts to use for this effort. Instead, we
competitively awarded contracts for temporary power generation,
line repair, and logistic support and transportation required
to support the mission.
This included acquiring over $283 million in materiels
critical to the restoration effort, many with unique
specifications for the Puerto Rican grid. The Corps is
partnering with PREPA in this effort and have energized almost
92 percent of customers thus far.
In coordination with FEMA, PREPA, and the commonwealth, we
have begun to gradually right-size our contracted work force.
The demobilization of Corps line repair contractors will be
complete late April. Remaining work will be turned over to
crews under the control of PREPA.
The Corps will continue to operate turbines at Palo Seco
and Yabucoa through late April as PREPA completes repairs to
the plants at these sites. Remining materiels will be used to
complete grid repairs and replenish depleted inventories on the
island through mid-May.
The Corps remains committed and capable of executing its
other civil works activities across the Nation despite our
heavy involvement in these on-going response and recovery
operations. We also remain ready and poised to assist in future
events as they may occur.
This concludes my testimony, and I look forward to
answering any questions you might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Donald E. ``Ed'' Jackson, Jr.
March 15, 2018
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the subcommittee: I am
honored to testify before you today to discuss the authorities and
responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) during
disaster response and recovery operations. I am Major General Ed
Jackson, Deputy Commanding General, Civil and Emergency Operations,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).
The Corps conducts its emergency response activities under two
basic authorities: The Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act); and Public Law 84-99, 33 U.S.C. 701n as amended (Public
Law 84-99). Under the Stafford Act, we and other Federal agencies
support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the
National Response Framework (NRF). In this capacity, the Corps is the
lead Federal agency for Emergency Support Function 3 (Public Works and
Engineering), but works under FEMA's direction. ESF-3 provides
Temporary Emergency Power, Temporary Roofing, Debris Management,
Emergency Infrastructure Assessment, Critical Public Facility
Restoration, Temporary Housing, Demolition/Structural Stabilization,
and support to FEMA Command and Control Nodes/ESF-3. Under Public Law
84-99, we prepare for disasters through planning, coordination, and
training with local, State, Federal partners; and by assisting State
and local entities in implementing advance measures to prevent/reduce
storm event damages. After the emergency event, Public Law 84-99
authorizes the Corps to repair damage to authorized Corps projects, and
work with States/municipalities to rehabilitate and restore eligible
non-Federal flood infrastructure to pre-storm conditions.
When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are mobilized
from across the country to assist the local Corps districts and offices
respond to the event. As part of this mission, the Corps has more than
50 specially-trained response teams, supported by emergency contracts,
to perform the wide range of public works and engineering-related
support missions I just described. Additionally, the Corps uses pre-
awarded contracts that can be quickly activated for missions such as
debris removal, temporary roofing, and generator installation.
2017 Hurricane Season.--With regard to hurricane activity, 2017 was
an unusually active season. The Corps was, and continues to be,
involved in the FEMA-led Federal response and recovery operations in
support of multiple events, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria.
Hurricane Harvey.--On August 25, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey
made landfall along the central Texas coast near Rockport, Texas,
between Port Aransas and Port O'Connor and the President approved an
Expedited Major Disaster Declaration for Texas. Large amounts of
rainfall fell across the greater Houston metropolitan area causing
record flooding. FEMA has identified $126 million in Mission
Assignments for the Corps to assist in Hurricane Harvey response and
recovery. Currently, the Corps has 130 Corps employees deployed to
support recovery mission assignments.
Temporary Emergency Power.--The Corps completed its temporary
emergency power mission assignment in Texas by completing 45
generator installations over the course of the mission.
Temporary Housing.--In the 31 disaster-impacted Texas counties, an
estimated 9,300 applicants are eligible for temporary housing.
Corps Technical Monitors (TMs) are inspecting approximately 400
haul and install unit installations a day and certifying
approximately 150 Mobile Housing Units (MHUs) as Ready for
Occupancy per week. To date, the Corps has assessed over 3,300
private sites (homeowner property) and over 1,200 commercial
mobile home parks. Corps Group Site personnel have assessed
more than 330 potential group site locations and continue to
assess sites as directed by FEMA.
Debris Management.--Debris teams led by Corps subject-matter
experts continue to provide State and county officials with
technical assistance in defining requirements and monitoring
debris removal and disposal operations in 10 counties.
Hurricanes Irma and Maria.--Category 5 Hurricane Irma made landfall
over the U.S. Virgin Islands on September 6, 2017, while also impacting
Puerto Rico with Category 2 winds, 12-foot storm surge and up to 20
inches of rain. Hurricane Irma made landfall in southern Florida/
Florida Keys on September 9, 2017. Soon thereafter, Category 5
Hurricane Maria made landfall over Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017,
causing major damage to critical infrastructure and homes. FEMA has
identified over $3 billion in Mission Assignments for the Corps through
ESF-3 to assist in Hurricanes Irma and Maria response and recovery (46
Mission Assignments totaling $177 million for Hurricane Irma and 39
Mission Assignments totaling $2.91 billion for Hurricane Maria).
Currently, the Corps has over 840 personnel deployed in various
locations supporting the recovery missions.
Temporary Emergency Power.--As of March 8, 2018, the Corps and its
contractors have executed 1,955 of 2,092 taskings received (for
temporary generators) in Puerto Rico and 1,779 generator
installations; the Corps is continuing to support this line of
effort. The Corps and its contractors concluded its temporary
emergency power mission assignment in the U.S. Virgin Islands
on February 20, 2018; the Corps installed 180 generators during
this mission. Fifteen generators remain installed and are
managed under a FEMA contract to provide additional stability
to critical facilities in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Temporary Roofing.--In order for the Corps and its contractors to
install temporary covering (blue roof), the Government and its
contractors require validated rights of entry. The Corps
completed its temporary roofing mission assignment in Florida
with 13,370 blue roofs installed. In the U.S. Virgin Islands,
the Corps installed 3,658 blue roofs over the course of the
mission. As of March 8, 2018, in Puerto Rico, the Corps and its
contractors have completed 59,292 blue roof installations and
collected over 60,683 rights of entry.
Debris Management.--As of March 8, 2018, the Corps has removed
approximately 822,000 cubic yards of the estimated 870,000
cubic yards of debris in the U.S. Virgin Islands and 3.54
million cubic yards of the estimated 3.9 million cubic yards of
debris in Puerto Rico. In Florida and Georgia, Corps debris
subject-matter experts provided technical assistance to
counties across Florida and Georgia in response to Hurricane
Irma.
Dam and Levee Safety, Assessments, and Response.--In Puerto Rico,
Corps Dam and Levee teams inspected 17 priority dam locations
and Guajataca Dam was the only site deemed in critical
condition. Hurricane Maria caused a significant rise in the
water level of the dam, and resulted in flow in the spillway.
The spillway structure was compromised and the surrounding area
began to erode, posing immediate risk to several thousand
residents. Corps teams placed over 500 Jersey barriers and over
1,300 super sand bags to cease any further erosion and allow
for long-term repair of the spillway. Additionally, the Corps
teams cleared existing outflow conduits and placed piping and
pumps to further reduce the water level in the dam to safe
levels. Under a FEMA mission assignment, the Corps is in the
process of contracting for six additional interim risk
reduction measures including grouting spillway slabs and
stabilizing intake slopes to reduce risk during Puerto Rico's
wet season with a completion date for all of this work in July,
2019. The Corps has no authority for permanent repairs at the
project.
Power Restoration Mission.--On September 30, 2017, the Corps was
given a FEMA Mission Assignment, within the authority of the
Stafford Act, to assist the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA) in further repairing the power system to its
pre-storm condition. Our priority is to safely restore reliable
power to the people of Puerto Rico as quickly as possible. As
of March 8, 2018, 90.7% (1.34 million of 1.47 million) of
customer meters are energized. The Corps has over 1,600
contractors working alongside PREPA and mutual aid utility
companies to restore power to Puerto Rico. The Corps of
Engineers, alongside PREPA and FEMA will continually evaluate
the remaining work in order to achieve our goals of restoring
electricity to 95% of customers on the island by March 31,
2018. In support of this line of effort, through the Defense
Logistics Agency as its contracting agent, the Corps has
executed the procurement of over $204 million of materials
required in the restoration the power grid.
The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing its
other Civil Works activities across the Nation despite our heavy
involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations. We also
remain ready and poised to assist in future events as they may occur.
This concludes my testimony and I look forward to answering any
questions you might have. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, General.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Kelly for his statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN V. KELLY, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Kelly. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss
FEMA's preparedness and response capabilities to the 2017
hurricanes, as well as my office's oversight efforts.
First, I would like to applaud the dedicated women and men
who quickly answered the call, rolled up their sleeves and
began the difficult work to help the people affected by three
major hurricanes. Harvey, Irma, and Maria made landfall within
4 weeks of each other.
According to NOAA, these storms rank as 3 of the 5 most
expensive storms in U.S. history, making the 2017 hurricane
season the costliest season in U.S. history. This even topped
the 2005 season that included Hurricane Katrina.
In response to the unprecedented disasters in Texas,
Florida, and Puerto Rico, the OIG deployed staff from our local
offices as well as other auditors, analysts, and criminal
investigators from around the country. OIG staff on the ground
creates an independent unit that oversees disaster response and
recovery activities, detects and alerts FEMA of systemic
problems, helps ensure accountability over Federal funds, and
identifies potential risks and vulnerabilities that provide
stakeholders with timely information to address operational
challenges.
The presence of our criminal investigators ensures
stakeholders that DHS and OIG is an integral part of the
Department of Justice's zero tolerance policy. Our
investigators work in partnership with the Justice's National
Center for Disaster Fraud to receive complaints and identify
trends. They also actively participate with local task forces
established by the U.S. attorneys.
Finally, they brief FEMA and multi-jurisdictional task
forces on fraud, waste, and abuse. It is disappointing, but
disasters often result in an uptick in fraud.
In fiscal year 2017, we received more than 4,800 FEMA-
related hotline complaints. In the first 5 months of fiscal
year 2018, we received over 14,600 hotline complaints. That is
more than triple the total amount we received in 2017.
From these complaints we initiated already 220
investigations of Hurricane Harvey, Irma, and Maria issues.
These numbers continue to grow every day.
For the 2017 hurricane season, FEMA faced both situational
challenges caused by the magnitude of the disasters and
systemic challenges that have persisted over time. Responding
to three major hurricanes at one time is difficult.
In 2017, the response was further complicated by Hurricanes
Irma and Maria devastating the Caribbean islands of Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands, which are remote and not easily
accessible locations. This poses additional logistical
challenges to an already taxed response work force.
To further complicate matter, much of the infrastructure
was already in disrepair prior to the damages caused by the
hurricanes.
In addition to the situation challenges, FEMA faces
persistent systemic vulnerabilities such as improper
procurement practices, duplication of benefits, inadequate
staffing, grant management issues, privacy vulnerabilities,
protecting survivors' home and property from further damages,
and providing funds to high-risk entities.
If left unmitigated, these challenges could delay survivor
recovery and put billions of Federal dollars at risk.
To this end, we have issued several lesson-learned reports
addressing FEMA's disaster preparedness and response to
recovery efforts. This work highlights on-going concerns that
FEMA must address to ensure it effectively meets its mission
and improves efficiency and effectiveness of program
operations.
Looking forward, the challenges identified during the
recent disasters highlight the importance of proactive and
thorough oversight, as well as continuing improvement of FEMA
in executing its mission. As agents of positive change, we have
over 30 on-going and planned reviews and strive to make
recommendations that improve FEMA's efficiency and
effectiveness, positively affect disaster survivors, and
safeguard public funds.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral statement. I welcome
any questions you or Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of John V. Kelly
March 15, 2018
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss lessons learned
from the 2017 disasters. I am pleased to have the opportunity to share
our office's oversight efforts in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma,
and Maria.
We applaud the dedicated women and men of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) who quickly answered the call, rolled up their
sleeves, and began the difficult and critical work to help the people
of Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and elsewhere.
For our office, the first order of business in response to the
unprecedented disasters was to deploy auditors and investigators to
FEMA's Joint Field Offices (JFOs) in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico.
We quickly deployed staff from our local field offices as well as other
auditors, analysts, and criminal investigators from around the country.
Having OIG staff on the ground serves multiple purposes: We serve as an
independent unit for oversight of disaster response and recovery
activities, to detect and alert FEMA of systemic problems, and to help
ensure accountability over Federal funds. Our deployment activities are
focused on identifying potential risks and vulnerabilities and
providing our stakeholders with timely, useful information to address
emerging challenges and on-going operations.\1\
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\1\As the committee is aware, our office recently recalled and
removed from our website 12 reports that resulted from prior early
deployment activities. This action was taken in an abundance of caution
after an internal review revealed that the reports may not have
adequately answered objectives and, in some cases, may have lacked
sufficient and appropriate evidence to support their conclusions. We
understand that you may have concerns about this action, and I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
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Additionally, the presence of our criminal investigators at the
JFOs serves to assure stakeholders that the OIG is an integral part of
the Department of Justice's (DOJ) position that it intends a ``zero
tolerance'' policy with respect to disaster-related fraud and other
crimes. They work in partnership with the DOJ-led National Center for
Disaster Fraud to receive complaints regarding fraud and other illegal
activity and identify trends and systemic issues. Our investigators are
also actively participating on the local Disaster Fraud Task Forces
established by the U.S. Attorney's Offices in the affected areas.
Finally, we brief FEMA management and multijurisdictional taskforces on
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement issues unique to the disaster
recovery process.
We plan to continue these efforts--and others that I describe
below--throughout the year as FEMA addresses the situational challenges
brought on by the 2017 hurricane season, as well as systemic challenges
that have persisted over time.
the 2017 hurricane season: unique and unprecedented
Three major hurricanes--Harvey, Irma, and Maria--made landfall in a
4-week time period during August and September 2017. These storms now
rank as three of the five most expensive in U.S. history, according to
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).\2\ This
makes the 2017 hurricane season the costliest in U.S. history, topping
even the 2005 season, which included Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
According to NOAA statistics, each of the 2017 storms was record-
breaking in its own right:
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\2\ Damages from Harvey are estimated at $125 billion; Maria's
damages are estimated at $90 billion; and Irma's at $50 billion.
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Hurricane Harvey produced 60.58 inches of rainfall in Texas,
the most ever recorded in the continental United States from a
tropical cyclone;
Hurricane Irma was the strongest storm on record to exist in
the Atlantic Ocean outside the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean; and
Hurricane Maria was the strongest hurricane to make landfall
in Puerto Rico since 1928.\3\
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\3\ https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/weather-
disasters.html.
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This confluence of events brought with it unique situational
challenges.
One of the chief challenges in a post-disaster environment is the
vulnerability for fraud and abuse. Unfortunately, there are those that
wish to profit from disasters, turning survivors into victims. Our
office works closely with the National Center for Disaster Fraud
Hotline as we receive and process complaints. In fiscal year 2017, we
received more than 4,800 FEMA-related complaints to the OIG Hotline. In
the first 5 months of fiscal year 2018 alone, we received more than
triple the amount of FEMA-related complaints--over 14,600. During this
time period, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria combined produced
almost 13,400 complaints that resulted in 220 initiated investigations.
These numbers continue to increase each day.
In addition to our permanent office in Puerto Rico, we have
temporarily assigned additional special agents to both Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and we have been in frequent contact with
prosecutors and the U.S. Virgin Islands Inspector General in these
areas to coordinate investigative activities related to:
contract, procurement, and grant fraud;
disaster applicant benefit fraud;
identity theft;
impersonation of FEMA or Federal law enforcement officials;
and
employee misconduct.
We have activated or leveraged various resources aimed at
combatting criminality in these areas. For example, our Major Frauds
and Corruption Unit has developed a robust capability to investigate
complex financial crimes. This multidisciplinary team of experts--
special agents, forensic auditors, and financial analysts--work
together to proactively identify DHS-related fraud. In the aftermath of
the 2017 disasters, this team interfaced with FEMA officials from
Office of the Chief Security Officer, Office of the Chief Procurement
Officer, Grant Programs Directorate, Office of Response and Recovery,
and Office of Chief Counsel to pursue criminal investigations of FEMA
benefit and related fraud, identify fraud victims, and assess the
effectiveness of FEMA efforts in the hurricane-impacted areas. In
furtherance of our mission to support the Department and FEMA by
identifying waste, fraud, and abuse, we aggressively investigate
potential criminal allegations. Whenever possible, we immediately alert
FEMA officials when we identify programmatic issues or vulnerabilities
that may adversely affect the effective execution of their mission.
As an additional example, we have developed in-house expertise in
digital forensics and analysis. These specially-trained special agents,
digital forensic analysts, and intelligence analysts work to identify,
acquire, and analyze digital evidence in furtherance of our
investigations. This group leverages large datasets from Government,
commercial, and open-source repositories to uncover fraud, waste, and
abuse in disaster assistance programs.
persistent challenges in disaster response and recovery
In addition to the situational challenges facing FEMA during the
2017 hurricane season, other challenges to FEMA's programs and
operations tend to be more persistent and systemic vulnerabilities:
improper procurement practices;
duplication of benefits;
mismanagement of disaster costs;
privacy vulnerabilities;
limitations in the ability to quickly protect survivors'
homes and property from further damage;
obstacles with accurate and timely home inspections;
incomplete controls when providing Federal funds to high-
risk entities; and
inconsistent contract oversight.
Unmitigated, these challenges could delay survivors' recovery and
put billions of dollars of Federal funds at risk. Thus, we have
identified numerous observations and concerns and issued several
lessons learned reports concerning FEMA's disaster preparedness,
response, and recovery efforts. This work highlights on-going concerns
FEMA must address to ensure it effectively meets its mission and
improves the efficiency and effectiveness of its programs and
operations.\4\
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\4\ We plan to translate relevant reports to Spanish for State and
local stakeholders in Puerto Rico.
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FEMA Faces Significant Challenges Overseeing the Procurement and
Contracting of Federal Grantees
As we noted in our recent report Lessons Learned from Prior Reports
on Disaster-related Procurement and Contracting,\5\ FEMA faces
significant challenges in ensuring its grant recipients properly manage
FEMA disaster funds. FEMA is continually challenged in its oversight of
procurement and contracting practices--namely, ensuring disaster grant
recipients and subrecipients understand and comply with Federal
regulations and FEMA guidelines.
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\5\ Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on Disaster-related
Procurement and Contracting (OIG-18-29).
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Throughout the course of our work during fiscal year 2015 through
June 2017, we identified (and questioned) more than $256 million in
ineligible contract costs because subrecipients did not follow Federal
procurement regulations.
These procurement-related deficiencies include:
Failure to provide full and open competition, resulting in
FEMA having limited assurance that incurred costs were
reasonable, as well as an increased risk for fraud, waste, and
abuse.
Failure to take all affirmative steps to assure the use of
disadvantaged businesses when possible, resulting in small and
minority firms, women's business enterprises, and labor surplus
area firms not always having sufficient opportunities to bid on
Federally-funded work.
Failure to include all required contract provisions,
resulting in an increased risk of misinterpretations, errors in
pricing, scopes of work, and contract disputes.
Failure to verify whether contractors were suspended,
debarred, or otherwise excluded or ineligible, resulting in
lack of protection of U.S. taxpayers from potential financial
risks posed by such contractors.
Procurement practices that do not comply with Federal requirements
can lead to high-risk contracts that can result in U.S. taxpayers
bearing excessive and ineligible costs. Lack of compliance also
increases the risk of favoritism, collusion, fraud, waste, and abuse.
Furthermore, we identified more than $191 million in ineligible costs
that subrecipients may have incurred had we not identified the
procurement problems before FEMA-obligated disaster assistance grant
funds.\6\
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\6\ Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on Disaster-related
Procurement and Contracting (OIG-18-29).
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FEMA Challenges in Ensuring Grantees Manage Public Assistance and
Hazard Mitigation Project Costs Properly
About 153,000 recipients and subrecipients of FEMA disaster
assistance grants are currently working on more than 650,000 open
projects worth over $68 billion--not including the majority of those
related to the 2017 hurricanes. As our office has reported over the
years, FEMA faces persistent challenges in ensuring that grant
recipients properly manage disaster funds. We described many of these
challenges in a letter to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
last year, and offered possible legislative changes at the Committee's
invitation.\7\ We have attached this letter to our testimony today.
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\7\ Letter from Inspector General John Roth to Chairman Johnson,
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, dated June 2, 2017
(attached).
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We most recently raised these issues to FEMA in a Management Alert
issued in December 2017.\8\ The majority of our disaster grant audits
focus on grants funded by the Disaster Relief Fund under FEMA's Public
Assistance grant program and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. Each
year, our reports identify issues with the management of millions of
dollars in Federal funds allocated for disaster assistance and recovery
efforts. From fiscal year 2009 to 2017, our reports provided more than
1,400 recommendations to disallow unsupported and ineligible costs, put
funds to better use, and improve grant management oversight of disaster
funds. We concluded these issues continue, in part, because FEMA does
not adequately manage disaster funds or hold grant recipients
accountable for properly managing disaster funds.
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\8\ Management Alert--FEMA Faces Significant Challenges Ensuring
Recipients Properly Manage Disaster Funds (OIG-18-33).
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Additionally, over the last 6 years, DHS's Independent Auditors
identified multiple internal control weaknesses related to FEMA's grant
management, such as:
not maintaining central oversight over its regional offices;
ineffectively communicating policies and procedures with its
regional offices; and lacking effective policies and procedures
related to grant management;
not ensuring recipients comply with Single Audit Act
requirements;
not effectively reconciling grantee (recipient) quarterly
performance reports to FEMA's systems; and
not consistently implementing effective controls to ensure
the timely closeout of FEMA's grants.
DHS's Independent Auditors also reported that FEMA did not
implement effective monitoring procedures over its grant activities
from fiscal years 2011 to 2016.\9\ These findings reveal that FEMA was
aware of its grant management issues yet did not take effective actions
to strengthen its internal controls.
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\9\ Independent Auditors' Report on DHS's Fiscal Year 2011
Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
(OIG-12-07); Independent Auditors' Report on DHS's Fiscal Year 2012
Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
(OIG-13-20); Independent Auditors' Report on DHS's Fiscal Year 2018
Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
(OIG-14-18); Independent Auditors' Report on DHS's Fiscal Year 2014
Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
(OIG-15-10); Independent Auditors' Report on DHS's Fiscal Year 2015
Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
(OIG-16-06); and Independent Auditors' Report on DHS's Fiscal Year 2016
Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
(OIG-17-12).
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In order to assist disaster assistance recipients and subrecipients
to properly manage their grant funds, in late September 2017, we issued
an updated version of our Audit Tips for Managing Disaster-Related
Project Costs.\9\ This report provides an overview of OIG
responsibilities; roles of FEMA, recipients, and subrecipients;
applicable disaster assistance Federal statutes, regulations, and
guidelines; the audit process and frequent audit findings; and tips for
managing project costs.
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\10\ Audit Tips for Managing Disaster-Related Project Costs (OIG-
17-120-D).
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This report should assist disaster assistance recipients and
subrecipients to:
document and account for disaster-related costs;
minimize the loss of FEMA disaster assistance funds;
maximize financial recovery; and
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of disaster funds.
Aside from its availability on-line, we frequently distribute this
report to FEMA, State, and grant recipient and subrecipient
stakeholders, and will continue to do so during our on-going fieldwork
in the disaster-damaged areas in which we are active.
Housing Challenges
In September 2017, we issued a Management Alert urging FEMA to
develop adequate controls to ensure Direct Housing Assistance (DHA)
funds are spent according to Federal regulations.
When FEMA began using this program during Hurricane Sandy, we
raised concerns about the need to: (1) Maintain strong internal
controls given the number of individuals affected by the hurricane; and
(2) address vulnerabilities associated with implementing pilot
programs. In a more recent report, we found that FEMA had still not
instituted adequate policies, procedures and, internal controls to
prevent waste, fraud, and program mismanagement. Furthermore, because
FEMA has not yet developed policies and procedures to provide regions
with a framework to follow, FEMA and regional staff at JFOs had to
develop and implement housing assistance on a disaster-by-disaster
basis.\11\
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\11\ Management Alert--Observations and Concerns with FEMA's
Housing Assistance Program Efforts for Hurricane Harvey in Texas (OIG-
17-121-MA).
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After Hurricane Harvey, we learned that FEMA planned to enter into
an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with the State of Texas General
Land Office (Texas) to provide assistance to FEMA in the delivery of
DHA funds to Hurricane Harvey survivors. We observed that FEMA's
agreement with Texas did not clearly define FEMA's and Texas'
responsibilities for monitoring and overseeing the DHA program. Thus,
we felt compelled to remind FEMA about our previous concerns and re-
emphasize the importance in ensuring DHA funds are spent according to
Federal regulations.
Specifically, we raised concerns that the agreement lacked adequate
controls that could lead to non-compliance with Federal procurement
standards resulting in a high-risk contract that can lead to excessive
and ineligible costs ultimately born by the U.S. taxpayer. Due to risk
involved, this program requires increased vigilance to monitor the
procurement of direct housing assistance services.
This program is high-risk and requires increased vigilance in order
to monitor the procurement of direct housing assistance services. We
also noted that if FEMA planned to use a similar plan in the future, it
should put in place policies and procedures to ensure that the State
has the capabilities and expertise to manage and oversee the program.
Finally, we also noted that if FEMA and Texas do not provide timely and
adequate oversight, significant amounts of Federal funding could be at
risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.
As a result of our concerns, we are currently reviewing FEMA and
Texas' Intergovernmental Service Agreement for direct housing. We are
also reviewing temporary housing delays in Texas under the Partial
Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering (PREPS) program.
Staffing Challenges
In 2016, our office reported on FEMA's disaster incident workforce,
finding that despite hiring initiatives, the workforce was
significantly understaffed.\12\ We reported that since the staffing
problems FEMA encountered after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA continues to
experience challenges hiring enough disaster workforce employees and
deploying Reservists in their FEMA Qualification System (FQS) position
with sufficient knowledge and skills to assist disaster survivors
effectively. Strong Reservist performance is critical to the Nation's
ability to respond to major disasters because Reservists make up about
half of FEMA's disaster incident workforce, a workforce that remains
far below the number necessary to respond effectively to the next
catastrophic disaster.
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\12\ FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster
Incident Workforce (OIG-16-127-D).
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In 2012, FEMA transitioned its on-call workforce from Disaster
Assistance Employees to Reservists. Since then, FEMA officials have
expressed their frustration regarding the performance of Reservists
deployed to disasters under their new FEMA Qualification System
positions. Despite recent hiring initiatives, FEMA's disaster incident
workforce remains significantly understaffed, and some Reservists
continue to deploy to disasters without the knowledge, skills, and
training they need to assist survivors effectively.
We made four recommendations to FEMA intended to improve the
knowledge, skills, performance, and morale of FEMA's Reservist
workforce. One of those recommendations has been closed and three
remain open. We plan additional work in this area going forward.
Challenges Related to Insurance under the Public Assistance Program
In November 2017, we issued a special report on lessons learned
from our previous work related to insurance under the Public Assistance
grant program.\13\ The goal of this report was to address challenges
FEMA, Texas, Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and
California may face managing insurance under the FEMA Public Assistance
program in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the
October 2017 California wildfires. Our report noted that if FEMA does
not address the recurring issues we identified in 37 previous reports
issued between fiscal years 2013 and 2017, it will be at risk of
violating the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act and exposing billions of taxpayer dollars to fraud,
waste, or mismanagement. The major recurring challenges we identified
include:
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\13\ Special Report: Lessons Learned from Previous Audit Reports on
Insurance under the Public Assistance Program (OIG-18-12).
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duplicate benefits in which subrecipients claimed FEMA
reimbursement for costs that were covered by insurance;
insufficient insurance in which subrecipients did not obtain
and maintain sufficient insurance coverage required as a
condition for receiving Federal disaster assistance; and
misapplied or misallocated insurance proceeds in which
subrecipients received insurance proceeds, and misapplied or
did not allocate those proceeds to FEMA projects.
The reports included 40 recommendations for FEMA to address
deficiencies or errors, totaling more than $322 million in questioned
costs. It is incumbent upon FEMA to take appropriate action on Public
Assistance program issues related to insurance because FEMA will likely
face similar challenges pertaining to insurance related to Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria.
Concerns with Potential Duplicate or Ineligible FEMA Public Assistance
Funding for Facilities Damaged by Back-to-Back Disasters
During the 2017 disasters' time frame, we reported to FEMA the
critical importance of implementing effective controls to minimize the
risk of funding duplicate or ineligible repair costs of facilities
damaged by back-to-back incidents.\14\
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\14\ Management Alert--Concerns with Potential Duplicate or
Ineligible FEMA Public Assistance Funding for Facilities Damaged by
Back-to-Back Disasters (OIG-18-14).
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Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria--some of the most catastrophic
disasters in recent United States history--resulted in multiple
disaster declarations and billions of dollars in damages to areas
within several Gulf Coast and Southeast States, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. We noted many of the same designated disaster
areas for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma overlapped disaster areas from 13
disaster incidents in 2016 and 2017. As a result, many of the same
facilities damaged by an earlier incident may have also received damage
under Hurricanes Harvey or Irma before repairs to the facility were
completed.
As of March 8, 2018, FEMA obligated an estimated $413 million of
Public Assistance funding to cover permanent repair or replacement
costs to facilities damaged under the 13 previous disaster
declarations. To avoid obligating duplicate or ineligible repair costs
to an affected facility, FEMA will need to discern which incident
caused damages to the facility and whether repairs necessitated by the
previous incident were complete.
FEMA must implement effective controls to minimize this risk of
funding duplicate or ineligible repair costs of facilities damaged by
back-to-back incidents.
looking forward: our work ahead
The challenges identified during the recent disasters highlight the
importance of proactive and thorough oversight, as well as continual
improvement of the ways by which FEMA executes its mission. As agents
of positive change, we strive to identify recommendations to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of FEMA's work; effect improvements
for disaster survivors; and safeguard public funds from fraud, waste,
and abuse.
Our investigations have already yielded results, uncovering serious
schemes aimed at defrauding FEMA and turning disaster survivors into
victims--something we are working diligently to prevent. For example:
We are investigating a wide-spread identity-theft ring in
which numerous individuals used the stolen identities of
hurricane victims to fraudulently apply for benefits, thereby
defrauding FEMA and victimizing hurricane survivors.
We have arrested an individual--in coordination with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement operatives--for False
Impersonation of a Federal Officer or Employee. This individual
attempted to procure work at an Emergency Management Center as
a voluntary staff member for Hurricane Maria relief efforts. At
the time of the arrest, the individual was wearing a Homeland
Security Investigations Special Agent t-shirt, a DHS cap, and
had a fake DHS badge in his possession. Our agents obtained
consent to search the person's residence where they found
additional t-shirts with Homeland Security Investigations
logos.
We will continue to review and triage the many complaints and
allegations that we receive each day and judiciously expend our limited
investigative resources on those matters that pose the greatest threats
or risks to FEMA programs and operations. And we will do so in close
and timely coordination with our investigative partners, FEMA, and our
oversight community. Our intent is clear: To protect disaster survivors
and the billions of taxpayer dollars entrusted to the critical efforts
of disaster response and recovery.
On the audit side of our house, we are planning, or have begun, a
variety of reviews both at the Federal and local disaster level,
intended to improve FEMA's programs and operations.
First, we plan to start several capacity audits in Texas, Florida,
and Puerto Rico during this fiscal year. Capacity audits and early
warning audits identify areas where FEMA public assistance grant
recipients and subrecipients may need additional technical assistance
or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements. In
addition, by undergoing an audit early in the grant cycle, grant
recipients and subrecipients have the opportunity to correct
noncompliance before they spend the majority of their grant funding. It
also allows them the opportunity to supplement deficient documentation
or locate missing records before too much time elapses.
Additionally, at the Federal level, our work includes audits in the
areas of:
FEMA's fraud prevention efforts under the Individuals and
Households Program;
FEMA's Transitional Shelter Assistance (TSA) Program;
FEMA's management and oversight of housing inspections; and
FEMA pre-positioned contracts.
In Texas, we have work under way and planned including:
a review of FEMA and Texas' Intergovernmental Service
Agreement for housing;
a review of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power
(STEP) Pilot Program, called Partial Repair and Essential Power
for Sheltering (PREPS) in Texas;
procurement capacity reviews of selected subgrantees;
lessons learned report on repair or replacement (50 percent
rule); and
lessons learned report on Direct Administrative Costs.
In Florida, our planned and on-going work includes:
the implementation of the STEP program;
the use of the new Public Assistance service delivery model;
FEMA's guidance to affected municipalities on private
property debris removal;
the use of direct leasing to shelter survivors;
duplication of Federal benefits (in coordination with HUD
OIG);
FEMA's automotive assistance, and
mission assignments for vessel removal and private property
debris removal.
In Puerto Rico, we have work under way and planned, including:
challenges with providing Puerto Rico disaster survivors
roof coverings to reduce further damage to their homes and
property;
review of disaster-related contracting including the
contracts with Whitefish Energy, Cobra Acquisitions, Bronze
Star LLC (blue tarps), and Tribute Contracting LLC (meals),
among others;
additional controls for Puerto Rico's high-risk grant
applicants;
FEMA's Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP)
Program;
FEMA's preparedness, management, and distribution of
supplies;
lessons learned from repair versus replacement funding
decisions; and
FEMA's plan to use alternative procedures for the Public
Assistance Program;
debris removal operations;
police overtime pay;
Federal considerations relating to the privatization of
PREPA;
duplication of Federal benefits (in coordination with HUD
OIG); and
key infrastructure repair costs (such as for the Guajataca
Dam).
In the U.S. Virgin Islands, we plan to review several areas
including:
FEMA's Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP)
Program;
mission assignment for sunken vessel removal;
mission assignment for medical waste disposal;
off-island debris disposal activities;
billing and payment processes for FEMA-contracted local
lodging; and
capacity audits of FEMA grant recipients and subrecipients.
In addition to these on-going and planned reviews, we will continue
to work with FEMA, its partners, and our oversight community to help
ensure challenges are timely identified and addressed.
conclusion
It is incumbent upon the OIG and FEMA to work collaboratively to
highlight risks, identify control weaknesses, and devise ways to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of FEMA's programs and
operations, while simultaneously mitigating fraud, waste, and abuse.
The recovery of countless survivors, as well as the accountability of
billions of dollars in public funds depends upon our collaboration. We
will continue to approach our work with a sense of dedication and
urgency, and will keep Congress fully informed of our findings and
recommendations, consistent with our obligations under the Inspector
General Act of 1978.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.
I am pleased to answer your questions, as well as those of the
other Members.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Administrator, first, let me commend you for your emergency
response efforts in my home State of Texas. Katy High School
turned into a forward operating base with the National Guard
active duty. We saw the Coast Guard. We saw private citizens,
the Cajun Navy, and FEMA was there to pre-position assets after
the President declared it an emergency.
I think that made a big difference.
But I think there is some also confusion about the role of
FEMA versus the role that the State and locals have to play as
well, working as a team together in the recovery efforts. I did
speak with my Governor, Governor Abbott recently, who one of
his frustrations was he had to deal with so many different
organizations.
I know we have talked about this. What is your vision to
possibly streamline and make more efficient the FEMA process in
these disasters?
Mr. Long. Thank you for the question. So first of all, I
would like to acknowledge that Governor Abbott is one of the
most bold Governors who has truly owned every bit of the
disaster response and recovery, and that is the way it should
work. I believe that Texas is a model.
I say that because it truly is where we need to go as
Federally-supported, State-managed, locally-executed. FEMA is
not a first responder. FEMA should not be the primary and only
responder. My job is to work directly with Governors to
understand what the response and recovery goals or the
preparedness goals, mitigation goals, are, organize our
resources to help that Governor achieve those goals.
In Texas I do believe that that is the model that was
played out, and that is the model we should be seeking for. The
problem particularly is what is complex is housing. As I said,
I would like to lay out a new vision for housing but it would
require granting authorities being given to me to help, you
know, from the Congress, to reorganize it.
For example, we are not housing experts. We are literally
good at doing emergency housing provisions. We are good at
sheltering. We are good at blue tarp missions with the Army
Corps of Engineers. We are good at transitional shelter
authority. We put nearly 4.7 million people in hotels or
overnight--no, excuse me--4.7 million nights in hotels has been
coordinated to this point.
It would take a person over I think 12,000 years to stay in
hotels that many nights. Let us identify what we are good at.
Give the Governors more granting authority to handle the
difficult housing issues and then clearly design the hand-off
between FEMA and the partnering agencies.
Streamline what we are all responsible for, how we should
work together, and in some cases the disaster survivor may get
up to 15 knocks at the door from FEMA to other Federal
Government agencies, from State governments to non-governmental
organizations, and it is confusing.
We have to do one inspection that cuts across the Federal
Government perspective and down through the agencies. We have
to streamline what we are doing.
Chairman McCaul. Yes, I think that is absolutely right.
One-stop shop, and I look forward to working with you on
legislation and granting authority for you as well.
Major General, this is a map that Army Corps, and you have
probably seen this. I have talked about it a lot. They did this
in 1940, and it created the Barker Addicks dam. But Cypress
Creek there is a proposed levee system that was never built.
So what happened in Hurricane Harvey was that Cypress Creek
overflowed, went into Barker and Addicks reservoir, then a
controlled spillage was done at about 1:30 in the morning and
those residents downstream were not very happy about that. It
filled up the bayous and then it flooded downtown Houston. So
it had sort-of a cascading effect here.
This gets more into flood mitigation. I think, you know,
you always hear an ounce of--the prevention piece is so
important. Can you tell me whether the Cypress Creek reservoir,
the third reservoir, is on your list of projects?
General Jackson. Congressman, thanks. I can see from here
even without my glasses that is a 1940's plan, and I think you
will agree that a lot has changed in the hydrology of the
region upstream and downstream since 1940, a lot of
development, which increases significantly the runoff.
To answer your question, though, we have a number of
projects that we have identified that we are going to try to
put forth to the administration for funding in the supplemental
that Congress passed to be able to take a look at that
reservoir, other opportunities to improve the flood
protection----
Chairman McCaul. If I could just take--my time is getting
ready--and if I could just say it is the Governor's No. 1
priority. He told me that and it is also my No. 1 priority is
to get that Cypress reservoir built and reinforce Barker
Addicks to make sure this doesn't happen again. Fifty inches of
rain is a lot of rain.
We also put language in the supplemental for $90 billion to
expedite some of these projects, so I would hope you would be
able to do this as quickly as possible. I think one of the
concerns we always have with the Army Corps is it takes too
long, the studies and the actual construction.
I think that is something that Congress has given you new
authorities to do it more expeditiously. I look forward to
working with you to get this done as quickly as possible
because it has flooded three times in 2 years. It really, you
know, again, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
We need to get this thing done.
So with that, I now recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, you talked about some improvements that
you hope to see in FEMA going forward. Would you share those
written improvements with this committee?
Mr. Long. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Thompson. Are they completed at this time?
Mr. Long. Yes, so what we tried to do is I believe in
streamlined and concise documents. Basically this is an outline
of the entire strategic plan on one page that outlines our
goals and objectives.
Mr. Thompson. I think they are good. So is your testimony
also that you have all the money you need to do your job?
Mr. Long. Can I get back to you on that? I do. I am very
thankful for the supplementals that went forward. I do have a
concern that with the magnitude of this event I have the
ability in FEMA to reimburse everybody but myself. One of the
problems that I think we are running into within the agency is
is that the operational budget and staffing pattern, as Mr.
Kelly alluded to, doesn't grow with the disaster response.
So the amount of paperwork, the requests that come into the
agency is exponentially increased with a year like this, but
the staffing pattern internally to my agency stays the same.
Mr. Thompson. So that means you won't get back with me?
Mr. Long. Yes, sir, I would be happy to respond to you in
writing. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. You got a time frame on that, on your
reponse?
Mr. Long. Can I have 2 weeks, sir?
Mr. Thompson. You have it.
Mr. Long. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. Is it also your testimony that the response
to Florida, Texas, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands was
acceptable under FEMA's present standards?
Mr. Long. Well, I think the term acceptable lies in the eye
of the beholder. You know, I am sure that there are people that
feel that FEMA slighted them out in the field and didn't give
them the assistance that they deserved.
It is very tough to deal with each and every community, but
as a whole, as I said, I am very proud of the response that was
put forward and the model of Federally-supported, State-
managed, and locally-executed played out in California, Texas,
and Florida.
In regards to Puerto Rico, we are still pushing forward
every day. I believe we still have 3,000 staff in place along
with the local hires that are there. In regards to things like
food and commodity, the amount of commodities that we put into
Puerto Rico is--one of the estimates I saw was close to $2
billion. That alone would rank as one of our top 20 most costly
disasters in the----
Mr. Thompson. I----
Mr. Long [continuing]. In the history of FEMA.
Mr. Thompson. I thank you for that, but I am trying to get
Brock Long's opinion as to whether or not you are confident
that the response to Texas, Florida, the Virgin Islands, and
Puerto Rico was acceptable to your standards. I am not talking
about anybody else.
Mr. Long. I would say yes it was acceptable, but do we have
room for improvement? Always. Always. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. What room for improvements would you ask for?
Mr. Long. Well, here again, improvement is not just my
agency. It is the emergency management profession as a whole.
What I mean by that is, as I said, catastrophic readiness
bothers me from a low- to no-notice standpoint of do all
counties, do States, have their own ability to push water, ice,
MREs, and life-saving commodities?
Have they actually written disaster cost recovery plans
that will help them understand how to receive funding from 17
different agencies and their outcome-driven, you know, when it
comes? Do they know how they are going to mitigate their
communities when these dollars arrive? And they know what their
goals are going to be?
You know, are we pre-planning up front at all levels of
government and doing it in an integrated fashion to where we
are pushing forward to do the greatest good with the taxpaying
dollars?
Mr. Thompson. So can you get this committee in writing what
you consider the acceptable consequences for the response to
those four disasters?
Mr. Long. Sure, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Now, Administrator Long, I understand that the Trump
administration is requiring Puerto Rico to use public
assistance alternative procedures on a permanent work projects
as a condition of receiving public assistance grants. Why is
Puerto Rico being treated differently than other areas?
Mr. Long. We are not treating Puerto Rico differently. In
everything that we have done with Governor Rossello--we have
been playing phone tag this morning and as of yesterday as
well--is everything is negotiated. We believe that the Section
428 in the Stafford Act is the most prudent way to move
forward. We briefed the Governors, and ultimately he requested
that.
We don't strong-arm people into doing things by any means.
That is not the way I want to conduct business. The reason we
went with 428 is because of the sheer magnitude of the amount
of damage to the infrastructure and the deferred maintenance
problems that we ran into.
For example, there were thousands of roadway obstructions.
It would be too cumbersome, it would be too costly for FEMA to
write a project worksheet for each one of those obstructions
that could be reversioned and reversioned time and time again
and then FEMA ends up being there for 20 years. A 428 program--
--
Mr. Thompson. I am reclaiming my time.
Mr. Chair, I would like to have your response to that
specific question in writing back to the committee?
Mr. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Ranking Member yields back.
Per the agreement with the Ranking Member's U.C. request, I
now recognize Ms. Velazquez for an opening statement.
Ms. Velazquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you Ranking Member Thompson for the opportunity to
speak here today. I also want to recognize you both for your
leadership in examining the aftermath of last year's
unprecedented hurricane season.
This work is critical because our disaster response
capabilities must continually evolve to meet the types and
frequencies of the disasters that we face. While much has been
debated about the Federal Government's response to Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands, I am here today to find solutions.
I am worry about the emotional toll that this unprecedented
hurricanes have taken upon the people of Puerto Rico. I am here
today because the people in Puerto Rico are losing hope. More
than 300,000 have left the island.
I am here because I am worried that before we know it,
hurricane season will be before us again. The truth is before
the hurricanes made landfall it was widely known that if a
natural disaster, especially one of catastrophic proportions
were to hit the island, the most vulnerable asset was Puerto
Rico's energy grid. As everyone in this room knows, this turned
out to be the case.
So months after the hurricanes some areas still look as
they were hit yesterday. I was in my hometown of Yabucoa 2
weeks ago where Maria made landfall. It looks like the
hurricane struck yesterday. They still desperately need our
help.
So today, as we near the half-year, I want to say to you,
Mr. Chairman, we are all keenly aware of what is at stake come
June when hurricane season starts again.
As we hear from FEMA, the Army Corps, DHS and local
officials, I want to make sure that we all coalesce leaving
behind our political inclinations and we work to come up with a
meaningful plan for future disasters, one that would allow us
to proactively deploy Federal resources and prevent the
mistakes of the past.
Mr. Long, we all knew Hurricane Irma, Category 5, was in
its track to hit Puerto Rico and we all knew how vulnerable
Puerto Rico was in terms of the power grid.
What steps proactively, knowing what we knew then, we need
to take in order to be quickly there to deploy the Federal
assets that we need, not to wait 2 weeks later to send the
Comfort when we knew that no hospital in Puerto Rico will have
electricity?
The people in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Texas,
Florida, California, and frankly all those subject to the wrath
of climate change destruction need to have the full faith and
confidence in the institutions meant to keep America safe.
I look forward to hearing about what has worked so far and
what gaps this committee can address moving forward.
Thank you again for allowing me to participate today, and I
yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize Delegate Plaskett for an opening statement.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you very much. It is not coming on.
There it is. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Thompson for the opportunity to say a few words before
the committee for this hearing on preparedness, response, and
rebuilding.
As we all know now, Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused dozens
of injuries and some deaths in my district, the U.S. Virgin
Islands. The damage from the storms, the psychological and
long-term economic impact is unparalleled as the occurrence of
two Category 5 hurricanes making landfall in a specific area
over a span of 2 weeks.
Recovery is far from over and the rebuilding has yet to
begin. The catastrophic destruction caused by the hurricanes
continue to demand massive amounts of aid to address the
overwhelming needs of the victims, who very much remain faced
with the daunting task of rebuilding their lives.
I will give you a couple of examples of where this is quite
evident. It has been found that approximately 19,000 homes have
been damaged. However, the Army Corps installed 3,658 blue
roofs. It became a long negotiation with FEMA for approval in
spending for the sheltered restoration and essential power
program, the STEP program.
The Federal Government's ingenious alternative to temporary
housing to get people back in their homes rather putting them
in temporary shelters long-term. This rapid repair program, as
it is called, was announced later February. That would be
September is the hurricane, February, 6 months after the
storms, and homeowners are still awaiting inspection and
approvals.
The next hurricane season begins June 1. Mounds of
hurricane debris, a second example being including appliances
and scrap metal are disposed near public schools and pose real
health and safety risks to the people. Debris removal on St.
Thomas and St. John was managed by the Army Corps of Engineers.
On St. Croix, three times the size of St. Thomas, debris
collection was run by the local government. Debris was
collected three times faster on St. Croix as it was on St.
Thomas. You heard testimony here this morning that they are
going to be picking up that debris for removal from the islands
this week.
That is for islands that are on St. Thomas, 32 square miles
and 84 square miles of space on St. Croix--6 months for debris
removal. As of today, the period of the 100 percent Federal
cost share for debris removal and emergency protective measures
has ended although Congress has requested an extension from
FEMA.
I would ask unanimous consent to submit for the record a
letter written by the Governor of the Virgin Islands on
February 14, 2018 requesting an extension of debris removal,
100 percent Federal cost share and a March 13 letter from
Ranking Member Peter DeFazio of the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure and your own Ranking Member, Ranking Member
Bennie Thompson on the Committee on Homeland Security,
requesting of the President that this extension be granted.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Kenneth E. Mapp, Governor, U.S. Virgin Islands
February 14, 2018.
The Honorable Donald J. Trump,
President of the United States, The White House, Washington, DC 20500.
Dear Mr. President: Greetings to you from the grateful people of
the U.S. Virgin Islands.
On behalf of the tens of thousands of our families who continue to
benefit from the federal assistance and support that you have
authorized, I sincerely thank you. The federal team here in the
Territory remains extremely collaborative and is working very hard
alongside my team every day as we continue to make tremendous progress
in our recovery from the historic devastation caused by Hurricanes Irma
and Maria.
I am writing today to respectfully request that you extend the
period of 100% federal funding for FEMA Public Assistance Program
Emergency Work. Specifically, I am appealing to you to extend the time-
period by 120-days for Category A, including Direct Federal Assistance
related to Debris Removal activities and 180-days for Category B,
including Direct Federal Assistance related to Emergency Protective
Measures.
While we are extremely appreciative that you initially allowed us a
180-day period for 100% cost share, despite our best collective
efforts, we are not physically going to be able to finish all of these
projects by the March 15th deadline--and simply do not have the
financial resources available to cover the local match on the
remainder, which is expected to total tens of millions of dollars just
to finish the most immediate work.
When you generously authorized the 100% federal share on October
3rd of last year, less than two weeks after the Virgin Islands was
decimated by the second Category 5 hurricane in the month of September,
none of us could have fully anticipated how much time and effort it
would take to achieve the most immediate response and recovery
objectives, yet we have made substantial progress.
Over the past five months, we have restored nearly 100% of the
power; cleared our roads and harbors of debris; completed distribution
of unprecedented quantities of food, water and other essential
supplies; started to make emergency repairs in our homes; and together
with our federal partners have taken the first bold steps on the long
road to recovery.
I hope that you will understand that we have been diligent,
accountable and transparent in our efforts and rigorous in our response
and project management. Without the significant results I described
above to demonstrate our progress, I would be hesitant to ask the
federal government to continue to pay 100% of the costs for a little
bit longer.
In considering our request, please consider the following examples
of why we believe that an extension is justifiable:
Category A--Off-Island Shipment of Debris.--Our two landfills in
the USVI are both nearing capacity and under federal consent decree to
be closed; therefore, we are extremely limited in our debris removal
options.
For several months we had been working on a plan with FEMA and the
US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to incinerate most of the 750,000
cubic yards of vegetative material that has been collected; however, in
January, FEMA advised us that, due to their new interpretation of
territorial laws, they could no longer able to support incineration.
Subsequently, FEMA has agreed to ship hurricane debris out of the
Territory, but it will take additional months for the Mission
Assignment amendment to be fully implemented and for all debris to be
sent to its final destination off-island. While we are fully
cooperating with our federal partners, we cannot control FEMA's timing
for completion of the debris removal.
Similarly, FEMA, USACE, the US Coast Guard and EPA are working
under a Mission Assignment to crush and dispose of nearly 350 salvaged
vessels outside of the Territory. This has been a complex and well-
executed project; however, the schedule for this project is also
federally managed and will take at least several more weeks to complete
beyond the deadline.
Accordingly, on January 26th, our FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer
(FCO), Mr. William Vogel, wrote to Mr. Christopher Logan, FEMA Public
Assistance Division Director:
``FEMA's denial of ACI [Air Curtain Incineration] use was just
rendered. Understandably, this multi-agency coordination effort will
take time and resources that will extend outside the March 15, 2018
deadline. Based on these extenuating circumstances that are outside the
control of the territory, I recommend the approval of the time
extension and 100% federal cost share funding requested.''
We hope you will support FCO Vogel's recommendation.
Category B--Emergency Housing Repairs.--On February 12th the USVI
finally launched our FEMA-funded STEP Emergency Housing Repair program,
which is expected to complete critical repairs to the homes of as many
as 12,000 Virgin Islands families over the next 3 to 4 months.
While we now have a comprehensive plan and full slate of
contractors in place to carry out this work at an unprecedented pace,
we only received the final program guidance from FEMA on December 8th,
and even now, we are still awaiting the FEMA Project Worksheet that
will lock-in the federal funding commitment. While we are willing to
lean as far forward as possible, in order to be fiscally responsible,
we were forced to delay our start date until we at least received the
tentative funding commitment from FEMA which we only received last
week.
Category B--Temporary Hospitals and Schools.--One of the most
severe impacts of Hurricanes Irma and Maria is that they completely
decimated the critical healthcare system of the Territory, wiping out
our only three primary care facilities--one hospital each on St. Thomas
and St. Croix as well as the clinic on St. John. As a result, to this
day, any seriously ill or injured Virgin Islanders must be evacuated to
the mainland for medical care, and those with chronic illnesses who
were taken to the mainland after the hurricanes are unable to return
home.
Recognizing that it will very likely take at least a couple of
years to reconstruct our hospitals and clinic, on September 23rd--just
a few days after Hurricane Maria--our hospital leadership made their
initial request to FEMA for temporary (modular) hospital buildings.
Unfortunately, FEMA's first attempt to meet this requirement was to
provide a tent structure; however, after the first one arrived in late
October, all stakeholders agreed this would not provide a safe
condition for providing medical care in the Territory.
Since that time, we have been working with FEMA to gain approval
for installation of suitable modular structures; however, it was only
on January 30th that we finally received approval for the architectural
and engineering design work necessary to develop the bid specifications
for these temporary facilities. Once these specifications and bid
documents are completed, FEMA will then have to approve the purchase of
the modular buildings; FEMA expects that it will then take several
months for the structures to be manufactured, shipped and installed.
We do understand that this type of work takes time; however, we are
heavily reliant on federal expertise to guide us through the
procurement process and, as a result, we cannot move the process along
any faster than our federal partners can support.
Similarly, we have three dozen damaged school buildings, nearly a
third of which need to be completely reconstructed. In the meantime,
our students have been attending classes in split sessions and in
partially damaged buildings, some of which are plagued with mold and
have roofs that leak during the frequent rainstorms that we experience
throughout the year.
As you know, one of my top priorities is to ensure that all of our
school children are in a safe and secure learning environment when they
return to school next September. Although we have been working
diligently on this project since last September, it was just last week
that FEMA gave tentative approval for us to purchase the first 154
temporary (modular) classrooms. As is the case with the hospitals, the
design, bidding, manufacturing and transportation and installation of
these facilities will take many months and we are hopeful that with
maximum efforts by all that we can have these in place for the next
school year, but much of the timing remains under FEMA's control for
approval of both the scope of work and funding.
Mr. President, these are just a few examples of the types of
projects which, despite the best efforts of many hundreds of
hardworking federal and territorial staff, simply cannot realistically
be completed by March 15th. We have all tried very hard and now must
appeal to you for relief. I am hopeful that your intent in setting the
March 15th deadline was to encourage us to work as hard as we have, and
that you will see fit to recognize these remarkable accomplishments by
granting us the additional time for 100% federal funding as requested
above.
As Governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands, I understand that we cannot
expect our fellow U.S. citizens to carry the full financial burden of
our recovery; however, the fiscal reality is that we have borrowed
funds up to our full debt capacity, including taking FEMA Community
Disaster Loans, we have had to commit all of our insurance proceeds to
urgent needs beyond what federal programs will cover, we have exhausted
what small amount of emergency funds we had at our disposal, and we are
still facing the need for nearly a half-billion dollars of local match
on FEMA Public Assistance Permanent Work (Categories C-G) and the FEMA
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
For the foreseeable future, the only source of funds that we will
have available to us to cover the non-federal share on any FEMA work is
the HUD Community Development Block Grant (CDBG-DR) funds allocated to
us from Congressional appropriations. While we are thankful to have
recently been allocated $243 million of CDBG-DR funds as announced by
HUD just over a week ago, we have been strongly encouraged by HUD to
use these funds to the maximum extent possible to address unmet housing
and local business recovery needs. While we will undoubtedly have to
carve out some of the CDBG-DR funds for non-federal match on FEMA
projects, we would be very appreciative if you could help us to
minimize this by extending the 100% federal funding for all FEMA
Emergency Work.
Mr. President, let me end where I started, by thanking you
immensely for all that you and your Administration have done to support
us. I trust that the U.S. Virgin Islands can be viewed as a model for
working with the national government in responding to natural disasters
and more hopeful that our success can be viewed as one of the wins of
your Administration.
On behalf of a grateful Territory, I am deeply thankful for your
leadership and our partnership with our federal family.
Sincerely,
Kenneth E. Mapp,
Governor.
______
Letter From Honorable Peter DeFazio and Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
March 13, 2018.
President Donald J. Trump,
The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20500.
Dear President Trump: We write to urge you to extend the Federal
cost share for debris removal and emergency protective measures,
including direct Federal assistance, for the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI)
for damage caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria. As you are aware, the
100 percent Federal cost share for these activities expires on or
around March 15, 2018. Much work remains on the Islands, and an
extension of the 100 percent Federal cost share is crucial to
completing this work.
Under a mission assignment from FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers has been in charge of the timetable for collecting and
removing debris. As of March 2, 2018, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) and territorial agencies have collected 870,726 cubic yards of
storm debris, while the U.S. Coast Guard has overseen the pollution
mitigation and removal of 479 displaced vessels. Collected hazardous
waste includes 5,950 bags of medical waste, 1,525 propane tanks, 69
pounds of refrigerant, 14,464 batteries and other waste products.\1\
This is a substantial amount of debris over which the USVI has had no
control.
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\1\ https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2018/03/02/6-months-after-
two-category-5-hurricanes-struck-us-virgin-islands.
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This vast amount of debris has greatly exacerbated waste disposal
issues. In fact, two landfills on the Islands were at or near capacity
and, pursuant to a Consent Decree between USVI and the Environmental
Protection Agency, were scheduled for permanent closure before the
hurricanes. An extension of the cost share is warranted as certain
debris must be moved off Island and this entire process has been
outside of the USVI's control. The Territory should not have to pay a
cost share because the Federal Government did not complete its job in a
timely manner.
With respect to emergency protective measures, despite the
extensive damage and lack of power, the Virgin Islands Housing Finance
Authority was prepared to begin work in early January and requested
approval of a Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) program
at that time. FEMA, however, did not enter the request into its system
until on or about February 16, 2018. Although FEMA has still not issued
final approval of the STEP program request, the USVI recently began to
implement the program. As a result, the STEP program in the USVI is
barely underway. Once again, an extension of the Federal cost share is
necessary due to the delay caused by FEMA.
We strongly supported the recent extension of the 100 percent
Federal cost share for debris removal and emergency protective
measures, including direct Federal assistance, for Puerto Rico and
believe that conditions on the USVI justifying a similar extension. We
urge you to execute such an extension without delay. Thank you for your
consideration of this request.
Sincerely,
Peter DeFazio,
Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
Bennie G. Thompson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you.
Progress has been made, but despite best collective
efforts, the territory has not physically been able to finish
all of these projects by March 15 deadline, and it simply does
not have the financial resources able to cover the local match
on the remainder. The territory is still awaiting modular
structure for use by schools and medical centers.
Until then, public schooling for the children of the Virgin
Islands is operating on 4-hour rotations. This is expected to
continue at least into the next school year, and access to care
at hospitals remains limited. As a result, dialysis patients,
inpatient care, and other services in the entire U.S. Virgin
Islands remain off-island.
Congress has set up a system where FEMA structural demands
that it guards its budget and gives only when requested or
pressed by local governments. This is a structure which must be
changed. It does not support the best interests of American
citizens living in disaster areas.
FEMA has to, and as we have heard here, is willing and
needs to the support of Congress to streamline the processes so
that results and support can get to the people. The examples I
give are just a few of the issues that the Virgin Islands
remains faced with 6 months after Irma and Maria, and I look
forward to the discussion and more questions on how to resolve
these issues.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes Resident Commissioner Gonzalez-Colon
for an opening statement.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I want to
thank you and all Members, Ranking Members of this committee
for calling this hearing and allow us to be here on such an
important matter.
I will thank the witnesses for answering the call and
coming before Congress to answer for the response to an
unprecedented disaster that affected millions of American
citizens, including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
It has been more than 5 months now that since we saw an
event that none of us expected to see in American soil in our
lifetimes. As I mentioned in a prior committee testimony, the
jurisdiction of the size of Connecticut if that kind of
jurisdiction lost all power generation and distribution
capabilities. Most of the communication system collapsed.
Nobody would allow Connecticut to be without power for so many
months. That is the size of Puerto Rico.
We live in a scenario of the failure of all technological
resources in which we counted for our daily lives. I think that
when we check on that, we have still got 90 percent of
generation but that doesn't mean people got power in their
homes.
When you are looking to what is the goal to finish the job,
most of the agencies are saying that that could be even March
or even May of this year. So we are talking about 5 or 6 months
waiting for power, not to account the hundreds of people with
diseases or medical conditions that require for them to get a
generator or have power in their houses.
According to FEMA and to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
this has been the biggest mission to restore utilities in those
agencies' history. Yet, millions of Puerto Ricans ask
themselves, what is taking so long?
One of my biggest question will be how much more resources
both agencies need to finish the job? How long it will take to
finish the last line of help in the center part of the island,
which we still got a lot of towns with less than 40 percent of
power.
All things are currently occurring under discussion, but
the estimate of the Corps is that the restoration should be
done by the end of March. We are not talking about having a
reliable system or a resilient system. We are talking about the
level of destruction defy everyone's expectation.
But my biggest concern will be here is that are we or any
part of America spending months with their utilities down, what
should happen? You will have a lot of people angry waiting for
that kind of response.
So I do think the people of Puerto Rico are being very
patient waiting to receive that kind of help. We know that our
aging infrastructure was in a bad shape before the hurricane
and that is the reason I thank all Members of this committee
and the Members of the House who voted for assign the resources
in the last supplemental. I think that supplemental will help
guide Puerto Rico in terms of the recovery.
One of my biggest question will be how long it will take or
what do you need to finish the job in 30 days? We cannot say
that May or June or July are the best scenario for finish and
having a 100 percent recovery of the island when we are going
to face the hurricane season again during this summer. So this
is one of the biggest challenge we got.
I do ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to allow a letter
that I just sent to Commanding General Semonite and District
Commander Jason Kirk to the Army Corps of Engineers asking them
to extend the mission of the U.S. Army Corps and the contracts
that have been provided to the island that are set to expire in
March 19 and April 7, if you allow that to happen, Chairman?
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Letter From Hon. Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon
March 13, 2018.
LTG Todd Semionite,
Commanding General and Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 441 G St. NW, Washington DC, 20314-1000.
COL Jason A. Kirk,
District Commander, Jacksonville District, USACE PO Box 4970,
Jacksonville FL, 32232-019.
RE: POWER RESTORATION MISSION IN PUERTO RICO
Dear Lieutenant General Semionite and Coronel Kirk: Restoring
electrical power to Puerto Rico has been our collective priority since
the day Hurricane Maria exited the Island. Without power, our economy
could not move; without power, water could not be distributed; without
power, our fellow citizens were left in the dark.
Puerto Rico's critical need for power restoration in the aftermath
of disasters has been a test for all of us who have been involved.
USACE has been an invaluable resource in this moment of great need and
it is vital to see to the full completion of the maintain good lines of
communication between the team addressing the relief and rebuilding
missions in Puerto Rico.
As of today, we are officially at the 90 percent generation
capacity mark. However, the observation on the field makes it evident
that electrical generation does not correlate with electrical service
to homes across Puerto Rico. Only six out of 78 municipalities have
reported 100 percent power restoration, knowing full well that the
fragility of the system can erase these gains in the blink of an eye.
There are still municipalities in the central mountainous region with
less than 60 percent restoration of service, with power restored mainly
in the towns and commercial areas, leaving vast rural areas left in the
dark. The movement of crews from areas with a high restoration rate to
address the lagging areas only causes distress in the former
communities, who feel that they are being abandoned without the job
being completed. With well over a hundred thousand customers still
lacking service, that is distressing.
USACE's contracts with Fluor Corporation and Power Secure are set
to expire on March 19th and April 7th, respectively. Personnel from
these companies have been working for the past 5 months in the
municipalities that compose the mountain region--such as Cayey, Lares,
Ciales, Morovis, and Utuado, to name a few examples--and, due to the
difficulty of the terrain and the immensity of the devastation, they
have not concluded their task; they should not leave until they do so.
Raising camp and leaving PREPA to finish the job is not an option.
PREPA's contracting process to substitute USACE's personnel will take
time, delaying relief for people who have already spent more than 6
months without power. Moreover, last week's winter storm Riley further
highlights the uncertainty that would be caused if Fluor and Power
Secure were to leave, when personnel working under PREPA's mutual aid
agreement were recalled to attend to natural disasters in their own
jurisdictions. After 6 months of no power or unreliable service, the
average citizen on the street in those communities cannot tolerate even
the perception that at this point we will begin to wind down the urgent
relief mission and that the process of finishing the job will slow
down.
I must urge USACE in the strongest terms to maintain the intensity
of effort; to extend contracts as required, to maintain the presence of
crews at a higher level than projected to address the areas where the
job is not finished; to inform and advise the local authorities and the
public of what are the time lines and keep the communications lines
open; to assist in supplying PREPA with materials and technical
assistance if and as necessary. The goal must be to have near 100
percent restoration--not generation--of power within a month and for
the people in Puerto Rico to have visible evidence of this being
pursued with a sense of urgency.
I wish to impress on the Corps leadership the importance of taking
this need of the American citizens living in Puerto Rico into
consideration in the making of decisions about the power restoration
mission, and I am ready to bring before my colleagues in Congress any
need for additional appropriations or for statutory language that will
move this forward.
Again, I must thank all the men and women both military and
civilian in USACE who have helped so much in the effort of Puerto
Rico's recovery. Our mission is not complete. We must act quickly so
that this project may retain its priority position. I look forward to
an effective communication with the USACE team to make sure that Puerto
Rico's needs are addressed.
Thank you for your service,
Jenniffer A. Gonzalez-Colon,
Member of Congress.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Of course, we have got a lot of
questions but the biggest of all those questions will be do we
have the resources? Do we have the materials? Do we have the
crews to handle those issues? I do know that that is not the
mission of the Corps of Engineers, but in a moment like this we
want you to finish the work you begin.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that, I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back.
We will go back to Members of the full committee, Mr.
Rogers, from Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Long, it is good to have you here. It is refreshing to
finally have a witness that doesn't have an accent before this
committee. But before I get to my questions, I wanted to
address some of the comments about local government officials
being disgruntled after a disaster.
I have been in this business 32 years. I was elected as a
local county commissioner first and then served in the
legislature 26 years here. Seen a lot of disasters over that
period of time. These are traumatic events that are
overwhelming to communities and is a Herculean effort to come
in and try to do recovery.
I have always seen disgruntled local officials, and we
always will. There is never going to be the perfect recovery.
But we then need to remember how far we have come.
After the hurricane that struck New Orleans, that was a
very poor performance anybody's standard. But FEMA has come a
long way since then. I was on this committee and down in New
Orleans during that period, but the last FEMA administrator was
a complete pro and brought that department a long way.
This FEMA administrator is top quality, too, and they are
doing a good job. They have done a really good job in this last
year with these overwhelming numbers of disasters. We need to
keep in mind that perfection is never going to happen.
But with that, Mr. Long, there was a story that came out
that disturbed me. You know, it was in February that said it
was reported that an entrepreneur, a Tiffany Brown, was awarded
a $156 million contract to provide some 30 million meals to
Puerto Rico in the wake of Hurricane Maria. She delivered only
50,000 with only some limited staff working for her.
Then the story went on to describe how shoddy those meals
were and how incapable she really was. It turns out she had
been getting Government contracts from a lot of different
departments over the years that she was not able to perform.
How is that happening? I mean, because it is just not
happening in FEMA. How did this woman get this huge contract
that she couldn't keep, fortunately, and we got somebody
professional that took it. But how would that happen?
Mr. Long. So there was never through the Federal awardee
procurement systems that we use Government-wide, particularly
FEMA as well, there was never an alert on the background that
this company was not able to perform to meet the ramifications
of the contract.
Let me back up to talk about the magnitude of this year as
well when it comes to procurement and contracts. Going into the
2017 hurricane season we had 59 pre-positioned contracts to do
water, ice, MREs, blue tarps, plastic sheeting, whatever. We
had to initiate 1,973 additional contracts to cover the entire
country from Calcinuria to the Virgin Islands.
Out of the nearly 2,000 contracts we had, only three were
canceled, Tribute being one of them. But there was no alert
process that went through that said stay away from this
company. Now, of the two companies that defaulted on the three
contracts, two of them no taxpaying dollars went out to.
You are correct. We spent $225,000 on 50,000 meals which
were delivered. They were not packaged correctly, in my
opinion, and the timing of getting the meals, for whatever
reasons, they defaulted on the contract. We canceled it in our
due diligence. Three out of 1,973 contracts were canceled.
The problem with it is, is that now my agency as a result
of going through this because there may have been other parts
of the Government that didn't do their due diligence to throw
the red flags into the system, now it is incumbent upon my
agency to make sure that if the actions that were not taken or
if they were trying to defraud us or whatever, that we alert
them into the system as then follow the Department process if
deemed necessary.
Mr. Rogers. OK. Shifting gears, during these multiple
disasters how did your emergency communications work, given the
fact that power, as we just heard, power has been out for so
long. Did that affect your ability for your first responders to
communicate with each other and communicate with local folks?
Mr. Long. So obviously, as I said in my opening statement,
the problem is is we do not have a resilient and a redundant
communications network so everything----
Mr. Rogers. Why?
Mr. Long. Well, because I think we have gotta reach out to
the private-sector partners that, you know, we are being
desensitized to our cellphones and to digital technologies. We
are stepping away from landlines. But in the California
wildfires a good portion of the capability was burned up. A
good portion of the capability was blown out by Hurricane Irma
and Maria.
Anytime you lose the ability to communicate two things
happen. You lose situational awareness, you lose the ability,
for example, in my opinion, it wasn't that there wasn't enough
food and water on the island of Puerto Rico. It was
communicating to people where to go to get it. It makes
everything difficult.
We have to go back and navigate by stars, per se, to enter
people into our individual assistance programs. So we have to
strike up a very, you know, thoughtful conversation with the
private-sector vendors of how do we build a system that doesn't
go down, that is prepared for all hazards so that we don't lose
that capability? It is crucial. It is beyond FEMA's ability to
do it.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you for your service.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Long. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking
Member for very wise effort. I hope that we can have succeeding
hearings on the on-going recovery of our respective
communities.
Let me acknowledge that to date, and the numbers may be
somewhat inaccurate, but let me offer to say that there were 88
deaths due to Hurricane Harvey in the State of Texas and about
30 as of September 4 in my surrounding area, including my
constituents who were a family of 6 who drowned trying to
escape in northeast Houston.
I think it is important to acknowledge again that when we
speak we speak for our brothers and sisters in the Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico, certainly in Florida and Louisiana and
certainly in California. We speak in two different formats, one
in appreciation. Being at the command station from the moment
Hurricane Harvey hit, being based at the George R. Brown
Convention Center in Houston, there was no doubt that it was a
collective effort that we were dependent upon the FEMA's rescue
part of their work.
Certainly along with them the Coast Guard, and I personally
am reminded of the first responders as we were sitting police
and fire with two phones to our ears as people were calling in
to be rescued. Those were difficult and dangerous and troubling
times that many of my colleagues have been involved in in their
own respective districts.
So Administrator, let me first of all say thank you and of
course as you well know I had more than 300-plus individuals
gathered in my district not even enough on Monday last who were
denials, people in hotels that were crying and frustrated about
whether they could stay or find housing. So we are still in a
period of recovery.
I think it is important to express appreciation, but also
to be honest on where we are today. Let me quickly try to
express my interest and concern with breaking up FEMA or having
FEMA have components of the rescue period, which is that early
stage and then long-term recovery.
I have a text on my phone from a pastor who indicates that
inspectors came and there was 4 feet of water and they said it
was 4 inches and denied. My meeting was based upon recovery and
asked people to bring their denial letters and I must say, all
of our local officials will acknowledge that the numbers of
denials in our community were enormous.
They particularly hit minority communities. In this text,
it indicated the inspectors were not assessing some of our
older homes properly and one statement, which I am trying to
research, but I think it is important, that there were too many
black employees that were hired that were temporary. We hope
that that is not true.
But my question to you is: What are your thoughts about
reforming FEMA on the rescue immediate and then the long-term
part of it? As you answer that question, would you answer the
question about the enormous number of vacancies that I hope to
put into the record--I ask unanimous consent to put in the
record--the list of vacancies which are enormous. I don't want
to take time to call them at FEMA. I don't know how you can
possibly do your job as you have indicated when there are so
many vacancies.
Then the question with our----
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
List Submitted by Hon. Jackson Lee
Positions that are Vacant or are Designated as Acting
Source: Federal Yellow Book Pages Winter 2018 Edition (pages 423-428)
Office of the Administrator
Advisor to the Administrator (Vacant)
Counselor to the Administrator (2 positions) (Vacant)
Assistant to the Administrator Area of Responsibility: National Guard
Bureau (Vacant)
Office of the Deputy Administrator (Acting)
Senior Advisor to the Deputy Administrator (Vacant)
Staff Assistant and Scheduler (Vacant)
Staff Assistant (Vacant)
Office of Executive Secretariat
Director (Vacant)
Office of Equal Rights
Affirmative Employment Program Manager (Vacant)
Equal Employment Opportunity Specialist (Vacant)
Senior Advisor to the Secretary
Senior Advisor to the Secretary for Emergency Management (Vacant)
Center for Faith-Eased and Neighborhood Partnerships
Director (Vacant)
Deputy Director (Vacant) [The only position staffed is the Executive
Officer]
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
Chief Financial Officer (Acting)
Deputy Chief Financial Officer (Acting)
Business Operations Staff Director (Vacant)
Office of Policy, Program Analysis, and International Affairs
Associate Administrator (Acting)
Deputy Assistant Administrator (Acting)
Grant Program Directorate
Senior Advisory (Vacant)
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System Division
Director (Vacant)
National Preparedness Directorate
Assistant Administrator (Acting)
Deputy Assistant Administrator (Acting)
National Exercise Division
Director (Vacant)
National Integration Center
Director (Acting)
Deputy Director (Vacant)
National Preparedness Assessment Division
Director (Acting)
Deputy Director and Program Evaluation and Special Projects Branch
Chief (Vacant)
Enterprise Business
Chief (Vacant)
Support Services and Facilities Management Division
Director (Vacant)
Executive Officer (Vacant)
Publishing, Personal Property and Support Branch Chief (Vacant)
Regional Operations Branch Chief (Vacant)
Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer
Deputy Chief Component Human Capital Officer (Acting)
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Deputy Chief Procurement Officer (Vacant)
Executive Officer (Vacant)
Field Operations Directorate
Deputy Director (Vacant)
Recovery Directorate
Deputy Assistant Administrator (Acting)
National Disaster Recovery Planning Division
Contract Financial Management Branch Chief (Acting)
Technology and Support Branch Chief (Vacant)
Response Directorate Operations Division
Director (Acting)
Federal Insurance Mitigation Administration
Associate Administrator (Acting)
Administrative Specialist (Vacant)
Senior Counselor (Vacant)
Risk Analysis Division
Director (Vacant)
Assessment and Planning Branch Chief (Vacant)
Business Analysis Branch Chief (Vacant)
Risk Insurance Division
Director (Vacant)
Risk Reduction Division
Director (Vacant)
Deputy Director (Vacant)
Floodplain Management Branch Chief (Vacant)
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Resources the Texas General
Land Office is trying to staff up. We need 90. I understand
there are 33. I don't know if FEMA will help with the monies
coming in that are part of FEMA assistance dollars to be able
to help do the housing part of the second half of the work.
So could you start on the reordering of FEMA and the
staffing and how we are going to recover? Let me also
acknowledge Representative--I am sorry, Mary Turner and our
Harris County judge, the Governor, all of us working together?
I yield to you.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Congresswoman. So in regards to the
response, you know, it is my job to coordinate the firepower of
32 Federal Government agencies down to do the life-saving,
life-sustaining mission, which from where I sit was pretty
unprecedented, the number of lives that were saved and
different things that are there.
The problem is is that it has got to be more than FEMA from
the standpoint in the recovery, but I believe it starts on the
preparedness and then it goes back to a true culture of
preparedness. For example, there is too much of an insurance
gap and we learned that in Harvey. We learned that in Texas
alone that we have got to go back to the basics to say that any
house can flood regardless if you are shown in a flood map or
not.
We have to double the number of insurance policies and, you
know, the level of assistance that FEMA puts out on an average
through individual assistance is like $3,000, $4,000, $5,000.
If you are properly insured the average payout in Harris
Country right now is like $110,000. How do we help people get
insurance and properly insured to speed up their recovery?
I cannot make people whole, as you realize. You know, the
toughest part is we still have a huge population in hotels and
it is the toughest part is transitioning them out of the hotel
and into more of a housing solution that is on their property.
That is going to require more than FEMA again. We are not
housing experts, and that is why I am asking for the granting
authority to be able to give the Governor the ability to
purchase their own trailers, purchase their own innovative
housing, you know, tech capabilities that are out there.
I believe that a Governor can do it faster, quicker, and
cheaper than FEMA ever can because I am having to physically
buy manufactured homes. I am having--use through the defense
production authorities that I have. It is a cumbersome, time-
consuming process.
I proactively put travel trailers back on the table because
there is more volume and easier access to travel trailers to be
able to do that. But I am not the housing expert. We have to
have more conversations with HUD, with SBA, with our Governors
to say what is the right mix? What are the swim lanes and
capabilities that we need? Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
I recognize Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for your
attendance. I am over here. I will start out as as a guy who
has worked in this arena a little bit, State disasters and some
Federal disasters as as a Pennsylvania guardsman. I am just
wondering, especially in these broad-scale disasters from
FEMA's standpoint and from the Corps' standpoint as well, is
there anything that the Guard can do better? Is there anything
that inhibits us?
I know that it is hard to pre-position certain--you don't
know what you need sometimes until you need it, right? You have
different States and different services, whether it is the Air
Guard or the Army Guard with different requirements and so on
and so forth.
I am just wondering from your standpoint is there anything
that we fall short on? Is there anything that we can improve
State-to-State to respond and be helpful and responsive in a
critical time of need?
Mr. Long. Well, first of all, my hat is off to the National
Guard. I mean, we, you know, here again, they are one of the
most critical partners that we have and one of the most
critical assets that a Governor has. We saw them do yeoman's
work when it comes to delivering water, ice, MREs, to saving
lives.
The issues that have been raised to me by General Lengyel
and others and as well as Governors falls in line with the
emergency management mutual aid assistance compacts in EMAC.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Long. The speed in which the National Guard assets are
reimbursed. I don't have the authority. If you were the
Governor of New York and say and Governor Rossello worked out
an EMAC deal and you are going to provide Governor Rossello
your National Guard, I don't have the ability to reimburse you
directly.
All my reimbursement authority under the Stafford Act has
to go through the Governor to you so you are dependent upon
that Governor, the requesting Governor, reimbursing you back.
That is the problem as I understand it. I don't know how to
solve that problem but----
Mr. Perry. So that is not a FEMA relationship, so to speak.
It is more of a guard bureau-to-State relationship----
Mr. Long. Well, EMAC----
Mr. Perry [continuing]. As you understand it?
Mr. Long. Yes, so EMAC is a Governor-to-Governor contract.
Quite frankly, I don't know if you want FEMA involved in that
Governor-to-Governor contract.
Mr. Perry. Right. I am not saying we do. I just want to
know where the shortcomings----
Mr. Long. Right.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. So we can try and improve.
Mr. Long. Yes, right, so that is it. If I get involved then
they have got to adhere to my procurement rules, 2 CFR Part
200. Honestly, you don't want that.
Mr. Perry. So it is essentially just the speed between
which Governors come to agreement and then inform you?
Mr. Long. Right, and then reimburse each other.
Mr. Perry. OK.
Mr. Long. You know, it is they have to cut that contract up
front.
Mr. Perry. OK. I have another question. I am sensitive to
some of the things that my good friend Ms. Gonzalez spoke to
regarding power and per the information I have it is, you know,
September 20 was when the hurricane hit Puerto Rico.
Irma I think about 10 days prior so they already sustained
damage from Irma. Now we are, you know, we are nearly 7 months
on, right? You know, March 20 it will be 7 months.
From the information I have Puerto Rico's power has been
restored and I am curious about generation because the
information I have says power has been restored to customers 90
percent, Virgin Islands 99.8, St. Thomas 99.1, or St. Croix--
St. Thomas and St. Croix.
So the question I have is, is we had a hearing some time
ago about how many crews the folks that are restoring the
power, whether it is generation or whether it is distribution
on the island, how many crews were available and we get the
situation with PREPA, how bad the infrastructure was prior to
the storm and that the ports of entry, whether air or sea were
damaged heavily and it just made it hard to, even if you had
pre-positioned assets, all those things withstanding, how many
crews do you know, if you do know, are still on the ground on
the island and to do this work? How many do you think are
required?
Mr. Long. I would need to yield to General Jackson.
Mr. Perry. Sure, absolutely.
Mr. Long. He owns the contracts for that.
General Jackson. Sure, Congressman, thanks for that. You
know, at the height of the activity on Puerto Rico where we had
the most number of boots on the ground we had about 6,000 line
workers that were a combination of what fell underneath the
Corps of Engineers command and control and what fell underneath
the contracts that PREPA's managing.
Today the Corps of Engineers has about 1,317 folks on the
ground. PREPA has 2,100 or so, 2,200 line workers on the
ground. That has changed over time.
There is something called a unified command group which is
headed by Mr. Carlos Torres, who is the Governor's storm
response coordinator. He is the one who leads a group, includes
FEMA, Corps of Engineers and includes PREPA leadership and
representatives from the Governor's office.
Every day they meet and they take a look at material
availability, prioritization of line repair, and they make
decisions on how lines are assigned, what requirements are out
there and try to----
Mr. Perry. Sir, I don't want to cut you short, but I am out
of time here. I am interested to know what your estimate is of
100 percent distribution completion on the island, if you know?
If you know that?
General Jackson. Congressman----
Mr. Perry. It has been a long time to be without power. I
mean, you can imagine, right?
General Jackson. Yes, it has been a long time. We are
estimating or we have estimated that it would be probably mid-
May before 100 people, 100 percent of all the stuff----
Mr. Perry. Mid-May?
General Jackson [continuing]. Is done. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perry. All right, thank you.
I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
Mr. Payne is recognized.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here and appreciate your testimony.
You know, staying focused on the territories, in Puerto
Rico nearly 1 in 3 schools lacks electricity and many also lack
consistent access to clean water. This has forced many schools
to operate on a limited daily schedule leading to school-age
children in Puerto Rico missing out on more than 20 million-
fold days of learning.
What plans do you have in place to ensure that no displaced
child is out of an educational setting for more than 30 days in
the future?
Mr. Long. Congressman, I would have to get back to you in
writing on that. I don't know.
Mr. Payne. Well, you know, we have situations that I have
brought up in the past surrounding children and their needs
during disasters. You know, we feel that more attention has to
be paid to the special circumstances not being with the parents
reconnecting with them after disasters.
The example that I use the most is several years ago the
tornadoes in Oklahoma, there was an issue about reuniting
children with their parents after the situation. Also the need
to identify areas of learning. You know, their daycare centers
sometimes aren't listed and first responders just went right
past, you know, because they are in private areas.
So we need to designate how we locate children as well in
these areas. But it is something that, you know, I have been a
proponent of, making sure that we have some type of, you know,
they are not little people.
They are children and so they need guidance and someone to
look out for them during these issues as they arise and then
being reunified with their parents.
So please, as you formulate, you know, your mission going
forward that you keep that in mind and also, you know, we can
discuss it more at at a later day.
Mr. Long. Just a couple resources we do have resources for
children in disasters. I agree with you. We have to do more. I
have two young boys, 11 and 8, and I think, but here again,
this is far greater than FEMA.
This is a partnership with FEMA, nongovernmental
organizations and the Department of Education for example,
because there are tons of statistics. You know, for example,
spousal abuse goes up after disasters, all types of things. So
we have to be able to recognize these things.
But here again, I don't know if FEMA's the expertise when
it comes to this, and we need partners. The other thing is is
that FEMA in the past has developed programs such as NMETS. It
is the National mass evacuation tracking systems for large-
scale disaster evacuations of trying to reconnect.
We have established family reunification concepts after
disasters as well. It might just be we need to further promote
and train at the local and State level as to what the
availability of our resources are. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Payne. Absolutely, and, you know, last year, you know,
FEMA had the National advisory council recommend the creation
of something along that line to support center of excellence,
you know, type training for emergency preparedness. So, you
know, that might be an area to look at as well.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
Mr. Donovan is recognized.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all three of you, for coming and sharing your
expertise with us. I am the Chairman of the subcommittee of
this committee that deals with emergency preparedness,
response, and communications. Five minutes of questioning, even
with all my colleagues, there is not enough time for us to
delve into all the areas of, as we have put as the title of
this hearing, ``Lessons Learned''.
So I was wondering if there is a way you could compile for
us the lessons that we have learned from these disasters? It is
absolutely amazing to me the amount of disasters that you had
to deal with simultaneously or consecutively with the resources
that you have. We haven't even talked about the wildfires and
mudslides in California, the amount of hurricanes we have had.
In my role as Chairman, it would be very helpful to us if
we had a compilation of all the things that you have learned
from this that we could help you for the future. Because places
like Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Florida, Texas,
Louisiana, they are going to get hit with other hurricanes.
My understanding is, from my colleagues who live in tornado
areas or even earthquake areas, there is not much warning
there, but with hurricanes we follow these models, these
patterns from storms developing off the coast of Africa and
then try to predict where they are going to hit. So it would be
very helpful to us if we had that so we could help you.
In my role, I visited Puerto Rico about 3 weeks after the
storm and then recently with Jenniffer went down to--and John
Rutherford--went down to see how the recovery is coming.
The island was consumed. The storm was bigger than the
island. It sat over there. My recollection is it moved at about
8 miles an hour after it hit landfall and for 36 hours dumped
more rain than Puerto Rico experiences in an entire year. The
ground couldn't absorb it.
When we flew over in Blackhawk helicopters without doors
and I told you in the muster room I am afraid of heights, but
we went up to visit the island and to observe all the
devastation. The island was brown there.
The challenges of getting supplies to folks who were just
isolated because they are an island, and I suspect when you
have a disaster that you are responding to in the mainland you
could drive supplies to. You have them pre-staged somewhere and
after the storm is over you can--it is very difficult, the
airport being closed, the port being closed. Your first
responders on Puerto Rico being victims themselves, very
challenging.
We witnessed when we went back a few weeks ago to see how,
General, you have to take telephone poles by helicopter up to
the mountains to get them into the ground and then by
helicopter stringing along the electrical wiring to provide
those poor folks up there with electricity.
It is an amazing challenge and one that I think, again,
would be helpful if you could tell us in some type of report of
what we could do to better be prepared for the future.
One of the things I would also ask you to do for me, Brock,
is I have a lot of attached housing where I live. I represent
New York City, parts of New York City, and to mitigate for
flood insurance a lot of the people that live in my district
cannot raise their houses.
So if FEMA could come up with some mitigators to those
folks who can't raise their homes so they can experience
reductions in their flood insurance, that would be very
helpful.
The last thing I would like to speak about before my time
runs out, I have constituents who took that responsibility and
spoke about and are trying to get flood insurance.
But they are not able to pay it in full at one time. Part
of the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014
created this system where people could pay by payment plan.
One particular woman who reached out to me, Camille Soulle,
who tried to do that and the system is not in place yet. So if
you could look into that for me, I would very much appreciate
it.
Again, this woman and many people are trying to do the
right thing, protect their properties by having National flood
insurance, but can't pay it in full or in whole and want to use
this payment plan that we have put into place. If you could
look into that for me I would very much appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time. Thank
you.
Chairman McCaul. All right. The gentleman yields.
Mrs. Demings from Florida is recognized.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and to our
Ranking Member and to our witnesses. Thank you for being here
today and thank you for all that you do to restore families
after natural disasters. I grew up in Florida, still represent
Florida, served as a first responder and so I am no stranger to
hurricanes.
Mr. Long. I do want to ask you, according to reports, FEMA
has denied about 23 percent of the 2.9 million applications for
individual assistance after Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria,
with the majority of those denials being in Florida. Several of
my constituents report that their applications have been
rejected for technicalities, typos, or an omitted document.
Rather than a plain language request for additional
information, they received a 4-page denial. My office had the
opportunity to assist one of the families whose home was
destroyed by patches of toxic mold covering every surface, but
because they were missing one insurance form they faced a
termination of their transitional housing assistance.
Now fortunately we were able to help them resubmit their
application and they qualified for an additional 18 months of
continued rental assistance.
So my question is how does this denial rate compare to
prior disasters? What factors might explain the difference, if
any?
Mr. Long. So I don't know what the, you know, where that
rate compares, but I can tell you that the fundamental problem
when it goes back to reducing the complexity of FEMA, one of
the problems that we have is we immediately go out and say call
1-800-621-FEMA. We blanket communities.
The problem that I have with that is is that we need to
change the dialog on that. It needs to be call 1-800-621--if
you meet this specific criteria to where aid can be rendered to
begin with, because it sets up a negative relationship with the
disaster survivor versus our agency right off the bat. It leads
to too many calls being rejected.
Now, if your citizens are being not afforded individual
assistance because of simple technicalities, I would like to
work with you directly on what those technicalities are so that
we can streamline whether it is the way the website is designed
to register systems or maybe we got it wrong and I can refer
you back to an NIA case manager in the joint field office in
Florida. I would be happy to do that.
We regularly have dialog like that, and I do believe it is
incumbent upon us to make sure that we leave no stone unturned
when it comes to the citizens, so----
Mrs. Demings. So would you say the process if a person did
not have all of the documentation that they needed, do you know
if the process is an automatic denial at that point? Or do you
see----
Mr. Long. Well----
Mrs. Demings [continuing]. This as additional information?
Mr. Long. I wouldn't say it is a denial, but the problem
is, is that people don't come prepared to the first phone call
because we are not doing enough to say when you call make sure
you have your insurance information, Social Security number,
and in some cases I think it is a messaging problem that we
have got to get better at the first time.
Then maybe they come back and then they are put in. But if
there is a true fundamental flaw with the system and the way it
is designed then I am all ears. I would be happy to understand
it and change it.
Mrs. Demings. OK. Thank you for that. Earlier you talked
about Texas and it being a model, and I believe you said that,
you know, in order to appropriately respond it has to be
Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-executed. Is
that correct?
Mr. Long. Right.
Mrs. Demings. You know, and as I mentioned in my opening
statement, you know, being no stranger to hurricanes in
Florida, could you talk a little bit about the Florida response
and may perhaps we might be able to improve and at which level?
Mr. Long. So Governor Scott has done a tremendous job as
well, and me calling out Texas specifically is no shot at
Governor Scott by any means or any of the other Governors.
Florida is also a model. Florida has also been a gold standard
as well.
They are also flush with resources, too. You know, the
thing about it is what I appreciate is, is that when a Governor
takes over the response and the recovery and provides me clear
outcome goals of what they are striving for, then I can better
the resources down to them from a financial standpoint or from
physical resource standpoint.
I would like FEMA to become more of a block-granting agency
to fund the response and allow the community to respond and
recover the way they see fit. I don't know Florida better than
you, ma'am.
I don't know Florida better than Governor Scott. So how do
I get the authorities and arrange the support down to where
Florida can recover the say Florida wants to recover? Puerto
Rico can recover the way Puerto Rico wants to recover.
It is my goal to provide technical expertise to Director
Wes Maul is going to be testifying with you together to say,
hey, here are some best practices. Here is the way to use this
funding to ultimately create a more resilient Florida.
I am tired of going back into communities as an emergency
manager and repeating this vicious cycle of things get blown
out, we repair it. Things get blown out and we repair it. That
is why I believe we have to also do more mitigation on the
front end to prevent these things.
The insurance gap is only growing. It is frustrating
because when people are uninsured or let their insurance lapse,
like what we saw in California, they paid off their mortgage,
the fire comes in and burns down their house. They are trying
to have a little extra money in retirement.
As a result then that becomes an individual assistance
problem. My individual assistance program grows daily the need
for FEMA is growing daily. I want it to go the opposite
direction. But we can't do it alone.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
Mr. Higgins is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Long, for your continued service and General
Jackson, as well Mr. Kelly. Thank you for being here today.
I represent south Louisiana, gentlemen, and we are
certainly well-experienced regarding hurricanes and natural
disasters and recovery thereafter and preparation prior. My
State provided support to Texas pre-staging a rescue operation,
sheltering prior to Harvey, and in the wake of Harvey.
I personally went into Texas immediately after Harvey on
the Thursday morning and participated in rescue operations on
the ground in Texas. I would like to talk about infrastructure
challenges in the continental United States versus Puerto Rico.
But regarding the process for reimbursement to the States
for domestic response, Mr. Long, what do you believe is an
acceptable time frame for reimbursement? How can FEMA improve
the process for reimbursement to the States that at their own
expense, sometimes tremendous expense, immediately participate
in sheltering and rescue operations in the wake of a natural
disaster?
Mr. Long. So we started to look at and it is something that
we have implemented kind-of after post-Katrina as expedited
public assistance payments down, particularly if there are
liquidity issues or issues to pay for the emergency services
right off the bat, which I believe is a success. We need to
continue to do it.
Always we have to protect against waste, you know, waste or
inaccurate funding and that type of thing. We----
Mr. Higgins. Do you think the reimbursement process that we
hope to improve would be included in you vision for reform and
streamlining the operations? Where greater availability of
block grants to Governors and give them----
Mr. Long. Yes.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Give them the opportunity to make
these decisions and be your filters so we get FEMA out of it?
And allow the Governors of the 50 sovereign States greater
flexibility on how to respond quickly?
Mr. Long. Absolutely. That is--you know, and we have to do
it. It would be a phased, delicate process to make sure that
we, you know, we are protecting the taxpaying dollars but we
are affording the Governor to truly find ways to be resilient.
I believe Governors can do business quicker and more
innovatively than the Federal Government.
Mr. Higgins. I agree, and I support that effort and hope to
be a part of the legislative effort to make that happen.
General Jackson, regarding infrastructure post-storm,
Houston, one of the most advanced cities in the Nation,
certainly by any measure, and yet in the city of Houston both
air traffic control towers at the two major airports in Houston
were down after Harvey.
First responders--of course commercial traffic was shut
down, but first responders' air traffic was handled through the
Army Memorial Hospital air traffic control tower at their--they
have a helipad, of course, at their airport.
It struck me as in the continental United States the level
of construction and infrastructure is quite different from, for
instance in Puerto Rico, the island of Puerto Rico. Yet even in
Texas, in Houston, the air traffic control towers were down
immediately after Harvey for first responders to use.
So regarding the standards for grid construction, for
instance in Puerto Rico, my understanding, my sources advise me
that prior to the storm approximately 20 percent of the grid
was down in Puerto Rico. Is that correct?
General Jackson. Congressman, the grid had some significant
deferred maintenance issues and significant operability issues
before Irma hit. Irma, when it came through caused some damage
to the grid that wasn't fully repaired before Maria came in and
further damaged the grid.
Mr. Higgins. So your efforts in Puerto Rico, have you
essentially restored the grid to its pre-storm performance?
General Jackson. Congressman, the Stafford Act allows us to
restore the grid in its current configuration, but in fact, the
grid in Puerto Rico is about 44 years old. The average grid in
the rest of the United States is about 15 years old.
So as we have gone and repaired the lines and the towers
and all the components of the grid, and it is only transmission
and distribution. We haven't been given any authority to work
generation other than temporary generation that we have used to
augment repair operations.
I mean, we are working continuing to build that back, and
it is going to be a much better grid than it was when we
inherited it just because of the State that it was in when we
took over the restoration effort.
So it is not changing in configuration so we are not
burying lines where lines were strung with transmission towers
before-hand. But we are replacing what was damaged with modern
equipment up to code. You know, the Puerto Rican grid had about
15 different types of transformers. The industry standard is
four.
So as we have had to piece this back together we have had
to put different components back in the system, which is going
to make it a more efficient system when we are done.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for your very thorough answer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Donovan [presiding]. The gentleman yields.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for your service. This is titled ``Lessons
Learned''. Part of what I want to get into is that those
lessons learned should be geared toward mitigation and
prevention in the future of disasters. In that case I also want
to associate with everything that is being said by the other
Members, but I want to gear in on my district in particular.
It is probably the most coastal area. It is the south
shore, the south coast, Cape Cod, and the islands. If it is not
one of the biggest coastal areas it is one of them. I just want
to address some of the important issues.
I think this boils down to we can't be expecting all of you
to do more, and we are going to have to do more the way the
cycle of climate change is going, with less. But in my
district, you know, there are some examples. We are doing a 701
study on the Cape Cod Canal, vital safety area, navigation area
in our area that has just been so delayed.
We have two connectors to almost 300,000 people in Cape Cod
area--only two bridges. There is a study with that that is just
so delayed. It is on-going, but delayed, and the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts is ready and willing to work with us, and that
is holding things back.
The potential for disaster is enormous. We have a nuclear
plant, right, in one of the third worst in terms of safety,
built on the coast, Fukushima's designed plant, yet those two
bridges can cut off access to all those people if there is any
kind of disaster.
On a daily basis the dredging issues in our area are
enormous and that affects rescue missions and dealing with it.
So I want to say just a couple of things. No. 1,
particularly General Jackson, we deal with the Army Corps daily
in our area, the personnel there, the administration there, the
communication is excellent.
We work together. We strategize together. They do a great
job, but again, the real issue, and when we talk to them is, we
don't have enough money to do this. There is no way to
prioritize for everything that is of equal or greater need. We
have to do a job here.
Now, I have helped with the appropriation process here
targeting in areas without earmarking, but we have been able to
do that and work together. I understand the constraints that
all of you are sitting under if you have to comment about not
being funded adequately. Not just this administration but
administrations before, sort-of they don't encourage you to say
you are not adequately funded.
But the plain fact is you just can't do, I think it is
irrefutable, you just can't do all these things with less.
So couple of things No. 1, I would ask you if you could,
outside the hearing, in the next few weeks maybe deal with our
staff here on that end. We are dealing so well with your staff
in the regional level, honestly, working these things out.
Also if you could just comment generally, if you could,
with the factor that not having enough resources to please
everyone, without talking about budget numbers and getting
yourself maybe compromised. How important that is, if you
could?
General Jackson. Congressman, sure, I will be glad to do
that. First of all, you know, authorized but unconstructed
projects that are in the Corps' portfolio right now top $96
billion in fiscal year 2016 numbers. But we are only able to
generate about slightly over $1 billion every year in
construction funding because there is not a limitless Federal
budget.
I mean, there are a lot of demands, a lot of hard decisions
have to be made. So but that is just the fact of what we have
to deal with every day.
What we are doing is we are working very closely with the
administration as they are putting forth their infrastructure
package to the Congress. You talked about the speed at which we
operate. We have identified or helped to identify a number of
legislative proposals that will help us move faster.
We are working a number of proposals inside the
administration to allow us to operate more quickly. We are
participating in all of the different initiatives that the
administration put forth specifically on regulatory
streamlining, permit streamlining, and environmental review
streamlining.
We are fully participative in all that as a whole of
Government, which allows us and all the other resource agencies
that work together to be able to sort-of move faster than we
have been able to in the past.
Mr. Keating. Well, I would certainly work with you on that.
My time is running out but I would like to say on the flood
insurance as well, we have questions outside of that where
there is good bipartisan work being done. But go on.
Mr. Long. Yes, so we need a lot of work on the NFIP
reauthorization. It is not a healthy program and we need to
make it financially solvent, no doubt about it.
In regards to funding, one thing I want to point out though
is that the bread and butter of emergency management is the
State and local levels of emergency management and Government.
It is not just whether or not FEMA has got enough money.
It is our Governors and States--and not even Governors--
State legislatures total, you know, really taking a look as a
result of going through the season and saying does their State
emergency management agency have what it needs?
Do their local emergency management agencies have what they
need? Because a majority of the events that the locals and
States are going to face, FEMA is not going to be involved.
Mr. Keating. Right.
Mr. Long. Yes.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. Thank you. I would say in our
State we are doing a pretty good job in that regard.
I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields. I know Mr. Long has a
hard stop at 12:30 so I would ask the remainder of the
questions to be kept within the time period.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jackson. I represent the three coastal counties in
northeast Florida, Nassau, Duval, and St. Johns, and my
question is, is beach nourishment and sand dune construction
treated differently than other mitigation from storms?
General Jackson. Congressman, it is not treated any
differently.
Mr. Rutherford. OK. Because here is my question, and I was
really glad to hear you say that we are looking for ways to
speed the process up. Colonel Kirk has been great to work with,
him and his personnel.
But one of the issues that we are looking at, I have one
home that is literally already falling into the ocean, and many
more South Ponte Vedra Beach that are really on the edge of
falling in, literally. I mean, they have already been
undermined.
And FDEP, the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection is working closely with us, but an 18-month study
seems like a long time when your house is hanging on the edge.
So my question is: Are there other ways that we can get
funding to the State after they pick up their piece of it, as
they should, is there other ways that we can get that funding
to them more quickly so that we can address these houses that
are really on the verge?
General Jackson. Congressman, I can tell you right now we
are wide open to any ideas that you or your staff might have as
well as Florida and the State government there. We have been in
a number of discussions with them about how to move faster.
A lot of times the study process that you referred to that
takes some period of time is driven by the environmental review
process, which I think the administration has been looking at
very closely to try to get done much more quickly and with less
ability for other Federal agencies to have long-standing
decisions that cause us to redo different portions of it.
So we are going to work really hard on that. I think the
supplemental that the Congress passed has given us some broad
discretion to take a look at areas that are either need to be
studied or are being studied right now or just need funding for
nourishment. They have been very specific about waiving 902 or
the cost limits that have been imposed based upon the
authorization.
Also that when we do build the beaches back that we build
them to full design, full construction requirements. So I think
there is a lot of great potential for the projects that you are
talking about with the supplemental that Congress passed.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you very much for that, and I will
look forward to working with you on that.
Mr. Long, I have to tell you, as a first responder myself,
I am familiar with pre-positioning equipment and the mitigation
after some of these horrible storms. Look, the last thing you
want to do is pre-position your equipment on an island that is
about to get hit by a Category 5 storm. So that is a bad idea.
But I will tell you that there was some pre-positioning
that went on of some goods that were pre-positioned in a city
that I represent, Jacksonville, Florida. As you know, I think
the American maritime industry did a fantastic job in response
to Puerto Rico's needs.
In fact, they had pre-positioned container units in
Jacksonville within days of the port opening. Those goods were
on the port, which actually allowed the mayor of San Juan to
stand there and criticize the response with thousands of
container units stacked up behind her.
The challenge was, is more people know, and I would like
everyone to know, the challenge was distribution. You mentioned
that. The communications, the transportation, all of that got
in the way of distribution of goods and services.
As somebody who has been responsible for that in the past,
I understand completely what you all were facing. So I would
mention that, you know, the Jones Act was so politicized that
there were folks on the news talking about how quickly the
President suspended the Jones Act in Texas and how long it took
for Puerto Rico. It was a 1-day difference. I went back and
checked--1-day difference.
In addition to that, so much misinformation about the Jones
Act and the cost of goods and services. Folks were actually
improperly describing how the Jones Act even works, talking
about--I heard an individual in Jacksonville on the news
talking about the reason it costs so much is because foreign
vessels have to sail into an American port, drop those goods
off, and then reload those goods onto an American-flagged ship
and sail it down to San Juan. Wrong. Those foreign ships can
sail directly into San Juan, and they do all the time.
So, you know, there was a lot of politicization of what was
going on down there. But I would like to ask one thing about
the contract issue. Would it help if we created a database of
these bad actors through these contracts?
Mr. Long. Well, I believe that the database in the system
exists. It just wasn't put in prior to us reaching out.
Mr. Rutherford. Oh, OK.
Mr. Long. There was a resource training. But one thing I
would like to follow up on regarding distribution and
commodities, this is the story that is not being told. As I
said, we have hired approximately 1,300 Puerto Ricans to be
part of the response and recovery and the future arm of
emergency management.
What we are doing to prepare for the 2018 hurricane season
is now we are starting to build a true network of emergency
management at the commonwealth and local level that did not
exist, in my opinion.
So what we are doing is we have planned a series of
training and exercises that are going to culminate in a full-
scale exercise in this coming June with the Governor, with the
mayors, specifically designed around the distribution of
commodities. We are also reconfiguring some contracts. You
don't just execute a contract and the ship shows up
immediately.
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Long. It takes 7, 8 days to fully execute the Comfort
in motion and ships like that. So we are doing a tremendous
amount of work that is not being talked about, and it is not
FEMA doing it for Puerto Rico and the commonwealth.
It is we are working with the commonwealth to make sure
that they will have the State level and local level capability
to manage this disaster in the future so that we reduce our
footprint in that manner.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. I have several other questions,
but my time is up.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Members of the panel here today. Thank you very
much for your testimony.
Let me start with Administrator Long and General Jackson.
Climate change continues to increase the incidence of major
storms and flooding, especially threatening the lives and
livelihoods of residents in coastal States like my home State
of Rhode Island.
Administrator Long and General Jackson, what steps are FEMA
and the Army Corps of Engineers taking to prepare coastal
communities like mine for this increased risk and to mitigate
the damage of future disasters?
Mr. Long. I will start. There are provisions and mitigation
planning so we require States and local governments to have
mitigation plans. They are signed off on by FEMA, just kind-of
your understanding of how you want to mitigate for future
disasters.
There are sea-level-rise provisions that are in those
mitigation standards that are there. The problem goes back to
you have got to get hit with a disaster to be able to execute
your mitigation plan if you want FEMA mitigation funding.
So the problem we have to solve in my opinion is we have
got to get the pre-disaster mitigation up front so that people
can execute those mitigation plans before the disaster occurs
or things like sea level rise start to occur.
General Jackson. Congressman, after Superstorm Sandy, the
Corps worked with all the States in the northeastern part of
the United States and also with experts adorn the world to
identify coastal risk and published the North Atlantic Coastal
Comprehensive Study, which identified a lot of different risk
areas and identified things that the Federal Government, the
States, and the localities could do to address just what you
have talked about.
So we are in the process right now of working with all the
States on the northeast side that were impacted by Sandy to try
and address those mitigation measures and lower the risks to
the communities that are on the coastline.
With the Corps we incorporate everything that we know about
climate change and sea level rise in our designs. So as we
conduct studies on coastal resilience and in areas that we know
have significant risk, we incorporate everything that we know
about that and those are implemented into our design standard
when we put those projects forward to the Congress for
authorization.
Mr. Langevin. Good. I think it is essential that we be as
forward-leaning, as forward-thinking as we can on this issue
preparing for climate change because it is here. What we can do
to mitigate it is going to make everyone better off in the long
run.
That is probably a whole other discussion about what we
really need to do long-term to reverse the effects of climate
change.
But let me start this. Natural disasters like hurricanes
and floods and fires that we saw in 2017 certainly were
devastating to countless people and communities in their path.
For individuals with critical health conditions or
disabilities, these effects are magnified, sometimes
significantly.
Despite requirements that disaster planning consider and
include accommodations for individuals who require accessible
modes of communication or transportation and medical devices or
other types of assistance, too many we found are left to fend
for themselves when catastrophe strikes.
So Administrator Long, in your testimony you mentioned the
importance of learning lessons about meeting the needs of
survivors with access and functional needs. What lessons have
FEMA and its partners learned from last year's disasters? What
changes have been made to procedural guidance?
How were these recommendations monitored for compliance and
implementation to ensure that people with disabilities are
carefully considered in disaster planning, response, and
recovery?
Mr. Long. Well, first of all, I believe as a Nation, not
just FEMA, but all entities need to bake in inclusion and
functional and access needs as to part of their DNA every day.
You know, I can't force a city to be ADA, you know, compliant.
But what I can do is start to organize recovery dollars
that go into communities after the fact or mitigation dollars
to help communities and emergency managers achieve a higher
level of functional and access needs.
Most recently I hired a lady by the name of Linda
Mastandrea, who is now FEMA's Office of Disability Integration
Coordination. I have asked her to go out to understand and work
across the lines with FEMA recovery office to say, look, when
all of this funding comes down how do we actually help these
communities improve facilities in a manner that they become
more functional and access needs-compliant to ensure inclusion,
you know, not only through the future of the infrastructure
that is built but also within our shelters.
We have a lot of work to do as a Nation, but that here
again, this problem is far greater than FEMA. But we are
working to address it every day. I would be happy to set you up
with Linda Mastandrea. She is phenomenal.
She was most recently in South Korea. She is a Paralympian
that has won, I think, 15 gold medals and phenomenal lady. She
is also a lawyer, so she is very, very well-versed and I think
you are going to see some changes in the way we handle
functional and access needs.
Mr. Langevin. Well, thank you. I look forward to that
meeting and I would like to further continue our discussion on
this topic. I have several more, but my time has expired.
I will yield back at this point, but I look forward to
submitting my questions for the record and hope that you can
get back to me as soon as possible on these and then I look
forward to our continued discussion on this important topic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr.
Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all three of you for your leadership. You
were put in a very tough situation with terrible hurricane, the
airport down, the roads, the power. I mean, what a challenge.
So I know you have been working this very hard.
My first question is for Administrator Long and General
Jackson. What would be the criteria for considering mission
complete?
Mr. Long. We are still there. We are going to be there for
years.
Mr. Bacon. Be there for years.
Mr. Long. You know, those--yes, I mean, you know, it is too
early to grade myself or say mission complete. Bottom line is
we are going to be administering dollars to help these
communities overcome for years.
The one thing that I think that we are missing here is is
that there weren't just four events last year.
Mr. Bacon. Right.
Mr. Long. Right now my staff is diligently working in 14
different States. Last year we picked up a new event every 3
days.
Mr. Bacon. But just to clarify you think you will be in
Puerto Rico for years?
Mr. Long. Absolutely.
Mr. Bacon. Like got to----
Mr. Long. Absolutely.
Mr. Bacon. General Jackson, anything else with that?
General Jackson. Congressman, I mean, we are in Puerto Rico
now. I have an area office there. We have Federal projects
there. We work with the Government there on a daily basis, so
we will always be in Puerto Rico----
Mr. Bacon. Right.
General Jackson [continuing]. And we will be supporting
FEMA as long as Mr. Long has mission assignments for us to
follow up on.
Mr. Bacon. Let me ask you both, what would be the largest
unexpected challenge that you had in Puerto Rico? Is there one
thing that took you by the most surprise?
Mr. Long. Getting the power back on solves so many
problems. Bottom line is that was the toughest challenge. I do
not control an aging system. I do not control deferred
maintenance on a power grid.
I have to fix what I have inherited, and, you know, we
rapidly put forward the mission and the mission assignment to
the Army Corps of Engineers. This is the only situation where
the Army Corps of Engineers is rebuilding the grid.
We have got to get to a model to where the gird is rebuilt
by private industry, in my opinion, similar to the way it was
done in California, Texas, and Florida.
Mr. Bacon. All right. How has the bankruptcy of PREPA
impacted the recovery efforts?
Mr. Long. The liquidity efforts or the liquidity issues as
a whole are very difficult. It compromises simple things such
as EMAC agreements. People demand 100 percent right off the bat
to do work when you bring in private contractors or other
support for fear that they may not be repaid.
Mr. Bacon. OK.
Mr. Long. You know, we are working very closely with
Governor Rossello, working very closely with the Treasury to
make sure that we solve some of these problems so that the
response and recovery doesn't slow down.
Mr. Bacon. OK.
One final question for General Jackson, what regulatory
relief is necessary to help you speed up these kind of efforts?
Is there something we can to do pull some of the regulatory
problems off your shoulders?
General Jackson. Congressman, I think the administration
has already taken a look at that, and they are really looking
at how to streamline all environmental reviews that all
ultimately result in permitting and other things that----
Mr. Bacon. Right.
General Jackson [continuing]. We are involved with. So I
think we are well on track and everybody has been participating
fully in that effort.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Knowing that your time is short, I
will yield back. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mrs.
Bonnie Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Long, hi. More than a decade after Hurricane Katrina,
your office is still involved in audit disputes, including
efforts to get a $2 billion settlement with roads and
infrastructure of the city overturned. Do you think that there
is a limit on how long after an event audits should last? Is it
an inefficient use of resources to Monday morning
quarterbacking years-long audits more than a decade later? Are
the communities affected this summer going to face decades of
audits and no relief?
Mr. Long. Well, I think we have to follow out the process
and the process that is put in place is just for due diligence
purposes. We have to follow out the process. But when there are
audits in question, and I have seen this as a former director
of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency when there are
deobligations in question or audits in question where there are
large amounts of money looming over a community that may be de-
obligated then it can impact their credit ratings going
forward.
So I do think that we have to move quickly to make sure
things like that don't occur. We have to move expeditiously,
but I would also----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well, do you agree, sir, that 2 years
is not moving expeditiously, that it is too long?
Mr. Long. I don't----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Is FEMA doing anything to sort-of----
Mr. Long. Which situation are you specifically referring
to?
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am talking about Katrina. That is
what I was asking you about.
Mr. Long. Oh, for Katrina?
Mrs. Watson Coleman. The $2 billion dispute and that has
been in audit for 2 years?
Mr. Long. I would have to get back or we would have to work
with you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes.
Mr. Long. I am not sure which one it is unless I could
defer to Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. Is it the water and sewer audit?
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes.
Mr. Long. OK.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Listen, may we have a specific----
Mr. Long. Sure.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Update on----
Mr. Long. Sure.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Why this is taking so long? What is
being done? Why are you lacking the resources to respond to it
after 2 years? When can we expect relief here? Mr. Long, can we
get that?
Mr. Long. Yes, absolutely, but I would also refer to Mr.
Kelly with OIG.
Mr. Kelly. Yes. That audit was initiated and completed
within roughly a year of the additional obligations for that
water and sewer project.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. Very little was done immediately after Katrina.
The inspector general's office has changed its style of
auditing.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly. We try to be more proactive and much closer to
when the money is being spent, not 10 years after it has been
spent.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, you know, this is all good, you
know, hypothetically, conceptually, and all that kind of stuff.
We are talking about communities that are ravaged. People who
have been displaced. People who can't get a job. People become
ill because of these terrible hurricanes.
I mean, look at what has happened in both the Virgin
Islands and in Puerto Rico. For the life of me, and Mr. Long,
maybe you can answer this question.
With all the resources, with all the armed forces, with all
the rescue emergency and whatever else there is that this great
country, the United States of America has at its disposal, if
you can't get up a road to deliver supplies, vitally needed for
people to live, why couldn't you airlift them in or do
something else? Why was that situation so inadequately
addressed and why is it still so inadequately addressed?
Mr. Long. First of all, ma'am, with all due respect, I
believe we live in the greatest country on the globe. The
amount of resources----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I never suggested we didn't sir.
Mr. Long [continuing]. That, well, yes, but the amount of
resources that the Federal Government put down, the amount of
resources the State governments, the lengths to which our
Government goes to help disaster victims can always be
improved. But it is unmatched. It is second to none in any
other country on the globe. We put people in hotels----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Long [continuing]. For months.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You know what? I don't need you to
make excuse. I need to tell you me why you failed there?
Mr. Long. We haven't failed, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Yes, you did.
Mr. Long. No, we did not. The bottom line is my agency made
a Herculean effort to put food and water in every area and it
is more complex than--it is not going to move as fast. When you
are talking about island jurisdictions----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK.
Mr. Long [continuing]. And the airport systems are
completely blown out, the ports are completely blown out, I
don't own the cranes. I don't own the airports. We have to
rebuild airports. We move rapidly.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Right. But you have collaborative
capacity and that collaborative capacity did not serve the
citizens of Puerto Rico well. So my concern, it is not just
you, sir. It is why did the United States of America, with all
of its vast resources not do its very best for people who are
indeed our people?
With that I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The administrator has very limited time,
so I am going to recognize the three, but if you could keep
your questions within a short period of time it would be very
much appreciated.
Ms. Gonzalez-Colon.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first of all thank the people from the Army Corps
of Engineers and the people from FEMA for all their hard work
they have been doing on the island. We acknowledge that,
although we still know that there is a lot to do still.
I want to thank you for your being always available for
calls, for meetings with mayors and for all the people in the
island. I really do that personally because I have been calling
you mostly every day to ask you about different issues.
My first question will be what resources will be necessary
to you to finish the work in 30 days? I am talking to the Corps
of Engineers in terms of the restoration of the power.
General Jackson. Ma'am, we have the materiels that we need
to finish that that are on order and they are either in transit
or they are on the island right now ready for distribution to
contractors. So and they will be continuing to flow onto the
island until the end of April.
So until we get everything on the ground, I mean, it is a
physics problem. It is everything had to come off production
lines. We had to special order materiel to meet the unique
specifications of the power grid.
So, you know, we have enough linemen on the ground to do
the work that needs to be done. It is just a matter of them
working through and energizing the lines and getting the pieces
and parts put back together. So there are really no other
resources that we need that I can think of.
Everything that we have asked for that we have needed to do
this mission we have been provided. So it is just a matter of
the physics of putting together a very complicated system that
is going to take us some time to finish.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. My concern with that is that you are
downsizing the group of the crew of your private contractors on
the island. One is going to be gone from the island the 19th of
March and the other one is 7th of April. So that means that the
resources are not going to be there to help us out to finish
the last mile of the process.
So how the island is going to feel that their issues are
going to be solved in terms of the connection of those center
part of the island when you are downsizing the Army Corps
presence to those areas? That is my main concern.
It doesn't say that PREPA is going to take charge of that
because it will take a month or a month and a half for them to
do the contracting process with the memorandum of understanding
with other utilities in the States.
General Jackson. Ma'am, the, you know, when we originally
asked to do this there were no mutual assistance workers
available. Now there are almost 1,000 mutual assistance
workers.
I know the numbers go up and down based upon how they get
recalled back to their State, but Mr. Torres and the team, the
unified command group, look at the numbers of line workers that
are required to do the missions based upon what is left to be
completed. They look at that every single day, and there are
decisions that are made.
FEMA, the government of Puerto Rico, and the Corps of
Engineers are all involved with meet and making. They could be
that, you know, the one company that we have that is going to
be done in April maybe they get extended a little bit longer.
We are looking at all those things every single day to make
sure that the progress of the work that we have in front of us
to finish is not impacted at all by a lack of people. There is
no lack of people.
Even though we are downsizing the contract, the big
contracts that we awarded in October, it is only because the
numbers that we have there aren't needed anymore, and they have
been replaced by mutual assistance workers who should have been
there in the first place.
So that is not--the changing of who is doing the work is
not impacting our ability to get the overall grid restored as
fast as we can get it restored.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. I just urge you to reconsider the
downsizing of the Army Corps on the island. I do think that we
don't have enough personnel to do that kind of work, and it
will take longer to the recovery processes in those areas just
because of the downsizing.
I do recommend extending the current contracts until the
time that PREPA or the mutual alliance linemen will be arriving
on the island. Remember that weeks ago with the winter storm
just took away 68 of those linemen to New York and
Pennsylvania. So we can't continue to be waiting for personnel
to arrive on the island.
General Jackson. Ma'am, we are not waiting. We have--
everybody is there. It just should be--they are going to be
different people. It is some cases it is the same
subcontractors that are working for different contractors.
So you know, PREPA has about 2,200 line workers on the
ground now, which includes, I mean, their own organic work
force and three other subcontractors that are doing work.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Mr. Jackson.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
I just for the last two Members, we are about 20 minutes
past the administrator's hard stop, so if you could keep your
time at a minimum.
Ms. Velazquez is recognized.
Ms. Velazquez. I will make it simple, Mr. Chairman.
If I could send you, Mr. Long, some of my questions so that
you can send them, your answers to my office?
General Jackson, I hear what you are saying to the
Congresslady from Puerto Rico, the gentlelady from Puerto Rico.
You are downsizing and you are allowing for PREPA to continue
to do the work with some of the subcontractors that they have.
Do you think that will--PREPA, given the conditions of
PREPA itself, should that provide any comfort to the people of
Yabucoa, my hometown, where Hurricane Maria made landfall and
to this day they have no electricity?
General Jackson. Congresswoman, as we discussed yesterday,
I am confident only because the experts that are making the
decisions on how we determine how we apportion the work force
are fully confident that based upon demonstrated capability
that the line workers that are there, both from PREPA's organic
work force and from the subcontractors that they have, are more
than capable of doing the work and are continuing to
demonstrate their ability to do that. Those are the----
Ms. Velazquez. I am worried. Why is that, that being the
town that where Maria made landfall, that 6 months later, what
is it about Yabucoa?
General Jackson. Congresswoman, I think Yabucoa's biggest
problem is it was the point of impact and it had sustained the
greatest damage and so the most work is being done right there.
Ms. Velazquez. I have been there four times. I never saw
any crew until just my last visit.
In any case, General Jackson, I really want to thank you
for getting back to me yesterday in our telephone call where I
raised some of the issues of the people of Vieques are facing
today. My question to you is regarding Puerto Rico's
preparedness for the upcoming hurricane season, particularly in
the area of energy.
It seems to me that no matter how much money we put into
the reconstruction of the grid, unless we ensure the entire
grid is strengthened to withstand Category 4/5, are just
throwing money away. Can you comment on the repair work being
done so far?
General Jackson. Congresswoman, I would be glad to do that.
I mean, the mission that we were given was to restore the power
and get people the light back on as fast as possible. So that
is what we are doing.
What you are describing is a more long-term goal that we
are working on it. We are working as part of FEMA's team, as
part of the Governor's team, to help the Governor develop a
long-term recovery strategy, which is going to take into
account all the things that you discussed, which would be
things like taking the power generation capabilities, making
them more modernized, putting them more closer to where the
population centers are, which allows us to more economically
bury lines where now, as Administrator Long talked about, these
lines crisscross the island.
That is what the power distribution transmission system is
based upon. So that is in the works right now and that will be
presented to the administration sometime at the end of the
summer.
Ms. Velazquez. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly, this week Puerto Rico is effectively pursuing a
policy that will weaken the Puerto Rico Energy Commission, an
effort that will severely undermine generally accepted
regulatory and accountability practices. As the inspector
general, can you provide us some detail in the importance of
oversight of Government and institution--if this type of entity
is weakened, how do we ensure good stewardship of taxpayers'
funds?
Mr. Kelly. Ma'am, that is going to be very difficult to do.
If you reduce oversight, especially on an organization that has
known risks, that is a recipe for disaster.
Ms. Velazquez. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Velazquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Ms. Plaskett.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you Ranking
Member for this. I am going to have as well try and bring a
bunch of questions in writing which I hope that you will
respond to as quickly as possible. I know that bureaucracy can
take some time, but the faster these answers come back to us
the better I think for everyone.
Administrator Long, one of the things that I brought up in
the opening statement, and I am hoping you can give me some
definition for, is who is responsible and what is the time line
for the modular units that are going to the schools as well as
to the hospitals in the Virgin Islands?
Mr. Long. So ultimately, in my opinion, the Governor, you
know, of the Virgin Islands, Governor Mapp, is responsible. It
is my job to make sure that he has the mechanisms and the
funding to do so, and we are working very closely with him. But
what I would be happy to respond in writing----
Ms. Plaskett. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Long [continuing]. About the whole entire process.
Ms. Plaskett. Because it seems like a circular discussion.
Department of Education says they are waiting for FEMA. FEMA
says they are waiting for this, and so the people want to know
who it is. So I----
Mr. Long. Absolutely.
Ms. Plaskett [continuing]. Appreciate that. In terms of the
discussion about full Federal cost share, you have received the
request. I know the White House has received the request. Do we
know when there will be an answer as to whether or not the
Virgin Islands will receive an extension of time for full cost
share for debris removal?
Mr. Long. I do not know. Obviously I don't control the
White House, but I can obviously reach out to them as well to
see where we are in queue.
Ms. Plaskett. I wanted to know if you were aware, however,
that under the Insular Area Acts, all Federal agencies have the
discretion to waive local match for insular areas, defined to
include the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico for Federal funding
programs. Has FEMA sought to exercise this express statutory
discretion to waive the local match for all disaster funding
for the U.S. Virgin Islands?
Mr. Long. I believe that that is a request that has got to
come in from the Governor, and I am not sure that we have
received any request to do so. If so, I will go back and check.
Ms. Plaskett. OK. The reason I am asking this is, of
course, that, you know, the insular areas have long had
underfunding and under inclusion across a litany of programs.
When you are facing a disaster such as this, that kind of
express statutory discretion that you have would seem to be the
appropriate time to do so.
You know, this is, again, what you just said was something
that, again, I brought up on my opening statement is that you
are waiting for a request from Governor Mapp. Oftentimes I am
not sure if Governors and other individuals in these areas know
that they can make these specific requests.
The tension between FEMA and the local agencies are such
that you wonder, you know, are Governors spending money on
having outside consultants come and consult them about what is
he supposed to be requesting? It seems that it is not the most
efficient use of funding.
Mr. Long. Congresswoman, so, you know, my approach is in my
FCOs who play an incredibly important role, I have asked them
and in their training, their sole purpose is to go out and say
Governor, this is what you are entitled to.
Ms. Plaskett. Uh-huh.
Mr. Long. This is--based on this event. If they are not
doing that, then that is on me. I can go back and check.
Ms. Plaskett. Right.
Mr. Long. But we never hold back things. It is our job to
administer the Stafford Act and the policies that are out
there. We have no reason to hold anything back. FEMA is not the
enemy of a Governor or of the disaster survivor.
Ms. Plaskett. Well, under FEMA, just that last question and
when you mentioned the Stafford Act, what is your position and
would you support an extension of Stafford Act language so that
it is not only bringing resilience to those things that are
considered emergency, which is defined as power, water,
communications, and education?
But would also extend to other public assistance projects
such as roads and public housing?
Mr. Long. I am not sure I understand the question because
we do fix roads and we----
Ms. Plaskett. No, no, no. So what I am asking----
Mr. Long [continuing]. Put in housing under emergency
provision.
Ms. Plaskett. An amendment to the Stafford Act which would
provide for embedding resilience, the resilience that you are
now going to bring to areas such as power and water and
communications----
Mr. Long. Right.
Ms. Plaskett [continuing]. Does not extend necessarily to
public roads and public housing.
Mr. Long. Right.
Ms. Plaskett. Would you be in favor of or supportive of an
amendment that addresses that in the Stafford Act to bring that
as well?
Mr. Long. Well, I am all----
Ms. Plaskett. I will yield back.
Mr. Long [continuing]. For resilience. Let me be honest. I
am all for resilience because I want to reduce the job. I mean,
we need to work FEMA out of a job over, you know, through
resilience and mitigation.
I believe that the 428 program, which is something that is
on the table with the Governor as well, allows for more
alternative projects and resilience projects to be built in.
The Stafford Act may allow us to do that for the roadway
systems, but that is a conversation that we can have off-line
as well if you would like, and I can explain that.
Chairman McCaul. All right. The gentlelady's time has
expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. I want to thank the witnesses.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to put three questions on the
record for Mr. Brock Long to hear.
Chairman McCaul. OK.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to ask for unanimous consent.
Mr. Brock, for as it relates to Houston and Texas, answer
directly to me in writing and by phone on the FEMA denials and
whether or not you will automatically extend those who are in
the hotels, the importance of working with local government.
That is difficult. I know that by the Stafford Act you work
with the State, but the local governments are really on the
ground working with the day-to-day complaints.
Then I think one of the solutions to these large contracts
that you have that have not been helpful to us is contracting
with local entities. Sometimes the entire region is not
devastated. There are local contractors that can do a very
important job, housing, food services, obviously debris we know
about that, but I think it is important for FEMA to look--
counseling, case work can be done by local entities.
I would like to reach back to you on those quests. Thank
you for having your staff be at my meeting on March 5.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you. Thank you. I want to thank the
witnesses for your patience. I know this went well over
schedule, but you stood by and answered all of our questions. I
appreciate that very much.
I would just like also to say that Major General Jackson I
look forward to working with you on the reservoir project.
To Administrator Long, the first bill I got passed in the
Congress was a FEMA reform bill after Katrina. So I think there
will be some great lessons learned from this, things that we
can work together to make it more streamlined, effective, and
efficient.
I want to thank you and commend you for the job that you
are doing right now.
Mr. Long. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Long. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. We are going to take a brief break and the
second panel will be joining us.
[Recess.]
Chairman McCaul. Yes. We are pleased to welcome our second
panel of witnesses. Thanks for your patience. I know it is
getting late. I think we have got a subcommittee hearing at 2
here.
Our second panel includes Mr. Reed Clay, chief operating
officer of the Office of the Governor, State of Texas, great
State of Texas; Mr. Wesley Maul, director of Division of
Emergency Management for the State of Florida; and finally the
Honorable Josephine Melendez-Ortiz, vice chairman of the
Committee on Federal and International Relations and Status for
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Ms. Jeanne-Aimee De
Marrais, senior director of Save the Children. Thank you all
for being here today.
I guess we will start with Mr. Clay.
STATEMENT OF REED CLAY, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR, STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Clay. Good afternoon. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you
for holding this important hearing and for the opportunity to
share lessons that we have learned from Hurricane Harvey in
Texas.
Let me quickly offer three key messages. The first is thank
you for your partnership. Governor Abbott and the State of
Texas are grateful for the strong partnership that we have
shared with our Federal counterparts to date.
President Donald Trump, Vice President Pence, multiple
members of the President's Cabinet, and FEMA Administrator
Brock Long showed their commitment to Texas even before the
storm made landfall. They pledged their full resources and
continue to show their commitment to the State to this day.
Of course, Congress, too, deserves our deepest gratitude.
Within days of Harvey's dissipation, as Texans had only begun
to understand the magnitude of devastation, Congress moved
quickly to appropriate needed financial assistance to quickly
begin the rebuilding process.
That hard work continued in the passage of additional
appropriation bills that will help Texas recover and rebuild.
I wouldn't be a proud Texan if I didn't pay particular
thanks to the Texas delegation, Chairman McCaul, Congresswoman
Jackson Lee, and the entire Texas delegation have been true
champions for their constituents and for all Texans. Thank you.
Next, let me share a couple lessons we have learned. The
first lesson is that disaster recovery could be substantially
improved by drastically cutting regulations and red tape at all
levels of government. When it comes to disaster response, we
must be outcome-focused, not process-oriented. Rest assured
Texas has done its part.
Governor Abbott has used his emergency authorities to waive
hundreds of regulations, employing a similar outlook,
Commissioner John Sharp, who leads the Governor's Commission to
Rebuild Texas, has consistently found ways to push past
bureaucratic barriers.
But there's more to do. Beginning next week, the Commission
to Rebuild Texas and the Texas Department of Emergency
Management will hold a series of workshops to develop lessons
learned and to focus on how best to restore, redevelop, and
rebuild a more resilient Texas.
These listen-and-learn sessions will inform a comprehensive
report delivered by the commission outlining changes that the
State must make. But Federal regulations also pose a problem.
Because disaster recovery is administered across multiple
agencies, amid multiple layers of government, recovery is
saddled by a redundancy of government.
The Federal Government has opportunities to simplify the
process and it must be streamlined. Too often, individuals are
passed between several agencies with different paperwork and
different rules.
Disaster response and recovery, as Administrator Long said
earlier, is best when executed at a local level, but under the
current process local governments are buried under layers of
government regulations. Disaster response and recovery cannot
truly be executed at the local level if it is micromanaged in
Washington.
The second lesson is that we must rebuild Texas stronger.
We now know Harvey was the biggest tropical cyclone rainfall
event in U.S. history. Peak rainfall measured over 60 inches,
with much of the area receiving more than 3 feet.
The amount of rain was literally off the charts. This was
not a 100-year flood or a 500-year flood. This was a 1,000-year
flood. It was so much rain that the National Weather Service
added additional colors to their rainfall charts to show just
how much rain was falling in Texas.
Not surprisingly then, Harvey is already the second-
costliest storm in U.S. history. The National Hurricane Center
estimates more than $125 billion in losses. It is reported that
only $30 billion of that is insured, meaning Harvey will be by
far the largest uninsured loss of 2017.
If Harvey teaches anything it is surely that we must invest
now to mitigate against losses from future storms that history
tells us will happen again and again and again.
Texas is already deploying hazard mitigation funds made
available under the Stafford Act to undertake valuable
mitigation projects through the affected region. The Governor
today will be in Houston announcing the first three projects
later today.
But many of the projects need to truly future-proof the
affected area will require further Federal assistance. Much of
the damage in the affected areas could have been prevented or
mitigated by Federal projects that have been considered for
years or in some cases decades.
If there is only one lesson to be learned from Harvey it is
this. We must rebuild stronger to future-proof our valuable
assets--human, natural, and economic--from future disasters.
Let me close with this. The pace of recovery is never fast
enough. If the numbers I cited above are any indication this
will be Texas' longest and hardest rebuilding effort yet.
We are grateful for the strong partnership with our Federal
partners thus far, but we also recognize that a recovery of
this size will require the continued commitment of resources
from our Federal partners for months to come. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reed Clay
March 15, 2018
Chairman McCaul, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to share with you lessons learned by the State of
Texas in preparing for, responding to, and recovery from Hurricane
Harvey. My name is Reed Clay, chief operating officer for Governor Greg
Abbott.
historic storm
More than 6 months since Hurricane Harvey first made landfall as a
Category 4 storm near Rockport, Texas, at about 10 p.m. on Aug. 25,
2017, we now know from the National Hurricane Center that Harvey was
``the most significant tropical cyclone rainfall event in United States
history, both in scope and peak rainfall amounts.'' The storm impacted
nearly 50,000 square miles of Texas; some 57 tornadoes were spawned;
and record-breaking rainfall of over 60 inches was recorded in
Nederland and in Groves, Texas. The previous record in the continental
United States of 48 inches was also broken in communities throughout
the Coastal Bend Region and in Houston, with many areas deluged by
historic flooding. As a result, nearly 1.4 million Texans likely
evacuated from their homes. More than 35,000 rescues were recorded.
More than 42,000 Texans sought refuge in 258 official shelters. Nearly
300,000 households were left without power. And tragically, it is
estimated that 68 people died, making Harvey the deadliest hurricane to
hit Texas in nearly 100 years. But we also know that no force of nature
is more powerful than Texans helping Texans, and Americans helping
Americans. We are grateful so many lives were spared, and inspired by
the resilience of the people of Texas, our commitment to help families
recover and communities rebuild is stronger than ever.
advance actions
This disaster was unprecedented in recent history, as was the
aggressive advance action and coordination of Federal, State, and local
emergency management resources and personnel in the 53 Texas counties
in the Presidential Disaster Declaration and 60 Texas counties in the
State Disaster Declaration. We are grateful for the swift action taken
and the continuing support offered by the President, Vice President,
Cabinet members, Congressional Members, and all of our Federal
partners.
Harvey left little time for the State of Texas to prepare, but we
believe actions taken before, during, and after Harvey to this very day
as rebuilding continues, serve as a model going forward for the Nation.
Let me provide a snapshot of advance actions taken in preparation for
the storm and to save lives.
On Aug. 23, 2017, 3 days in advance of then-Tropical
Depression Harvey's projected arrival, Governor Greg Abbott
ordered the multi-agency State Operations Center (SOC) to
elevate its readiness level, and directed State agencies to
make available any and all State resources to assist in
preparation, rescue, and recovery. The Governor pre-emptively
issued a State Disaster Declaration for 30 counties most at
risk of the anticipated storm, activated the Texas National
Guard and Texas State Guard, and asked Texans to heed all local
warnings.
On Aug. 24, 2017, Harvey was upgraded to a Tropical Storm.
Governor Abbott discussed hurricane preparedness and the
importance of local evacuation warnings with Acting Secretary
of Homeland Security Elaine Duke and Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Brock Long. President
Donald Trump called Governor Abbott and pledged all available
Federal resources. The Governor again urged all Texans to heed
local officials' warnings, strongly consider voluntary
evacuation orders, and strictly comply with all mandatory
evacuation orders.
On Aug. 25, 2017, following a briefing by the Texas Division
of Emergency Management (TDEM) and all activated State agencies
at the State Operations Center (SOC), Governor Abbott held a
press conference where he again urged all Texans to heed local
officials' warnings, strongly consider voluntary evacuation
orders, and strictly comply with all mandatory evacuation
orders. Governor Abbott requested a Presidential Disaster
Declaration in advance for 6 counties to more rapidly secure
Federal aid to supplement State and local recovery efforts. The
Governor then visited Texans seeking refuge at a San Antonio
shelter, and suspended State and local hotel and motel
occupancy tax for relief personnel and victims of the storm.
Hurricane Harvey made landfall at 10 p.m. near Rockport as a
Category 4 hurricane.
rescue, recovery, and rebuilding
Immediately following landfall, coordinated rescue, recovery, and
rebuilding efforts began. With the support of our Federal partners,
here is a snapshot of actions taken by the State of Texas the first 33
days after landfall.
On Aug. 26, 2017, Governor Abbott contacted local officials
in the region by phone to hear damage estimates first-hand and
to offer support. The Governor began receiving formal daily
briefings from the Texas Division of Emergency Management
(TDEM) and FEMA, provided a media update at the State
Operations Center (SOC), and added 20 Texas counties to the
State Disaster Declaration. Following multiple media interviews
and while receiving reports from the region on rescue and
recovery operations, Governor Abbott and First Lady Cecilia
Abbott visited an Austin Red Cross Shelter where they helped
serve dinner.
On Aug. 27, 2017, following the daily State Operations
Center (SOC) briefing and based on continuing updates from the
region, Governor Abbott requested 12 Texas counties be added to
the Presidential Disaster Declaration, and he added 4 to the
State Disaster Declaration. Governor Abbott requested of
Secretary of Defense General James Mattis that a Texas National
Guard Dual Status Command be established to allow for a single
commander of both Federal and State forces providing disaster
response. The Governor was joined by U.S. Coast Guard Vice
Admiral Karl Schultz and agency officials at SOC for a media
update on on-going rescue and recovery operations.
On Aug. 28, 2017, Governor Abbott activated the entire Texas
National Guard, added another four counties to the State
Disaster Declaration, and issued a proclamation allowing public
utilities to access private property as needed to repair power
lines and reconnect the electric utility grid. The Governor
visited the Coastal Bend Region for an on-site briefing and
provided what became a daily media update. After an aerial tour
of the region to survey the extensive damage, the Governor
spoke with local officials and Texans impacted by the storm. He
was joined on the ground by Senator John Cornyn and FEMA
Administrator Long. At the Governor's direction to State
agencies to extend deadlines, waive fees, and cut red tape, the
Texas Department of Public Safety began providing a free
replacement driver's license or ID card for survivors.
On Aug. 29, 2017, Governor Abbott joined President Trump and
Cabinet members in Corpus Christi to meet with local leaders
and relief organizations before traveling to Austin for a
detailed briefing at the State Operations Center (SOC). They
were joined by Federal and State officials, including Senators
John Cornyn and Ted Cruz. Governor Abbott reminded residents of
Houston threatened by rising floodwaters that preserving life
remained the top priority. The Governor announced an award of
$25 million in Federal funds to the Texas Department of
Transportation for debris removal, clean-up, and transportation
infrastructure repairs.
On Aug. 30, 2017, Governor Abbott requested the addition of
14 Texas counties to the Presidential Disaster Declaration.
On Aug. 31, 2017, Governor Abbott sent a letter to county
judges outlining available assistance, and he increased the
number of National Guard troops helping with hurricane response
to 24,000. The Governor suspended vehicle registration,
titling, and inspection rules for hurricane victims, and he
eased restrictions on truckers bringing fuel and relief
supplies into the State. Governor Abbott and Texas First Lady
Cecilia Abbott joined Vice President Mike Pence and Second Lady
of the United States Karen Pence on a visit to Rockport and
Victoria to meet with victims, volunteers, and first
responders. The Governor proclaimed Sept. 3, 2017, as a Day of
Prayer in Texas; then Governor Abbott and Vice President Pence
assisted with debris clearing in Rockport.
On Sept. 1, 2017, Governor Abbott announced that Gulf Coast
refineries were coming back on-line, that Louisiana, Oklahoma,
and New Mexico were shipping gas into Texas, and that a
pipeline carrying gasoline to Oklahoma had been reversed,
keeping the fuel in the State, as the Port of Corpus Christi
also opened for barges loaded with fuel. President Trump
authorized an increase in Federal funds for debris removal and
emergency protective measures, increasing the Federal cost-
share from 75 percent to 90 percent. Governor Abbott announced
the Michael & Susan Dell Foundation in collaboration with the
OneStar Foundation was forming the Rebuild Texas Fund. The
Governor requested three more Texas counties be added to the
Presidential Disaster Declaration, and he issued a proclamation
warning against price gouging.
On Sept. 2, 2017, Governor Abbott and Texas First Lady
Cecilia Abbott greeted President Donald Trump and First Lady
Melania Trump in Houston for a briefing and visit with
resilient victims, emergency responders, and volunteers. The
Governor and the President met with Texans taking refuge at NRG
Stadium where they also helped serve meals. Governor Abbott and
President Trump also visited the First Church of Pearland,
which was serving as a hurricane relief center for victims of
the storm. Members of the President's Cabinet, Senator Cruz,
and Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner joined them for the day.
On Sept. 3, 2017, Governor Abbott joined in the National and
Texas Day of Prayer for victims of Hurricane Harvey at Hyde
Park Baptist Church in Austin. Governor Abbott met with Senator
John Cornyn, Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and Chairman
Michael McCaul at the SOC to discuss the Congressional response
to the costliest disaster to ever hit Texas.
On Sept. 4, 2017, Governor Abbott announced FEMA had
approved his request for Community Disaster Loan assistance to
help cities maintain operating budgets and provide essential
services. The Governor requested seven Texas counties be added
to the Presidential Disaster Declaration.
On Sept. 5, 2017, Governor Abbott visited the communities of
Wharton and Beaumont to thank local officials for their
tireless efforts on behalf of their citizens.
On Sept. 6, 2017, Governor Abbott thanked the U.S. House of
Representatives for voting to allocate $7.85 billion as an
initial down payment to Texas in the aftermath of Hurricane
Harvey. The Governor suspended the State's waiting period for
auto claims payments to hurricane victims.
On Sept. 7, 2017, Governor Abbott announced the Governor's
Commission to Rebuild Texas, and appointed Texas A&M University
System Chancellor John Sharp as commissioner. The Governor
charged the Commission with efficiently and effectively
bringing the resources of all State agencies together to help
communities in assessing their needs, and in navigating State
and Federal resources for the rebuilding of roads, bridges,
schools, and government buildings. The Governor directed the
Texas Workforce Commission, Texas Higher Education Coordinating
Board, and Texas Education Agency (TEA), to develop an
education and workforce training plan to support the rebuilding
of communities and to put Texans back to work. Governor Abbott,
Commissioner Sharp, and State agency heads met with local
officials in Corpus Christi and Richmond. The Governor
announced aerial spraying for mosquitoes would begin with added
assistance from the U.S. Air Force Reserve and specially-
equipped cargo planes.
On Sept. 8, 2017, Governor Abbott, Commissioner Sharp, and
State agency heads met with local officials in Houston and
Victoria. Governor Abbott thanked Congress for passing and the
President for immediately signing a $15.3 billion disaster
relief package for several States. The Governor announced a
Texas Education Agency hotline with public education updates
for parents, and he announced the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) had completed the initial assessments of all 60 Superfund
sites in the area.
On Sept. 9, 2017, Governor Abbott, Commissioner Sharp, and
State agency heads met with local officials in Beaumont. The
Governor sent a letter to EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt
expressing his support for a Texas Water Development Board
request to streamline Federal funding for flood and water
infrastructure projects.
On Sept. 11, 2017, Governor Abbott announced the Texas
Health and Human Services Commission would begin offering D-
SNAP disaster food relief for hurricane survivors.
On Sept. 12, 2017, Governor Abbott proclaimed Sept. 12 as
``Hand In Hand Day'' in Texas to promote the telethon featuring
George Strait, Miranda Lambert, Lyle Lovett, Robert Earl Keen,
Chris Stapleton, and other artists. At the Governor's direction
to State agencies to extend deadlines, waive fees, and cut red
tape, the State began waiving the fee for replacement copies of
birth certificates for hurricane survivors.
On Sept. 13, 2017, Governor Abbott announced a $30 million
Federal grant to the Texas Workforce Commission to create
temporary jobs to assist with clean-up, recovery, and
humanitarian efforts. The Governor announced the launch of
RebuildTexas.Today, a real-time resource for local officials
with information on State and Federal assistance available for
infrastructure rebuilding. The Governor suspended the State's
7-day waiting period for disaster unemployment insurance.
On Sept. 14, 2017, Governor Abbott announced Texas
Department of Transportation (TxDOT) crews, having already
reopened roads for emergency responders, replaced signage,
reactivated signals, and resumed ferry service, was now
removing roadside debris in the region. Governor Abbott
announced that Texas Land Commissioner George P. Bush would
head the State's short- and long-term housing recovery efforts
that were to be locally-led, State-supported, and Federally-
funded. The Governor added two Texas counties to the State
Disaster Declaration.
On Sept. 15, 2017, Governor Abbott released the first issue
of the on-going Update from the Commission to Rebuild Texas,
with recovery reports from State and Federal agencies, and
local communities.
On Sept. 19, 2017, Governor Abbott suspended State trucking
regulations to aid Hurricane Irma relief in Florida.
On Sept. 20, 2017, Governor Abbott sent a letter to county
judges encouraging the utilization of disaster relief funding
for their communities. Governor Abbott extended the State
Disaster Declaration for now 60 Texas counties. The Governor
announced the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) had
removed approximately 432,000 cubic feet, or 8 football fields,
of debris from roadways in addition to local efforts to remove
debris as quickly as possible. The Governor joined Attorney
General Ken Paxton in a letter to President Trump, urging him
to ensure that churches and religious organizations are treated
equally with other nonprofits and not excluded from FEMA
disaster funding.
On Sept. 21, 2017, Governor Abbott joined George Strait and
Acting DHS Secretary Duke in Rockport to reaffirm his
commitment to help Texans rebuild even stronger than before.
On Sept. 22, 2017, Governor Abbott was joined by HUD
Secretary Ben Carson and Commissioner Bush in a tour of
impacted housing developments in Port Arthur where they spoke
with survivors of the storm.
On Sept. 26, 2017, Governor Abbott, Lt. Governor Dan
Patrick, and Commissioner Sharp joined Texas State legislators
at the FEMA Joint Field Office in Austin for a briefing.
On Sept. 27, 2017, Governor Abbott announced TxDOT had now
collected more than 2.4 million cubic feet, or 45 football
fields, of debris left behind by Hurricane Harvey on roadways
across the 4 districts hardest hit by the storm.
On Sept. 29, 2017, as a critical milestone, Governor Abbott
announced all but 3 public school districts had returned to
class. The Governor traveled to Houston to present a $50
million check for urgent debris removal to Mayor Turner.
economic loss/damage estimates
The enormity of Harvey's destruction has now been revealed. The
National Hurricane Center estimates that Harvey is the second-costliest
storm in U.S. history, and by far the costliest storm in Texas'
history, at $125 billion in damages or more. The Insurance Journal
estimates that Texans suffered in excess of $70 billion of uninsured
loss. Nearly 900,000 applications for Individual Assistance, and nearly
1,200 requests for Public Assistance from jurisdictions, have been
received by FEMA. And communities in the impacted region have requested
more than $61 billion in expedited Federal funding for public
infrastructure repairs and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers projects that
could mitigate the potential for future storm damage.
state expenses
Current best estimates show that the State and local governments
will incur approximately $2.72 billion in obligations. State funds
spent or allocated for rescue, recovery, and rebuilding include: $438
million for repair of our public schools; $90 million to cover local
jurisdictions' cost-share for debris removal of approximately 16
million cubic yards; $38 million for immediate housing needs; and due
to property value declines, Texas school districts stand to suffer up
to a $1 billion loss in the local property taxes that fund our school
finance system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Agency Actuals as of Jan 2018................. $421,225,019
State Agency Projected for remainder of fiscal year 747,100,000
2018...............................................
Texas Education Agency Estimates for fiscal year 438,000,000
2018-19............................................
School finance estimated State increase due to local 1,000,000,000
property value loss for fiscal year 2020...........
Transfer to General Land Office for housing programs 38,600,000
Remainder of $90 million made available to local 77,000,000
governments for debris removal match...............
-------------------
TOTAL......................................... $2,721,925,019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
federal assistance
As of March 9, 2018, more than $13.3 billion in Federal funds have
been provided directly to Texans, including FEMA grants to households,
National Flood Insurance Program claims payments, and SBA disaster
loans; and more than $362 million in Public Assistance funding from
FEMA for State and local governments has been obligated. Additionally,
Congress has appropriated over $100 billion toward hurricane relief and
recovery. A portion of that money will be allocated to Texas for
housing recovery, infrastructure, mitigation, and numerous other needs.
housing
As of March 12, 2018, repairs have been completed on 8,356 homes
through the Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering (PREPS)
program, and nearly 8,000 homes are in the process of receiving
repairs. Sixty-nine homes have completed repairs through the Direct
Assistance for Limited Home Repair (DALHR) program, with 538 additional
applicants. Some 2,263 families have been housed through the Direct
Housing Program, receiving temporary housing units such as a
manufactured housing unit, a travel trailer, or Direct Lease;
additional housing options are being prepped for occupancy for an
additional 2,621 applicants. And 7,249 households are taking advantage
of FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance, staying in hotels or
other accommodations while seeking longer-term housing solutions.
lessons learned
Now more than 6 months after Hurricane Harvey made landfall, and as
rebuilding efforts continue, much progress has been made through the
outstanding coordination of teams at the Federal, State, and local
levels. In each community, it was because of the courage and calm
leadership of local emergency managers, elected officials, law
enforcement, and first responders that so many lives were spared, and
that many of their citizens are on the long road to recovery--even as
they too suffered personal loss. Our Federal partners have been
responsive and innovative, including improvements to speed funding to
impacted communities. In the early days after landfall of Hurricane
Harvey, as the devastating damage became apparent, it was clear the
affected jurisdictions would need assistance and need it quickly--both
for debris removal (Category A) and to reimburse the massive emergency
protective measures (Category B) that were deployed across 53 counties
in the Presidential Disaster Declaration. As a result, FEMA and the
State worked together to expedite payments for Public Assistance. These
efforts pushed over $290 million to locals in the first 30 days. And
the work of the Governor's Commission to Rebuild Texas in helping local
communities navigate State and Federal resources for infrastructure
rebuilding has also been commendable, as have the county extension
agents who have served as a force extender for those efforts in the
field. With lessons learned in terms of training needs at the local
level, as well as technology improvements made to track response and
recovery efforts, this Commission is a model that could be replicated
in future disasters. However, even as all State agency resources were
leveraged, and our partnership with Federal agencies is strong, there
is much room for improvement at all levels of government to meet our
ultimate goal of helping Texas families and communities to recover from
a devastating storm of historic proportions.
Obstacle: Bureaucratic Delays
The disaster recovery apparatus is saddled by redundancy of
Government. Disaster relief is administered across multiple agencies
amongst multiple layers of Government. The complexity related to the
coordination of the numerous Federal programs (FEMA, HUD, SBA, USDA,
etc.) is challenging at best for individuals and communities that must
apply and qualify for assistance from these numerous programs. Most
often an individual or entity is required to apply for multiple sources
of assistance, with each program requiring new applications containing
much of the same information. The individual or entity also must
navigate the maze of qualifying for and receiving assistance from the
source of prime responsibility before they can qualify for assistance
under other programs. This is very confusing, cumbersome, and
complicated. This results in some individuals or entities ultimately
not receiving the assistance they rightly qualify for because they fail
to properly navigate this bureaucratic labyrinth.
Recommendation: Streamline and speed immediate relief for
individuals.
The complexity of the sequence of delivery for Individual
Assistance (IA) through FEMA must be remedied. Even within the
centralized Disaster Recovery Centers, already traumatized survivors
must navigate a confusing gauntlet of Federal agencies, State agencies,
and relief organizations. And multiple organizations send multiple
inspectors to the same property, then debate and delay the actual
delivery of services because everyone wants to be the payer of last
resort. Families would recover faster if FEMA would develop a tiered IA
structure that delivers grant funds to families based on damage
assessments regardless of who else might be supporting the survivors.
This needs to be regardless of insurance status.
Recommendation: Cut red tape at all levels.
Some jurisdictions encountered challenges in quickly procuring
needed support services, while many others discovered that the
contracts they had in advance of the storm did not include all of the
contract provisions required under the governing Federal laws and/or
rules. Many of these required Federal provisions seem to be onerous,
such as the prohibition to use interlocal agreements to allow contracts
procured by one jurisdiction (i.e. the county) to be used to perform
work for another jurisdiction (i.e. a city). This is common practice
under State procurement laws, but prohibited by Federal laws governing
disaster response. This prohibition greatly reduces the options
available to local jurisdictions to quickly and efficiently respond to
their needs. Additionally, confusion as to what is required for Public
Assistance (PA) funding was problematic. Due to this inconsistency,
local auditors, finance directors, and emergency managers operated
under a cloud of anxiety. The lack of a true and cohesive checklist
detailing the documentation requirements can greatly affect a
jurisdiction's Public Assistance funding.
Cutting red tape works. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Harvey, Governor Abbott used the authority provided to him in Texas
Govt. Code section 418 to suspend hundreds of regulatory statutes and
State agency rules that would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay
necessary action in coping with the disaster. The suspended
regulations/rules fall under the authority of more than 30 State
agencies and cover a variety of topics including peace officers,
vehicle storage facilities, professional license renewal, animal
health, and many more. (A complete list is available on request.) The
removal of the regulations allowed for State and local entities to
focus on the goal of picking up the people of Texas, rather than on
complying with procedures and process.
Obstacle: Housing Delays
The loss of family homes and family memories, and the sense of
security those bring, was deeply devastating for many Texans. Given the
enormity of the potential housing project in Texas, and the likelihood
that FEMA would be spread too thin to manage responses to three
separate storms concurrently, Texas agreed to take the primary role in
delivering temporary housing. A cooperative federalism of this sort has
the potential to radically transform the way housing is delivered. In
its best form, the Federal Government can provide tremendous financial
assistance to those whose lives have been devastated by the storm,
while permitting States to provide solutions that satisfy the unique
geographical, legal, and even political concerns of their State. But
such a method will only work if the insertion of the State into the
implementation of the temporary housing programs does not simply insert
an additional layer of process and procedure. In some places, the
temporary housing program has been slowed by trying to coordinate
procedures and ensure compliance at three different levels of
government.
Recommendation: Streamline delivery; remove regulatory
roadblocks.
Though still on-going, Texas learned two valuable lessons from its
implementation of the temporary housing program. First, in order for
the cooperation to work, States must truly be relieved of complying
with the tangle of Federal regulations governing the temporary housing
program. Indeed, it would seem that even FEMA--which continues to help
implement the temporary housing program in some parts of the State--
struggles to efficiently deliver housing solutions while complying with
these regulations. And while the labyrinth of regulations and processes
is long and tortuous, many of the rules themselves have the perverse
effect of being both more costly and less effective. Second, Texas
itself must do a better job of removing regulatory obstacles from the
successful delivery of temporary housing solutions. The patchwork of
codes and local ordinances that crisscross the State has made it
extremely difficult to design a one-size-fits-all solution to immediate
housing needs. Take for example, the RV and Manufactured Home
solution--the most widely-used FEMA program. Many areas, such as the
city of Houston, do not permit the installation of RVs or manufactured
homes.
Obstacle: Debris Removal and Procurement
The faster debris is removed, the faster recovery begins. With an
estimated 16 million cubic yards of debris generated by Hurricane
Harvey, debris collection and removal was a huge issue early during the
response and recovery phases, and to a certain extent continues today.
We are thankful that the President rapidly authorized a 90 percent
Federal cost share for debris removal, which helped alleviate some of
these burdens, however on-the-ground problems ranged from insufficient
resources to remove debris to a lack of disposal sites available in
some areas to accept mixed debris. And many cities let a single
contract for debris removal. At its best, this scenario provides no
incentive for debris haulers to move quickly. At its worst, it provides
a perverse incentive for price gouging and coercion. Opportunities
exist to improve the debris collection and removal response through
improved contracting practices, pre-approved collection and disposal
sites, and prepositioning of critical assets.
Recommendation: Remove regulatory roadblocks.
Federal regulations have posed a problem for local jurisdictions as
the requirements involve more stringent guidelines, as well as
additional personnel and resources for already overwhelmed and
understaffed departments. Jurisdictions struggle to implement the
Federal guideline of full and open competition due to the extreme
nature of the event. As these jurisdictions were responding to public
safety and saving lives, the task of publishing solicitations,
adjusting time lines, researching products and services, and
prohibiting local preferences all took a secondary role in the response
effort. Jurisdictions were forced to take time away from their efforts
of managing the devastation to focus on Federal grant requirements,
which were more stringent than local or State laws, regulation, or
policy. Although many jurisdictions had prepared for disaster services
by awarding pre-positioned contracts prior to the event, the
jurisdictions found that these contracts were not compliant with
Federal procurement regulations.
The three hurricanes in 2017 found many debris contractors leaving
Texas (often without fulfilling their contract), assisting other
States, returning to Texas, and then raising their agreed-upon contract
prices with Texas jurisdictions. Under Federal guidelines, a cost
change to an original contract would require a detailed cost analysis.
Due to the unusual and unique circumstances of three devastating events
affecting the United States, Texas jurisdictions were not only at the
mercy of the debris contractors, but they were also under pressure to
remove the debris quickly and expediently due to health and safety
hazards. Conducting detailed cost and price analysis under such
circumstances became a heavy burden on these jurisdictions.
FEMA could speed up recovery by removing regulations on private
property and commercial property debris removal. It has been theorized
that insurance should cover private and commercial properties, but
since FEMA is the insurer under NFIP, by applying outdated regulations,
all FEMA is doing is slowing the recovery process.
Economic Losses
As a result of Hurricane Harvey, nearly 1.4 million Texans likely
evacuated from their homes, more than 35,000 rescues were recorded,
more than 42,000 Texans sought refuge, and nearly 300,000 households
were left without power. And tragically, it is estimated that 68 people
died, making Harvey the deadliest hurricane to hit Texas in nearly 100
years. The event upended millions of Texans' lives. On top of this,
Hurricane Harvey's economic impact was in the range of $125 billion,
according to the National Hurricane Center.
Recommendation: Prioritize mitigation projects.
Disaster recovery is a long and expensive process--and one that
should be thought of both in terms of present and future need. Governor
Abbott has made clear that we cannot simply repair the damage left
behind by Hurricane Harvey--but that we must ``future proof'' for the
next storm. Spending precious taxpayer dollars without consideration of
future costs, both in terms of dollars and lives, is short-sighted and
fiscally irresponsible. Texas has asked the Federal Government to
provide assistance to ensure that Texas rebuilds stronger than ever
after Hurricane Harvey, and it is our intention to be good stewards of
those dollars both in terms of present and future need. Thanks to the
hard work of the Texas Congressional delegation and Members of
Congress, we are off to a good start toward ``future-proofing.''
We can minimize the cost of future disasters by investing money now
to mitigate damage in the future. For example, Texas is funding hazard
mitigation projects in communities impacted by Hurricane Harvey through
FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). The funding from FEMA
will provide an estimated $1 billion for projects designed to both help
Texas rebuild and reduce the risk of future damage from flooding and
hurricanes. The HMGP is an example of a State-Federal partnership that
targets financial resources toward local projects that will help
``future proof'' against the next storm.
attachment
Historic Storm
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, ``Tropical Cyclone Report,
Hurricane Harvey,'' Jan. 23, 2018. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey.pdf
``Harvey started as a typical weak August tropical storm that
affected the Lesser Antilles and dissipated over the central
Caribbean Sea. However, after re-forming over the Bay of
Campeche, Harvey rapidly intensified into a category 4
hurricane (on the Saffir Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale) before
making landfall along the middle Texas coast. The storm then
stalled, with its center over or near the Texas coast for 4
days, dropping historic amounts of rainfall of more than 60
inches over southeastern Texas--Harvey was the most significant
tropical cyclone rainfall event in United States history, both
in scope and peak rainfall amounts, since reliable rainfall
records began around the 1880's. The highest storm total
rainfall report from Harvey was 60.58 inches near Nederland,
Texas, with another report of 60.54 inches from near Groves,
Texas. Both of these values (and from five other stations)
exceed the previously accepted United States tropical cyclone
storm total rainfall record of 52.00 inches at Kanalohuluhulu
Ranger Station, Hawaii, in August of 1950 from Hurricane
Hiki.''
@NWS, Aug. 28, 2017. https://twitter.com/NWS/status/
902174274571689984/photo/1
Rescue, Recovery, and Rebuilding
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, REPORT TO THE PEOPLE, ``Steps to
Recovery,'' Jan. 29, 2018. A snapshot of action taken by the
Governor; not inclusive of all briefings, hearings,
proclamations, actions, or events in Texas. Begins on page 28:
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/
2018ReportTOThePeople_- 01292018.pdf
Economic Loss/Damage
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, ``Costliest U.S. tropical
cyclones tables updated,'' Jan. 26, 2018. Table 3b. Costliest
mainland United States tropical cyclones, 1900-2017, after
accounting for inflation to 2017 dollars. https://
www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf
INSURANCE JOURNAL, ``Top 10 Global Economic Loss Events,''
Jan. 24, 2018. Insurance Journal estimates Harvey exceeded $100
billion in economic loss; only $30 billion was insured. https:/
/www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2018/01/24/
478246.htm
Chairman McCaul. Thank you so much. Let me just say I think
the Governor made us all Texas proud and strong, so thanks for
your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Maul for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF WESLEY MAUL, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Maul. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon. At 9:10 a.m. on
September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma made landfall at Cudjoe Key
as a Category 4 storm, becoming the first major hurricane to
impact Florida since Wilma in 2005.
Hurricane Irma's constantly-changing course and intensity
required the State emergency response team to plan for dozens
of impact scenarios and resulted in one of the largest storm
responses in Florida's history.
Record-breaking evacuations, shelter populations, commodity
distribution, mission requests, and quite possibly the largest
power restoration in American history. The success of our
State's response would not have been possible without the
steadfast support of our mutual aid and EMAC partners.
In the end, 38 States and the District of Columbia aided
our efforts either through dedicated teams or through resources
shipped.
Additionally, the military's contributions to Florida's
response cannot be understated. Strategic partnerships with the
National Guard and DOD proved to be the game-changing element
in our response. It is important to remember that Hurricane
Irma was not the only challenge we faced in 2017. Irma's
impacts came just 2 weeks after Hurricane Harvey caused
catastrophic damage in Texas. Ten days after Irma made landfall
in Florida, Hurricane Maria impacted Puerto Rico, devastating
the island. Nate was not far behind, impacting the Gulf Coast
on October 7.
Despite the effects of one of the largest storms to hit our
shores in over a decade, Florida stood ready in support of
Texas' efforts associated with Hurricane Harvey; the division
coordinated the deployment of three search-and-rescue teams in
a voluntary agency liaison.
To prepare for the Gulf Coast impacts associated with
Hurricane Nate, we pre-staged an IMT and we made sure that
ambulance, swift water rescue, recon, and US&R teams were on
standby.
The aftermath of Hurricane Maria's devastating landfall in
Puerto Rico presented a unique set of challenges for those
affected by the storm. However, Florida once again stood ready
to help our neighbors. We fulfilled critical EMAC missions,
requests for law enforcement, National Guard, transportation,
and utility professionals in support of the response effort.
Division staff worked closely with their Puerto Rican
counterparts and members of Governor Rossello's administration
to provide technical and strategic expertise, as well as
information regarding the availability of Florida-based
resources.
Florida remains the only State to have entered into a host
State agreement to directly assist Maria survivors. This helped
us coordinate the opening of resource centers to provide tens
of thousands of Maria evacuees in Florida with a one-stop shop
for available survivor resources.
At the request of Governor Scott, the disaster case
management program was also approved for Maria evacuees in our
State. This, when considered alongside TSA and the marks proves
Florida's commitment to providing every storm survivor with the
same level of care regardless of their origin.
The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was a defining event for
the division and our partners. We will continue to review and
reflect upon the actions taken during our many response
operations, seeking ways to improve our practices and provide
Floridians with the best possible quality of service.
As we chart the course forward, Florida must strategically
position itself to build a culture of preparedness, ready our
communities for catastrophic disasters, and reduce the
complexity of disaster programming. The 2017 season was the
most expensive in U.S. history.
FEMA Administrator Brock Long said that if this is the new
normal, Americans can't rely on a Federal cavalry when disaster
strikes. They will need to have to take care of themselves.
In Florida, we couldn't agree more. As emergency managers
we are taught that disasters are inherently local, and we
recognize that until we return to a culture of localized
responsibility, we will never truly be prepared for all
disasters.
To that end, there are things we can do now together to
ensure that we are ready for whatever the future may hold. Let
us streamline our policies and our procedures at every level.
The last thing a storm survivor needs to deal with in the
aftermath of a devastating impact is another bureaucratic maze.
We can partner to train and mitigate on the front end, thus
buying down the cost of disasters. Maximizing resiliency prior
to emergencies will always prove more cost-effective than even
the best of recoveries.
Let us plan and fund strategies that are Federally
supported, State-managed and locally executed. For example,
increasing management costs 12 percent would better position
States and communities to manage disasters on their own while
decreasing their overall dependency on Federal resources.
Administrator Long was correct in his statement: Building a
culture of preparedness will be the most effective way to deal
with the new normal. It is time to be bold and hit the reset
button on much of what we thought we knew in this profession.
Moving forward, I want this committee to know that my team
and I are available to discuss with, partner on, and work with
you on all issues. We also stand ready to work alongside
Administrator Long and our fellow States to move this
profession forward.
I want to close by saying thank you to our Federal, State,
and local partners. It was a pleasure working with you last
season, and we appreciate all of your hard work. You
contributed to our success, which in turn allowed us to support
our neighbors when they needed it the most. That is exactly how
this business is supposed to work. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wesley Maul
March 15, 2018
section i
At 9:10 a.m. on September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma made landfall at
Cudjoe Key as a Category 4 storm, becoming the first major hurricane to
make landfall in Florida since Wilma in 2005.
Later that afternoon, Irma made landfall in Florida for a second
time, now on Marco Island as a Category 3 storm. The State Emergency
Operations Center (SEOC) had been at the highest level of activation
since September 5; almost a week of round-the-clock operations in
anticipation of a major hurricane impact.
As Irma moved across our State, hurricane strength winds extended
up to 80 miles and tropical storm force winds extended up to 400 miles
from the center of the storm. At least 32 of Florida's rivers and
creeks flooded, and 18 tornadoes were confirmed across the peninsula.
Fifty-four out of our State's 67 counties issued evacuation orders
to a record 6.8 million people, resulting in our State's largest
evacuation to date.
On September 11, as the storm made its way north, more than 6.7
million customers lost power--more than 64 percent of Florida utility
customers.
Hurricane Irma's constantly changing course and intensity
projections required the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to plan
for dozens of potential impact scenarios simultaneously and resulted in
one of the largest storm responses in Florida history.
The SERT began operations by initiating coordination calls with the
National Hurricane Center and county emergency management officials on
September 4, a week before landfall. On September 5, the SEOC activated
to Level One, the highest level of activation, and sustained its 24-
hour operations until the 21st of that same month. The SEOC remained
activated for a total of 35 consecutive days, until the evening of
October 8, when the Activation Level returned to Three.
State and local governments utilized Alert Florida, the State-wide
alert notification system, to send more than 4,500 alert messages to
more than 7,000,000 unique recipients. The total number of
registrations grew by 156,675 in the month of September alone.
In the SERT's common operating platform, Emergency Management (EM)
Constellation, a total of 6,768 missions have been entered to date--
2,000 more than Hurricane Charley and almost 5,000 more than last
year's Hurricane Matthew.
Five first responder base camps were opened by the State, while 95
SERT Liaisons deployed to EOCs.
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) operations were conducted across our
State, with tens of thousands of structures searched.
State-wide, 1,440 personnel from nine Florida and 21 out-of-State
USAR Task Forces completed 64 USAR missions, resulting in 751 residents
assisted and 62 animals rescued.
State law enforcement also played a vital role in Florida's
response, as evidenced by the 400 mission requests completed through
the SERT. These operations included dedicated escorts for emergency
fuel and commodity shipments moving across the State, security and the
staffing of critical checkpoints.
Sixty-two Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) personnel
deployed, including 21 who supported SEOC operations. These agents and
officers spent 27 uninterrupted days working tirelessly to coordinate
pre- and post-landfall law enforcement missions. Their contributions
formed an important pillar of Florida's response.
Beach fortification and marine debris cleanup occurred on an
impressive scale. In addition, 62,189 cubic yards of sand were used to
fortify beaches in St Johns, Volusia, and Flagler Counties.
State-wide, 2,377 vessels were assessed and 2,118 were removed;
1,685 of those removed were in the Florida Keys alone.
Two hundred fifty-two thousand, forty-five cubic yards of
vegetation, construction and demolition debris were cleared, including
much from waterways in Duval, Clay, St. Johns, Putnam, Brevard,
Collier, Marion, and Lee Counties.
In total, the SERT distributed more than 14,945,854 liters of
water, 13,870,560 meals, 270,042 tarps, and 13,000 cots.
Seven hundred three shelters opened throughout the State, housing a
record-breaking peak population of 191,764 people.
These totals include 117 Special Needs shelters that housed a peak
population of 14,290 individuals. In addition, sheltered survivors were
served more than 1 million meals.
Forty-four thousand, eight hundred three volunteers donated almost
1.5 million hours to the response effort, a time commitment valued at
almost $3.2 million. Five-point-eight million pounds of food donations
were received.
The Florida Disaster Fund, working with Volunteer Florida, has
contributed $2.5 million in grants to 77 organizations, and hopes to
commit another $5 million.
Thanks to the outstanding efforts of our team and partners, every
request for resources from county emergency management agencies was
met. The SERT successfully planned and actively coordinated the
strategic and logistical operations required of an effective response
to a major storm impact.
section ii
The success of our State's response would not have been possible
without the steadfast support of our Mutual Aid and EMAC partners.
Last year, the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM)
successfully coordinated 145 EMAC and Mutual Aid requests-129 for
Hurricane Irma, 11 for Maria, 4 for Harvey, and 1 for Nate.
Thousands of linemen arrived through Mutual Aid agreements and
helped restore electricity to those more than 6.7 million customers
left without power. Their round-the-clock efforts resulted in a 91
percent restoration of State-wide power in only 6 days.
Two-hundred twenty-six trucks carried 1,422,587 gallons of fuel
into Florida. The 24 emergency fueling stations supplied through these
operations supported the efforts of our first responders throughout the
State.
Thirty-four Incident Management Teams (IMTs) deployed, 28 from
outside Florida, and conducted a host of missions, including Basecamp,
Field, EOC Support, Recovery, and MARC Support Operations.
In the end, 38 States and the District of Columbia aided our
efforts, either through dedicated teams or through resources shipped.
Federal agencies also proved invaluable partners during the
response to Irma. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for
example, supplied 8,455,768 meals, 70,042 tarps, 42,491 gallons of
fuel, and 5,446,546 liters of drinking water.
Federal personnel deployed across the State in a variety of mission
roles. These included including 465 FEMA and 294 Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) surge staff, 11 management teams, and 8 FEMA Urban
Search-and-Rescue teams.
The military's contribution to Florida's response cannot be
understated. Almost 11,000 uniformed Service Members were deployed,
3,228 of them from outside our State.
The Florida National Guard supported nearly every aspect of the
State's response through sheltering, search and rescue, security,
communications, and commodity distribution operations. Two thousand
eight hundred seventy-seven Guard personnel supported 352 shelters in
42 counties, distributed more than 4.8 million meals and almost 6.5
million liters of water, and de-mucked 471 homes in the Florida Keys.
Regarding Title X resources, the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE)
integrated extremely well into daily operations.
The Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and his team assisted in the
development of a plan that helped the Florida Air Operations Branch
build a robust set of planning, coordination, and tracking
capabilities. This plan's implementation allowed for the
synchronization of aviation assets between 6 agencies and across 853
fixed-wing and 423 rotary-wing missions.
The DCE also coordinated, planned, and executed operations
involving four uniformed services.
They provided operational coordination with the ships USS Iwo Jima,
USS New York, and USS Abraham Lincoln, major naval assets positioned to
help with Florida's response.
In addition, Naval Air Station (NAS) Key West provided responder
housing as well as docking and support for the TS Empire State, a troop
ship that ensured the availability of critically-needed rescue and
support capabilities in the Florida Keys.
They worked with FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to
track the delivery of more than 800 trailers containing life-saving and
life-sustaining FEMA supplies.
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) coordinated more
than 20 air transport missions carrying the medically dependent,
critical supplies, and personnel.
Last, the Joint Regional Medical Planning Officer (JRMPO) attached
to the DCE successfully integrated with the SERT's Health and Human
Services personnel. The partnership assisted in the development of
mission assignments, such as for the movement of critical medical
assets under the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).
The JRMPO also assisted the ESF-8 with the development of patient
movement and sheltering plans and coordinated with U.S. Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM) and the SERT to develop a vector control plan for
anticipated threats stemming from post-storm expanding mosquito
populations.
In all, the FEMA Region IV DCE identified the necessary Title X
resources and deployed 49 staff from all four service branches. During
the response, the DCE completed 48 mission assignments and 11 tasking
orders, resulting in the obligation of more than $300 million--all with
zero loss or damage. Their operational contributions and strategic
insights only enhanced the SERT's capabilities, proving, once again,
that DoD contributions are indispensable.
section iii
It is important to remember that Hurricane Irma was not the only
challenge we faced in 2017. Irma's impact came just 2 weeks after
Hurricane Harvey caused catastrophic damage in Texas. Ten days after
Irma made landfall in Florida, Hurricane Maria impacted Puerto Rico,
devastating the island. Nate was not far behind, impacting the Gulf
Coast on October 7.
Despite the effects of one of the largest storms to hit our shores
in over a decade, Florida and FDEM stood ready to support.
In support of Texas's efforts associated with Hurricane Harvey, the
Division coordinated the deployment of a volunteer agency liaison as
well as three Search-and-Rescue teams. These assets travelled to the
Houston area and helped their Texas counterparts respond to the storm.
To prepare for potential West Florida impacts associated with
Hurricane Nate, we pre-staged an IMT at the SEOC. We made sure
Ambulance, Swift Water Rescue, Recon, and USAR Teams were on Standby.
We also expanded the operation of the State Assistance and
Information Line (SAIL) in anticipation of any potential impact
scenarios and coordinated the opening and staffing of seven public
shelters.
Hurricane Maria's devastating landfall in Puerto Rico presented a
unique set of challenges for those affected by the storm. However,
Florida once again stood ready to help our neighbors. In preparation
and response to the storm's impact, the Division and our partners took
several important steps.
We fulfilled critical EMAC mission requests in support of the
response effort. These included:
an FDOT crew to evaluate traffic signal installations and
transportation systems,
an 8-member FDLE Law Enforcement IMT,
a 26-airman National Guard sheltering support mission,
50 Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) officers, along with 12
officers from the Orlando Police Department, providing security
and law enforcement support,
a 20-day National Guard rotary-wing mission.
Division staff worked closely with their Puerto Rico counterparts
and members of Governor Rossello's government to provide technical and
strategic expertise, as well as information regarding the availability
of Florida-based resources.
Just as important was our effort to safeguard the hundreds of
thousands of Puerto Ricans who evacuated to the State of Florida.
Florida remains the only State to have entered into a Host State
Agreement to directly assist Maria survivors. This helped us coordinate
the opening of State Multi-Agency Resource Centers (MARC) at our
airports, and later in the community, as early as October 10, 2017.
These MARCs have proven an incredibly helpful resource for many of
those who were displaced by the effects of Hurricane Maria. The centers
brought together State and Federal agencies as well as volunteer
organizations to provide Maria evacuees in Florida with a one-stop shop
of available survivor resources.
Participating agencies included include FEMA, the Florida
Department of Children and Families, Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,
Department of Health, Department of Economic Opportunity, the American
Red Cross, and Catholic Charities.
These partners offer storm victims a wide range of important
services, including help with registering for FEMA Individual
Assistance, crisis counseling, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) information, assistance with unaccompanied minors and
agency social services, assistance with animal services, medical
attention and health concerns, employment information and training
services, food and water resources, language guidance, and spiritual
care.
To date, 34,017 individuals have visited Florida MARCs and received
assistance, leaving little doubt that these facilities made a
substantial contribution in addressing the needs Maria survivors.
Additionally, the Division has supported Individual Assistance
programming for Maria survivors in Florida, such the Transitional
Shelter Assistance (TSA) program.
TSA saw a peak of 1,786 households on January 14, 2018, totaling
4,855 individual Maria survivors checked into Florida hotels.
At the request of Governor Scott, the Disaster Case Management
(DCM) program was also approved for Maria evacuees in in our State.
This, when considered alongside TSA and the MARCs, proves Florida's
commitment to providing every storm survivor with the same level of
service, regardless of their origin.
The SEOC currently remains activated in support of Puerto Rico's
recovery as FDEM continues to play an integral role in the coordination
of response efforts between Federal, State, local, private industry,
volunteer, and faith-based organizations.
section iv
The information regarding Hurricane Irma's total impact is still
being collected.
All of Florida's 67 counties were declared under a Presidential
Disaster Declaration. Out of these, 55 counties were declared for all
categories of Public Assistance, while 49 counties were declared for
Individual Assistance.
To date, 9,444 recovery projects have been initiated through 1,214
Requests for Public Assistance (RPA). At last estimate, Florida's State
Agencies spent $727,327,438 responding to the storm, and our local
community costs are expected to exceed $1 billion.
A record-breaking 2,644,137 Floridians have registered for
Individual Assistance.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has approved more than
31,000 loans, totaling $1,059,938,900 in Florida.
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) has approved
$992,041,840.70 million in assistance, with a to-date disbursement of
$909,200,734.85.
This includes $686,487,724.77 in Housing Assistance, of which
$679,737,471.13 is already in the hands of storm survivors.
IHP also includes $305,554,225.93 approved in Other Needs
Assessment (ONA) grants, with a to-date disbursement of
$229,463,263.72.
The Transitional Sheltering Assistance program successfully
provided hotel rooms for 27,332 displaced households over a 6-month
period, ending just this past week.
For the first time, Florida executed the Sheltering and Temporary
Emergency Power (STEP) program. However, unlike in other States,
Florida took the approach of a Federally-funded, State-administered,
locally-managed program.
STEP was authorized in ten Florida counties: Monroe, Collier, Lee,
Hendry, Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, Hendry, Charlotte, and St.
Johns. However, only Monroe County chose to utilize the program for a
current total of 204 eligible households. To date, approximately $1.6
million dollars has been spent on STEP within Monroe County at an
average of $8,827 per unit--all to provide safe, sanitary, and secure
survivor housing in the Florida Keys.
Moving forward, there are important considerations regarding State
mitigation efforts.
Currently, FEMA's revised 6-month HMGP estimate stands at
$354,066,081, while counties still have more in unfunded project costs
than our programs have in available funding--$4,152,347,415 as of last
estimate.
For decades, Florida has been a model of mitigation practices, and
Hurricane Irma provided yet another case study in the value of
mitigation planning. The juxtaposition of pre-Hurricane Andrew and
post-Florida Building Codes structures in the Florida Keys will provide
valuable data as we begin to employ Irma HMGP funds in buying down the
cost of future disasters.
section v
Hurricane Irma's recovery marks the first full implementation of
the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) in Florida, and having
the full Federal family integrated into the process has proven a
tremendous success.
Florida's NDRF structure mirrored the Federal NDRF structure in
pairing partner agencies to perform in a disaster recovery context.
This framework was critical in transitioning through the response,
recovery, and mitigation phases of Hurricane Irma.
In addition, this level of integration carried into the place-based
teams, facilitating expeditious resource delivery to the most impacted
jurisdictions. Staff embodied four guiding principles when engaging
with impacted entities:
1. Disasters are local; locals maintain the best knowledge
regarding their communities' needs.
2. Focus on tangible projects that buy down natural hazard risk.
3. Promote return on investment in all actions.
4. Always be mindful of a project's life cycle.
The leveraging of funds and programs through the NDRF provided the
ability to build resiliency through mitigation. The NDRF structure
integrated steady-state and Stafford Act funds and programs in support
of disaster recovery and mitigation needs.
Exploring the integration of additional disaster recovery
opportunities is on-going. Current efforts in project advancement
include the Community Reinvestment Act and Public-Private Partnerships.
The framework also provides a mechanism for direct access to
Federal agencies with regulatory oversight or funding opportunities.
This level of engagement during the early stages of project development
increases program compliance decreases the odds of funding de-
obligation.
Florida's success in utilizing the NDRF should serve as a model for
other States, ensuring the speedy recovery of impacted communities.
section vi
The 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season was a defining event for the
Division and our partners. We will continue to review and reflect upon
the actions taken during the response, seeking ways to improve our
practices and provide Floridians with the best possible quality of
service.
Though the storm moved through Florida only 6 months ago, we have
already begun to chart a course forward.
Debris cleanup, evacuations, fuel, mass logistics, health and
medical risks, communications, and considerations for medically
dependent and vulnerable populations will be our primary areas of
focus. Through effective After-Action Reviews and continuously seeking
opportunities for improvement, FDEM will ensure that every Floridian
receives the care and service they need to successfully prepare for,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate against any potential emergency.
Recovery is a lengthy process--one that takes years of hard work
and dedication. Considering the magnitude of the event we witnessed
last year, there is still much to be done before we can officially
declare this mission accomplished. However, after witnessing the
outstanding determination and efficiency of our staff during my time
with the Division, and the exemplary results achieved through our
team's work during Irma, I have no doubt that Florida is beyond
equipped to handle the challenges ahead and will continue to set the
standard for emergency management everywhere.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Melendez.
STATEMENT OF JOSE MELENDEZ-ORTIZ, VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND STATUS, COMMONWEALTH
OF PUERTO RICO
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member for the opportunity to appear before this committee
today. Before I begin, I would like to extend our deepest
gratitude for your dedicated support in assisting us in the
process of recovery and rebuilding. I also want to thank you
for your unconditional assistance to our sole representative in
Congress, our champion and my friend, the Honorable Jenniffer
Gonzalez.
It has been 6 months since Hurricane Irma fumbled through
the Caribbean including Puerto Rico and 176 days since
Hurricane Maria ripped through our island. In the span of 2
weeks, Puerto Rico was hit by two Category 4 and 5 hurricanes.
For the past 20 years, since Hurricane Georges, we have
been spared. Up until September of last year, we often boasted
that Puerto Rico was especially blessed and protected. Then we
were humbled.
In September 2017, we were facing one of the worst natural
disasters in modern history. It was as if Mother Nature was
reminding us all that no matter how strong one might be, nature
will always be more powerful and it deserves our utmost
respect. That, Mr. Chairman and Members of this committee, is
our first lesson.
Let us be honest. None of us, either at the State or
Federal levels, were prepared to tackle the devastation caused
by Hurricane Maria. This is our second lesson. We must make the
necessary adjustments to adapt our emergency preparedness and
recovery efforts for a more effective and efficient response in
the upcoming hurricane season.
To do this at the Federal level, a citizen guidance must be
taken into consideration. No. 1, the Federal Government must
anticipate shipping delays to the island and take the necessary
steps to ensure rapid response by sea and air.
No. 2, nowadays telecommunications are a basic necessity.
Your smartphone is no longer a luxury. It is a piece of
emergency equipment that need to function in order for the most
basic communication to phone.
No. 3, cut the red tape. Whoever thought that bureaucracy
could effectively handle emergencies was sorely mistaken. It
can't despite all good intentions.
No. 4, there is no space for political pandering in the
middle of an emergency. To use the pain and suffering of
millions of American citizens to indulge in cheap politician
and gain political recognition is simply immoral. It is a
shameful exploitation of people who are merely trying to recoup
their normalcy in the midst of chaos.
No. 5, and this is important, we must urgently invest in
strengthening our power grid. You know, the recently-approved
relief package included $16 billion for Puerto Rico. The funds
are badly needed as Puerto Rico simply lacks the resources,
human or financial, to fortify the system and prepare for
hurricane season.
The simple truth is that we need more time. We need more
time, more materials, more resources. It pains me to say, but
we need more sense of urgency.
So it is with the deep respect that I ask you as Members of
Congress inject that much-needed sense of urgency to our
Federal agencies. I make this humble request on behalf of
millions of families who in the face of adversity rose up the
day after the storm to clean their houses, clean their debris
from the streets, and help those in most need in their
communities.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of doctors
who have continued to attend to the sick in spite of the lack
of power or internet in their offices or hospitals.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of
entrepreneurs who have invested every single penny they have in
the bank to save their businesses and open their doors to the
public. They rose in spite of adversity.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of people
who lost their jobs in the aftermath but have not quit, and
continue to look for work in order to get ahead.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of kids who
go to school every day in spite of a lack of power or water.
Dedication continues to be more important than any obstacle
because you see, behind the devastation of Maria a bigger story
is being written in Puerto Rico. It is a story of resilience.
It is a story of people who want to get ahead, who want to be
self-sufficient, who want to get back to normal.
With that, I thank you for your time and I hope that we can
continue to working together so we can build a stronger and
better Puerto Rico. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Melendez-Ortiz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jose Melendez, State Representative, At-Large,
Puerto Rico
March 15, 2018
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member Thompson for the
opportunity to appear before this committee today to share with you
some of the many lessons learned from the passing of Hurricane Maria
through Puerto Rico nearly 6 months ago.
Mr. Chairman, I appear before you as an At-Large State
Representative, on behalf of the nearly 3.5 million American citizens
who call Puerto Rico our home. Before I begin, I wish to extend our
deepest gratitude for your dedicated support in assisting us in the
process of recovery and rebuilding. In the past 6 months, you have
maintained a watchful and empathic eye, evaluating the situation on the
island first-hand with visits, and maintaining constant communications
with Federal and local agencies to ensure that the needs of our
American citizens are met and that the normalcy we all long for is
finally restored. I also want to thank you for your unconditional
assistance to our sole representative in Congress, the Honorable
Jenniffer Gonzalez, who has demonstrated exemplary leadership as a
coalitions builder to secure the necessary resources that afford these
American citizens sound health, homes, and the restoration of basic
needs including electricity, potable water, and telecommunications,
among many other items.
It has been 6 months since Hurricane Irma pummeled through the
Caribbean, including Puerto Rico, and 176 days since Hurricane Maria
ripped through our island. Within a span of 2 weeks, Puerto Rico was
hit by two Category 4 and 5 hurricanes. For the past 20 years--since
Hurricane Georges--we had been spared, and up until September of last
year, we often boasted that Puerto Rico was especially blessed and
protected.
And then, in just 15 days, we were humbled. On September 23, 2017
we were facing one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. It
was as if Mother Nature was reminding us all that no mailer how strong
one might be, nature will always be more powerful, and it deserves our
utmost respect. That, Mr. Chairman and Members of this committee, is
our first lesson.
Let me begin by stating that in spite of enjoying a 20-year period
of relative peace during hurricane season, I can confidently state that
our emergency preparedness plans have always been comprehensive and
effective. For both Hurricanes Irma and Maria, our plan was put in
place on time; allowing the State government and our first responders,
as well as the mayors, to quickly evacuate residents from at-risk
communities onto shelters, and for individuals and families to purchase
food and supplies, and to secure their homes and businesses. When
Hurricane Irma made landfall, we were ready, and we were fortunate that
while it devastated certain areas in the northeast of the island, the
damage caused in other parts was not severe, allowing for swift
mobilization and recovery.
As far as Hurricane Irma was concerned, we were lucky, unlike our
neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean. We were grateful for having been
partially spared and immediately began to help our neighbors. Thousands
of Puerto Ricans answered the call for help and packed their boats with
tons of much-needed supplies and resources. They headed Southeast to
lend a helping hand to our neighbors in the United States and British
Virgin Islands, St. Marteen, Antigua & Barbuda, among others.
And then, suddenly; Maria showed up on the map. It moved rapidly
through the Atlantic, and we prepared once more and prayed that luck
would be on our side again. But this time, there was no escaping the
wrath. Hurricane Maria enveloped our entire island, and for over 12
hours, it ravaged us with fierce winds and torrential rains. In less
than 1 day, millions of families were robbed of their most precious
belongings; stripped of basic services, lost without their livelihood.
The next day, as we opened the doors of our damaged homes to try
and recover from the trauma, we found ourselves without no water, no
power, no communications . . . and just, utter devastation. As I
mentioned before, our emergency preparedness plan was implemented well
in advance of the storm. But our plan did not take into account the
magnitude and sheer force of this hurricane. It was put in place, but
it was not enough. FEMA's plan was also ready, but it also proved
inadequate. Let's be honest. None of us--either at the State or Federal
levels--were prepared to tackle the devastation caused by Hurricane
Maria. This is our second lesson: We must make the necessary
adjustments to adapt our emergency preparedness and recovery efforts
for more effective and efficient response in the upcoming hurricane
season.
In making adjustments to emergency preparedness plans at the
Federal level, a series of important items must be taken into
consideration:
1. In order to better prepare for hurricane season, the Federal
Government must anticipate shipping delays to the island and
take the necessary steps, to ensure rapid response by sea and
air, including waiving or eliminating cabotage laws.--Puerto
Rico is an island. It may seem obvious, but we quickly learned
that because of our distance from the mainland, urgent
supplies, including water, power generators, and medical
supplies took weeks to get to the island, delaying FEMA's
relief efforts. Indeed, shipping delays have caused havoc in
the restoration of power as outside contractors and the Corps
of Engineers wait impatiently for materials and equipment to
arrive.
2. Nowadays, telecommunications are a basic necessity.--Your
smartphone is no longer a luxury. It is a piece of emergency
equipment that needs to function in order for the most basic of
communications to flow. In Puerto Rico, we expected that we
would be without power for some time after the storm. But we
did not anticipate that telecommunications would be shot down
entirely.
This is extremely important. I want you to picture being on a
mountain after a solid 12-hour pounding of 155 miles per hour
winds and over 20 inches of rain in a house that lost its roof
. . . has no electricity, no water, and a diabetic mother who
needs dialysis. You have no landline, no WIFI, and your telecom
company service is down. The road is blocked by debris, so you
are unable to move from your location. You don't know if the
nearest hospital is open, and you cannot call your neighbor for
help. You also won't be able to reach 9-1-1 to request
emergency services of any kind. I cannot stress enough how
terrible is the feeling of isolation in the midst of
devastation. Six months after the storm, this remains the case
for many people in Puerto Rico. It is unacceptable.
The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) announcement last
week to direct $954 million toward the restoration and
expansion of communications networks in Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands is welcome news. We must afford people in
emergency situations access to telecommunications during and
after the emergencies so that they can check in with friends
and family and seek help, if needed.
3. Cut the red tape.--Whoever thought that bureaucracy could
effectively handle emergencies was sorely mistaken. It can't,
despite all good intentions. Sadly, we are still suffering the
consequences of inefficiencies brought on by excessive
paperwork, inter and intra-agency consultation and needless
requirements. Just this week, Governor Rossello, announced an
initiative aimed at identifying and eliminating areas of
overregulation and bureaucratic burdens. The Federal Government
is not immune to these shortcomings. It should follow suit and
eliminate red tape in order to ensure a more effective response
to emergencies.
4. There is no space for political pandering in the middle of an
emergency.--I--as well as most of the American citizens in
Puerto Rico--wholeheartedly believe that our leaders at the
Executive branch and here in Congress have done their best to
provide for steadfast relief and recovery. You have done so
because you are genuinely concerned for the well-being of the
3.5 million American citizens in Puerto Rico. Can we improve
the way we do it? Certainly. Nobody is perfect. This committee
hearing is testament to that, and we are immensely grateful for
your consideration.
But, to use the pain and suffering of millions of American citizens
to indulge in cheap politicking and gain political recognition
is simply immoral. It is a shameful exploitation of people who
are merely trying to recoup their normalcy in the midst of
chaos. As we approach rebuilding efforts, I urge all decision
makers and leaders to find common ground, set partisanship
aside, and rally together for the thousands of families in
Puerto Rico that deserve to rise and prosper.
5. We must urgently invest in strengthening our power grid.--
According to the Puerto Rico Power Authority (PREPA), as of
Monday we had 93% power generation and 91% power consumption,
meaning that over 1.3 million customers have had their power
restored. In numbers, it looks as if there has been progress.
It has been slow, but there has been progress.
But, let's put this in perspective. Six months after Hurricane Irma
hit the island, over 130,000 people are still without power.
Imagine living close to 200 days without electricity. And, less
than 2 weeks ago, a failure in one of the main distribution
lines provoked a major outage and suddenly, about 800,000
customers had lost power again. Telecommunications were shot
and tensions grew high.
So, yes, there has been progress. But. we still have a long, long
way to go. And, no one, absolutely no one, can be satisfied
with these numbers. Just last week, hundreds of thousands of
residents throughout the northeast mainland were left without
power after the winter cyclone bomb, and authorities could not
work fast enough to restore service.
Our system is old and fragile. Recently, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Lieutenant General Todd Semonite asserted that the
shortage of supplies that has delayed power restoration is due
in part to the age of our grid; and pointed at the fact that
some of the parts that were needed were no longer available in
the market. In order to complete the work, they had to order
these parts be manufactured once again just for Puerto Rico.
Sadly, the investment being made in producing these old parts and
equipment is only a ``Band-aid.'' Because the system is not
being modernized, it will remain just as vulnerable as it was a
day before Hurricane Irma made landfall last September.
Wouldn't it be better to invest taxpayers' dollars in updating
the system so that it holds better during the upcoming
hurricane season, which starts in just 76 days?
The recently-approved relief package that was approved and signed
into law included $16 billion for Puerto Rico. The funds are badly
needed as Puerto Rico simply lacks the resources--human or financial--
to fortify the system and prepare for hurricane season.
The simple truth is that we need more time. We need more time, more
materials, more resources. It pains me to say, we need more sense of
urgency.
Our request for diligence is far from ungrateful. We are forever
indebted to the thousands of Federal workers from FEMA, the U.S. Corps
of Engineers, and other agencies who are working on-site. They are
committed public servants who want to see our people recover, grow, and
prosper.
We cherish our Federal workers' hard work on our behalf. We
understand that they too, have been humbled by nature. We believe that
by coming over, they have confronted a challenge that they never
imagined.
We know that they have left their families behind to come here and
look after us. We get that they miss their homes. They want to get back
to normal. Just like we do.
So it is with deep respect that I ask that you, as Members of
Congress, inject that much-needed sense of urgency to our Federal
agencies. We all need to be more efficient and steadfast in our
recovery efforts. We need it not just so that the people of Puerto Rico
get back to normal, but so that ALL of us do.
I make this humble request on behalf of the millions of families
who in the face of adversity, rose up the day after the storm to clean
their houses, clear the debris from the streets, and help those most in
need in their communities.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of doctors who have
continued to tend to the sick in spite of the lack of power or internet
in their offices or hospitals. Many of them lost their homes, their
offices were severely damaged, but that has not stopped them from
caring for their patients.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of entrepreneurs who
have invested every single penny they have in the bank to save their
businesses, and open their doors to the public. Some of them are chefs
. . . others are barbers or mechanics. They rose in spite of adversity.
They go to work every day hoping for normalcy, for economic recovery
and salvation of their aspirations.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of people who lost
their jobs in the aftermath, but have not quit, and continue to look
for work in order to get ahead.
I make this request on behalf of the thousands of kids who go to
school every day, in spite of the lack of power or water. Their
education continues to be more important than any obstacle.
Because you see, behind the devastation of Maria, a bigger story is
being written in Puerto Rico. It is a story of resilience. It is about
people who want to get ahead, who want be self-sufficient, who want to
get back to normal.
With that, I thank you for your time, and hope that we can continue
working together so we can build a stronger and better Puerto Rico.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir.
The Chair recognizes Ms. De Marrais.
STATEMENT OF JEANNE-AIMEE DE MARRAIS, SENIOR DIRECTOR, SAVE THE
CHILDREN
Ms. De Marrais. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson,
and Members of the committee, I am Jeanne-Aimee De Marrais, the
senior director of U.S. Emergencies for Save the Children.
Since Katrina in 2005, I have led our response to every
natural disaster and man-made disaster in the United States,
and I had the honor of serving on FEMA's National Advisory
Council and I currently serve on FEMA's IPAWS Subcommittee of
the NAC.
On behalf of Save the Children, thank you for this
opportunity to really highlight the needs of children and the
lessons learned across all three disasters.
I would be remiss if I also though didn't thank Ranking
Member Thompson, Congressman Donovan, Congressman Payne for
your leadership in introducing and helping pass the Homeland
Security Act for Children through the House. This legislation
will go a long way to help children in emergencies and
hopefully will help fill some of the gaps that I am going to
highlight today.
So Save the Children has been working for more than 100
years to support children in crisis and emergencies in the
United States and around the world. Through our on-the-ground
work during the three hurricanes we have identified critical
gaps. We keep seeing these gaps again and again in emergencies.
We seek to partner with Congress to help really close these
gaps to better protect and support children.
The three hurricanes, as we have heard, had a massive
impact on infrastructure, but it had a massive even greater
impact on children's lives across all three disasters. Save the
Children continues to work on the long-term recovery in each of
the three areas, helping rebuild schools, helping rebuild child
care programs, after-school programs, and helping deliver
mental health and psychosocial recovery programs for children,
which is the most profound gap that we have seen across all
three emergencies.
In Puerto Rico specifically, the estimates are that it is
going to take more than 10 years for the overall recovery. We
have heard that from many of the experts.
We continue to hear that many schools have lacked
electricity and lacked running water, lacked drinking water.
Imagine trying to conduct school for hundreds of children each
day without power in the classrooms, without access to learning
laboratories, without access to regular support.
So children in Puerto Rico have missed hundreds and
hundreds of hours of learning. Many of the most vulnerable
children will not ever catch up because of the months of school
that they have had decreased opportunities for learning.
So while there are many visible indications of damage to
structures, outdoor spaces, recreational equipment, there is
also this profound impact and what we call invisible scars and
emotional and mental stress for children, for teachers, for
their families.
So what can we do about this? We would urge Congress to
consider three areas to help close the gap. The first is in
education recovery and what we call a return to learning.
Congress must enact policies with a commitment that no child
affected by a disaster misses more than a month of school post-
disaster.
This is something that globally we are trying to work
toward, but in the United States to have children miss multiple
months of school related to disasters is not OK. It is not
enough.
The commitment to the return to learning should include a
policy framework that quickly assesses the number of children
out of school and the amount of recovery support and learning
support that children need to get back to normal.
The second area is Congress should consider amending
Stafford to include child care as a critical service. Right
now, schools, primary, secondary, and higher ed are included,
but early learning and child care is still not included as a
critical service. So that would go a long way to support
children.
Then the last area is that Congress must adequately fund
mental health recovery programs for survivors of natural
disasters. We are seeing this in every single incident in the
United States that it is a critical gap that is putting the
children at risk and families at risk.
So thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on
our work. Children might be only 25 percent of our Nation, but
they are 100 percent of our future, so thank you for your
commitment to children.
[The prepared statement of Ms. De Marrais follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeanne-Aimee De Marrais
March 15, 2018
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, I am Jeanne-Aimee De Marrais, the senior director of U.S.
Emergencies at Save the Children. Since 2005, I have led the
organization's response to every natural and man-made disaster in the
United States since Hurricane Katrina. I also have served on the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) National Advisory Council
from since 2014. On behalf of Save the Children, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the lessons learned following the three major
hurricanes that hit the United States in 2017.
Save the Children is the National leader for child-focused disaster
preparedness, response, and recovery. We have responded to emergencies
and humanitarian crises around the world for nearly 100 years. Through
our on-the-ground work in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria, and other disasters, we have identified critical gaps in States'
and communities' capacities to protect children in emergencies. Save
the Children seeks to work with Congress to ensure the unique needs of
children are addressed during the long road to recovery and to better
equip States to respond to the next disaster.
Hurricanes Maria, Irma, and Harvey created catastrophic damage and
upended the lives of millions of children. Save the Children responded
quickly to each of these major storms to provide relief to children and
families in emergency shelters. Our response included child-friendly
spaces, distribution of essential supplies for children and babies, and
psychosocial support. Our on-going response is now focused on
recovery--providing evidence-based programs that strengthen community
outreach and assist with child care and school restoration recovery
efforts. Save the Children is also providing psychosocial support (PSS)
training and programs across program areas and building partnerships to
support the PSS recovery phase. Our focus is to serve the most
marginalized children and families in these communities.
Experts estimate the Puerto Rico recovery process will take 10
years, longer than the recovery process after Hurricane Katrina. Six
months post-hurricane, at least 15 percent of the island remains
without power, and frequent brown-outs impact as much as 50 percent of
the island.
Nearly one in three schools lacks electricity and many also lack
consistent access to clean, potable water. This has forced many schools
to operate on a limited daily schedule from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
This has led to school-age children in Puerto Rico missing out on many
hundreds of hours of learning. Not only are Puerto Rican students
falling behind their peers academically, but they lack the daily
routine school brings, which is critical for emotional recovery. While
the visible damage to structures, outdoor spaces, and recreational
equipment are a constant reminder of the physical devastation of the
hurricane, children and families continue to have invisible scars from
emotional and mental stress. Many children urgently need psychological
and emotional support.
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria forced children into incredibly
stressful situations--evacuations, unfamiliar emergency shelters, and
the loss of homes, possessions, and routines. Families arrived at
shelters with little or no supplies for hygiene or infant care. Child
care and early childhood development programs and schools were closed
or damaged, leaving children and families without these critical
services. The storms may also impact children's long-term emotional,
mental health, and psychosocial well-being. If not addressed, this can
have a detrimental effect on their behavior and school performance and
affect a family for generations.
Following Hurricane Katrina, the Presidentially-appointed National
Commission on Children and Disasters was formed, chaired by Save the
Children. The Commission released its final report in 2010 documenting
81 recommendations to improve outcomes for children across 11 emergency
planning functions (including mass care, disaster case management,
health, schools, child care, housing, evacuation and reunification, and
recovery).\1\ \2\ From 2008-2015, Save the Children issued a National
Report Card on Protecting Children in Disasters measuring the Nation's
progress against the National Commission's recommendations.\3\ The 2015
report found that 79 percent of these recommendations remained unfilled
more than a decade after Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, large gaps
remain in preparation for family reunification, protection in mass care
settings, coordinating with child-serving institutions, and providing
immediate and long-term psychosocial/mental health and pediatric
support.
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\1\ National Commission on Children and Disasters. 2010 Report to
the President and Congress. AHRQ Publication No. 10-M037. Rockville,
MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2010).
\2\ https://archive.ahrq.gov/prep/nccdreport/nccdreport.pdf.
\3\ Save The Children. Still At Risk: U.S. Children 10 Years After
Hurricane Katrina 2015 National Report Card on Protecting Children in
Disasters. Fairfield, CT: Save The Children. (2015).
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Much work remains to be done to ensure children are protected when
crisis strikes. We wanted to focus on four areas today that Congress
could do to help children as they recover from these three devastating
hurricanes.
education recovery--return to learning
Each year disasters have a major impact on children, youth, and
education systems. Big or small, these result in children missing
school days, absenteeism by teachers who themselves may be affected by
the disasters, disruption of education cycles, school closure because
of damage and destruction to school infrastructure, or repeated or
prolonged use of schools as emergency shelters. For disaster-prone
areas, this can mean that every year children are losing many precious
student-teacher contact hours, which severely impacts educational
outcomes and a child's overall development.
Additionally, when children have safe spaces to learn and play, and
can access a full range of services and support, they are less
vulnerable to the increased risks that go hand-in-hand with disasters.
Schools can also provide children with the space they need to access
psychological support and assist with regaining a sense of normality
and healing from trauma.
There are significant gaps in information from the education sector
on both the short- and long-term impacts disasters have on education. A
lack of official data collection and analysis of the number of children
and schools affected by disasters inhibits coordination between
response agencies, Government bodies, and community organizations, and
impacts the effectiveness of the education response as a whole.
Congressional Recommendation.--Ensure that no displaced child is
out of an educational setting for more than 30 days. Congress must
enact policies with a commitment that no child misses more than a month
of school, post-disaster. A return to learning policy framework should
include: Assessing the number children out of school, number of
learning spaces needed, limiting the use of schools as temporary
shelters, expediting the rehabilitation and refurbishment of damaged
schools, establishing temporary learning spaces, and providing
alternative education delivery programs (such as education in shelters
or additional funding for afterschool programming). Congress should
create a permanent funding mechanism to support recovery for schools
and students to ensure that school systems recovering from disasters
are provided immediate resources to reopen and restore the learning
environment in a timely manner and provide support for displaced
students and their host schools.
We also urge Congress to call for an investigation and
documentation of the short- and long-term impacts of disasters on
schools. Such a study can identify policy, implementation, data, and
knowledge gaps that will provide an evidence base to inform program and
advocacy strategies, as well as seek to put more comprehensive numbers
behind the stories of the impacts of disasters.
child care recovery
Currently, private, for-profit child care programs, which comprise
the majority of child care programs in the United States, are
ineligible for FEMA recovery funding. Extensive research has shown that
child care services are essential to the economic health and vitality
of a community.\4\ During a disaster, workers with young children
cannot resume their jobs unless there is safe, secure child care for
their children. Due to limited funding opportunities for private child
care programs, most facilities that are damaged or destroyed in a
disaster receive little to no Federal recovery support.
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\4\ http://www.mildredwarner.org/econdev/child-care.
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Congressional Recommendation.--Congress should amend the Stafford
Act to make child care a critical service. This would place it in the
same category as schools, which would alleviate the requirement for
child care facilities to apply to for Small Business Administration
(SBA) loans. Child care providers rarely receive SBA loans because
their profit margin is so low. This has acted as a deterrent for many
of these providers to even apply. In addition, we urge Congress to
authorize a grant funding mechanism, such as an emergency contingency
fund, to repair or rebuild private, for-profit child care facilities,
support the establishment of temporary child care, and reimburse States
for subsidizing child care services to disaster-affected families.
mental health needs
Natural and man-made disasters frequently have wide-spread, deep,
and enduring impacts on children's mental health. Most children
experience long-term reactions to a disaster. Therefore, it is
important that adults who care for children at schools and child care
facilities are trained to provide supportive services after a major
disaster, rather than relying exclusively on the traditional clinical
approach of triage and referral.
Congressional Recommendation.--Congress and the Department of
Education should award funds to States to implement and evaluate
training and professional development programs train teachers on how to
provide support to grieving students and students in crisis. States
should also be encouraged to establish requirements related to teacher
certification and recertification. In addition, Congress should
adequately fund the National Child Traumatic Stress Initiative (NCTSI)
and Project SERV State grants to provide trauma treatment, programming,
and services in schools and communities for children, youth, and
families who experience or witness traumatic events.
government funding & accountability
The biggest obstacle to supporting children through disaster
response is inadequate funding. Robust funding and strong
accountability structures are required to meet the needs of children.
While the United States invests billions of dollars to support
emergency preparedness and response, very often children's needs are
overlooked. In fact, of every $10 in Federal emergency preparedness
grants, less than one cent has gone toward activities targeting
children's safety.
Congressional Recommendation.--Congress, through the appropriations
process, has the responsibility to fund the Federal Government in such
a way as to meet the needs of children. We need to dedicate more
funding to emergency preparedness, response, and recovery to lessen the
gaps that remain and further support children.
We thank the committee for the opportunity to provide testimony on
our work responding to these disasters and look forward to working with
the Members of the committee to ensure that children and families
receive the support they need to recover from disasters.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you for your commitment to children
as well. I think it was very moving. I went through a lot of
shelters, you know, after Harvey hit and it was very sad to see
all these children in the shelters.
I will take a look at amending the Stafford Act. I think it
is a very good idea. It is a very good idea.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Clay, I would like to kind-of focus on sort-of my
backyard and yours. That is my State that--your State that
got--Sheila's State that got hit, and this is kind-of the--I
thought we had an easel. I am sorry you have got to hold that
up.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCaul. But so this is a map that I have shown to
the Governor, and I have shown to actually the President of the
United States when he came down talking about how the flood
actually happened.
Cypress Creek was supposed to be a levee system but they
never did that and water shedded down to Barker Addicks, and
then controlled spillage into the neighborhoods downstream at
1:30 in the morning, which wasn't all that great, and then
Buffalo Bayou downtown Houston.
So it seems to me, you know, since this has flooded three
times in the last 2 years, doing some of these flood mitigation
projects is going to be absolutely essential, which is why we
passed the supplemental, $90 billion supplemental bill to deal
with some of these flood mitigation projects.
You know, I think, again, an ounce of prevention is a pound
of cure, and I know the Governor sees this the same way. When
we have discussed this project he agree with me that it would
be the No. 1 priority in the State in terms of flood
mitigation.
Where is the Governor on this? I think you mentioned
something about your first three projects have now been
approved. Can you tell me what those are? Then what, in your
view, will happen with I think both the refortification of
Barker Addicks and also the third reservoir?
Mr. Clay. Sure. Well, let me first say the Governor
completely agrees with you that in order to really rebuild
after Harvey, you know, a large portion of what we are going to
have to do are these major scale projects that, as you
mentioned, three floods in the last 2 years, major floods in
the last 2 years.
In Houston they have actually had 26 since the year 2000 in
Houston and 9 Federally-declared disasters in Houston. So
projects of this scale are going to have to happen.
As for the announcements later today, they are from the
Hazard Mitigation Fund, which is the money, it is about $1.1
billion, that we get under the Stafford Act as sort of a, you
know, add-on. They will be helping fund a study, a regional
study in the Houston area for a watershed assessment to look at
what we can do, particularly in sort of the Montgomery County,
northeast Houston area.
It will be for home buyouts throughout the Harris County
flood control district. It will be to start the process,
engineering and study for dredging of the San Jacinto River.
As for the third reservoir, obviously it is a huge priority
for the Governor, and it is our understanding that we are, you
know, going to be able to get this off the ground by doing a
study first and then hopefully follow it up because of your
work and the appropriation follow-up with getting it built.
Chairman McCaul. Right, and, you know, we, I think, did our
work in the Congress. We got $90 billion appropriated and Army
Corps of Engineers.
You know, let me just close because I know it is getting
late in the day, but I would look forward to continuing to work
with the Governor and your office, sir, on making this a
priority. I think getting the Army Corps moving faster than
they normally do, we put language in the supplemental that
requires them to expedite some of these projects.
We already had studies done on Barker Addicks, but a study
has never been done on Cypress. So that makes it even more
critical to try to move forward as expeditiously as possible,
so we can get it done. Because a study takes a while, the
construction takes time and I don't think this west Harris
County, you know, area can wait 10 years for this.
Mr. Clay. Yes, sir, and let me say we completely agree with
getting the Army Corps to move faster than it normally does as
the Governor was here about 3 weeks ago and sat down with
General Semonite and his team over there.
So we are going to continue to work with them to make sure
that this project and all the other ones that are needed get
done as quickly as possible.
Chairman McCaul. OK.
Mr. Clay. I mean, we are committed to working with you and
the Army Corps to make sure that happens.
Chairman McCaul. Likewise. Likewise.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman and the Ranking
Member for, again, their leadership and acknowledge the fact
that in particular Mr. Clay, the Texas delegation worked
extensively hard. As a senior member the Homeland Security
Committee, it was the experience that I have gained from a
series of hurricanes, those in our jurisdiction, but as well
throughout the Nation, that I hope help bring to bear the
urgency.
I introduced the first relief bill, which was for $174
billion. I was not far off. In fact, the Governor supported the
introduction. It had 43 co-sponsors. I am glad as to where we
are, but we are not finished, and frankly, I think the $174
billion is a closer mark than where we are.
I hope we will continue advocating for continued relief as
we do so for others who are similarly situated from Puerto Rico
to the Virgin Islands to Florida and others.
Disaster has to be a Federal responsibility working with
our local leaders from the State to the cities and counties. I
hope you agree with that?
Mr. Clay. Absolutely, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In the course of that, and I have read
your statement and noted, as the Chairman made mention of the
changing map, the fact that you have a map that so much rain
fell that we had to update the color charts.
I remember looking at those, charts in the command center
where the mayor was and then George R. Brown. That is the one
that you had.
In fact, we couldn't discern the boundaries of Harris
County or Houston or anywhere else. There were some places
where we were just simply an ocean. I think people had to be
there to understand the catastrophic nature of it.
So I raise this point as we are beginning to work, I guess
it would be on the second half, which is long-term recovery.
What I would like to have is the input of the Governor on
hopefully working with the Chairman and Ranking Member.
We all have ideas, but beginning to, mine is being written
as we speak, over the years of experience, and that is FEMA in
the immediate rescue, and I just want to put it in that term,
rushing in, dealing with the immediate rescue, folk on the
ground coming in, shelters, and then long-term recovery, which
is what I am seeing in northeast Houston, Kashmere Gardens, and
a number of other pockets of my community. People are still
suffering.
What is your thought about that? That would be really on
the second phase of where the Governor is now. People are in
hotels. They need housing. People housing are still in bad
condition. What do you think about structuring along with some
amendments on the Stafford Act?
I realize that, but that there is a bifurcation so we know
when we are in the Federal long-term recovery period?
Mr. Clay. Well, we couldn't agree more that it is not going
fast enough, and that is true in Houston and throughout the
whole region. I think, you know, one of the things and, you
know, I would have to see the details a little bit closer, what
Administrator Long said earlier about grants directly to the
State.
I think that it has the potential to make things go more
quickly with one caveat which is it would have to free the
State up from all the compliance issues that are 2 CFR and some
of the other Stafford Act requirements.
That sounds scary, but we have got to and you know that
this, Congresswoman, but we have ample laws and procurement and
risk law to protect against fraud, waste, and abuse in State
statute that we would still comply with.
But right now, as it stands, as we go through this long-
term recovery process we are not only trying to comply with the
local and State laws and regulations, but also the massive 2
CFR that governs FEMA's response.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me as the announcements, as I
heard and I am sorry that my colleagues are in Washington as
the Governor's making announcement, but we congratulate him. We
worked very hard on the watershed study. I have had that
submitted over the years and very grateful that we got it in
again. That is what they are operating under.
Of course, the buyout, I think there should be major
announcement so that both inner city and rural areas and urban
areas are aware of that potential through the local government.
Let me quickly thank Save the Children. I worked closely
with you and your work and the children are vital. You worked
with me. You were at a big event that I had in Houston during
the Christmas holidays when children were still suffering.
To the gentleman from Florida, let me quickly ask would a
reordering--and I will just ask these two questions--would a
reordering of FEMA so there is a part that is long-term
recovery that they can deal with and move kind-of quickly on
the long-term recovery be helpful to you?
To the legislator from Puerto Rico, I am stunned about
politicians and partisanship because I know that Congressional
persons, Republicans and Democrats came to Puerto Rico with the
greatest sincerity. I am planning on being there in the next
couple of months and didn't see any partisanship; just a cry
for help.
So if you can answer that but to the gentleman from
Florida, would that be helpful to you? Would it be helpful that
when your constituents apply for FEMA and they get that 33-5,
there is so much red tape that people are struggling and can't
get it. Give them the 33-5 and let them provide documentation
because you are denying them on little problem of
documentation.
But would the long-term recovery be helpful to you if there
was a process so that it could be a focus after we have done
all the initial rescuing?
Mr. Maul. Yes, ma'am, of course. I think we saw something
encouraging come out of the Federal Government in the last
couple years, and that is the National Disaster Recovery
Framework. All of the same collaboration that we bring to the
table in an actual response is now expected on the back side
during a recovery operation.
In our joint field office down in Orlando, Florida, we were
thrilled to have a whole host of Federal partners there at the
table with us Day 1 after the storm looking to put together a
long-term recovery strategy, looking across the Federal
Government at grant programs, how we could leverage those
programs in our communities to provide a more holistic approach
to our recovery.
It was the first time we ever implemented it in Florida. I
think one of the first times in the country that it has been
done, and we would continue to want to develop that process in
our own State partnership with that process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So the Federal Government helping you by
continuing a long-term approach would be helpful to you?
Mr. Maul. Yes, sir. I mean, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Then last, to the gentleman, we care about
Puerto Rico as we do the Virgin Islands. I can't name one
politician that might have come in and been grandstanding. We
care. We cried. We want to keep fighting with you. Well, who
was being--I don't understand your point.
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. Well, my point is very simply, you
know, this hearing is about lessons learned.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. We have, you know, during all this
issue of recovery effort of Irma and Maria, you know, we have
to struggle on the local level and within the Federal
Government, you know, with the issue of politics.
You know, I know local politics, the Puerto Rico politics,
are not entirely understood on a Federal level, and they should
not be part of this discussion. But it is important that, you
know, we, the Puerto Ricans, we, you know, we move as a whole,
as as a people, you know? Everyone was touched by this storm.
The fact that, the fact that some of them at the local
level and at the Federal level actually tried to gain, you
know, political recognition using, you know, the pain and
suffering of all people, you know, it is shameful.
But I don't want to leave--you know, I am not here to be
naming names. I am just trying to state that that was one of
the lessons that we learned down in Puerto Rico.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I will just conclude by saying
everyone on this panel I know are here supporting you and
wanting to----
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. I thank you for that.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Work very hard to----
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. I thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Develop and to find solutions
to Puerto Rico. I just want to honestly say all of the Federal
Members of Congress that I have encountered I have never heard
a cry of politics. I have heard a cry for help, and I want to
encourage them because their cry for help is generating help
for all of you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back.
Mr. Donovan is recognized.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Noticing how long we have been here and the time I would
just like to ask the four of you if you could submit to our
committee recommendations that you have. Each of you
experienced a different devastation, a different disaster, a
different population of people you were trying to help.
So it would be real helpful to us if you could tell us what
worked, what didn't work in a small--we don't need an elaborate
report. But if you could just submit to us--if we have it in
writing and your suggestions for us, that would be very helpful
for us to act and to help you prepare for and respond to the
next disaster that you face.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my
time. I thank all of you.
Ms. De Marrais. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. We thank you for yielding back the
remainder of your time.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCaul. Ms. Demings is recognized.
Mrs. Demings. Great, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Yes, we have
been here for a little while, but thank you so much for taking
our questions.
My question is for you, Mr. Maul. You know how important
Federal and State partnerships are to our response and trying
to make sure that it is adequate and appropriate a response.
As you know, Hurricane Irma had a tremendous impact on
Florida, even on central Florida where I represent thousands,
including medically vulnerable individuals who were without
power for several days.
Homes in the Orlo Vista area, in the Orlando area, were
flooded and though many lost their possessions, they did
survive. We are certainly thankful for that.
While you were not the director at the time of Hurricane
Irma, it is my understanding that you did serve as the chief of
staff, the position that did not exist prior to your service, I
believe. As a chief of staff I am sure you are aware of the
needlessly tragic events that resulted in more than a dozen
deaths at the rehabilitation center in Hollywood Hills.
As a Floridian who has weathered my share of hurricanes, I
understand that the power goes out. Mine did as well. It can
take some time to be restored, and we do have to be reasonable
and understanding in that area.
But I also know that vulnerable populations like seniors
and seriously ill or mobility-restricted individuals require
accommodations that you or I would want certainly if we were in
their place.
Yet it took, I believe, 3 days to evacuate 140 patients in
Florida's September heat with no air conditioning, to move them
right across the street to a hospital there.
So my question for you, Mr. Maul, is: Now that you are the
emergency management director, what steps have you taken or are
you taking to ensure that proper communications channels are in
place to prevent tragedies like the one in Hollywood Hills?
Mr. Maul. Yes, ma'am, thank you. Obviously taking care of
our vulnerable populations that are medically dependent is not
only a priority of ours, but it is a priority of everybody in
our State.
First and foremost, as it relates to power restoration,
that has been a huge focus. We know in Florida that if you get
the power back on most of your other problems goes away. The
Government can get out of the recovery business and local
communities can more quickly recover.
So we have been making huge strides in that. Like I said
before, we understood the largest power restoration in American
history. We got to about 100 percent restoration in less than a
week.
We have created strategic partnerships with Health and
Human Services up here in the District of Columbia. They have
been able to provide us critical information of data they have
on individuals who are dependent on medical equipment for--I
mean, electrical equipment for their medical needs.
We are able to do proactive callouts to check in on those
folks. We provide that information to our communities so that
they can do proactive callouts in the immediate aftermath to
see if they need to be evacuated.
Mrs. Demings. I am sorry, could you go over the equipment
that you provided? What is the equipment that you provided?
Mr. Maul. Not providing equipment.
Mrs. Demings. OK. What----
Mr. Maul. It is a list of people that HHS has been able to
provide us----
Mrs. Demings. OK.
Mr. Maul [continuing]. Of people who are dependent on the
electrical equipment for medical needs.
Mrs. Demings. OK.
Mr. Maul. We are able to find out in the immediate
aftermath who those individuals are and do a proactive reach-
out to see do you have power? Do we need to transport you
somewhere so you have power for your medical supplies?
Obviously the investigation that is on-going down in south
Florida, I know that there is a criminal investigation going
on, and I do believe that the local medical examiner has ruled
those a homicide. However, the Governor has taken some very
aggressive steps to make sure that situations like this don't
ever happen again.
Mrs. Demings. Could you go over some for examples of those
steps, not just dealing with the investigation. I understand--
--
Mr. Maul. Yes.
Mrs. Demings [continuing]. An on-going investigation, but
it could happen this hurricane season. So what steps have been
taken to ensure that it doesn't?
Mr. Maul. We have required that all medical facilities have
the ability to sustain power in the immediate aftermath,
whether it be through generators, direct tap-ins to natural gas
so for an extended period of time in the aftermath of a storm
they are able to support that capability.
We are also working on our sheltering plans to make sure
that we have adequate special needs shelter space. A lot of
what we saw in the aftermath of Irma, or leading up to Irma,
was that we had an inadequacy in planning at the local level as
it related to the special needs planning.
So there were facilities that were literally putting people
on transports and just dropping them off at special needs
shelters and that was their disaster plan. So we are looking at
reorganizing those to make sure that we have partnerships
between facilities for the transport of those individuals.
Then lately, we are really working with our local
communities to make sure they have a handle on what facilities
are in their jurisdictions and how we can best support them.
Mrs. Demings. OK. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
Before I turn the gavel over to Sheriff Rutherford, I just
want to thank all three of you for being here today and your
service. Yes, I thought I said all of you.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCaul. Thanks to all of you for your service and
both in hurricane relief and also saving the children. That is
God's work on earth and just so at last we can conclude, I
think a common thread that I heard between the three of you is
a lot of red tape, needs to be better streamlined, maybe more
control given back to the States.
I think that is what the Administrator Brock Long was
talking about and how to maybe block grants administered to the
States to get more flexibility, let things move faster. Don't
let it get bottlenecked up.
So as we move forward on this committee, your input will be
very important if we look at legislation to help make the
response and recovery more efficient and effective.
So with that, I yield.
I turn it over to Sheriff Rutherford.
Mr. Rutherford [presiding]. Yes. Well, that was perfect
timing because now I get to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rutherford. Mr. Melendez, if I could ask you, I know on
page No. 3 of your written comments it talks about the need to
make necessary adjustments to adapt our emergency preparedness
and recovery efforts to more effective and efficient response.
No. 1 on that list of what to do is actually to ensure
rapid response by sea and air, including waiving or eliminating
the cabotage laws, the Jones Act for ocean vessels.
So I wanted to point out I believe somewhere between 75
percent and 80 percent of Puerto Rico's goods come through
foreign vessels and about 25 percent of Jones Act vessels. That
the President did, in fact, waive the Jones Act.
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. Did he?
Mr. Rutherford. There was some controversy and this might
have been what you were referring to. There was some
controversy about the President being slow in waiving the Jones
Act and the impact that that was having on recovery.
I would like to point out that my calculations show that
the President waived the Jones Act exactly 1 day later than he
did for Harvey in Texas. Fact of the matter is after waiving
the Jones Act exactly one foreign vessel sailed from an
American port into Puerto Rico.
So for folks who point to the Jones Act and cabotage laws
as a somehow slowing down the response, I think, No. 1, is it
is incorrect as I believe you do as well.
No. 2, it is very misleading in the fact that I take great
pride in the fact that the American maritime industry,
particularly our Jones Act vessels under TOTE and Crowley in
Jacksonville are really--I looked at them as the first
responders, the first maritime responders for Puerto Rico
because they have that, you know, they call it the milk run.
They do it so often they have that built-in efficiency and
effectiveness. So they had actually pre-positioned goods at our
port so that they could get them to San Juan more quickly and
in fact, that was accomplished in a very, very quick fashion.
So I----
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. Well, the only reason that it is on my
statement, you know, the reference to the cabotage and the
Jones Act is because of the controversy that, you know, public
inquiry whether it was the right timing when the President
actually gave the waiver. So that is why it is on the
statement.
Mr. Rutherford. OK, but I just want to make sure that you
are not laying out a case that somehow the Jones Act slowed
down the response----
Mr. Melendez-Ortiz. No, no, no, not at all. Not at all.
Mr. Rutherford. I just wanted to make that clear.
Mr. Maul we had discussed earlier and I don't know if other
States have this issue, but I know in Florida a lot of
municipalities and other Governmental agencies we had these
pre-arranged contracts with providers, contractors to take the
debris our of our neighborhoods.
I just want to ask what do you think we can do to make them
honor those contracts when they leave those contracts that they
made pre-storm at a much lower price, by the way, so they can
get the contract and once the storm hits they go to other
localities where they can make more money.
I would call on our Attorney General Pam Bondi to look at
that because to me that sounds like gouging maybe. I know she
is on top of that. So what do you think about that?
Mr. Maul. So you asked whether other States have
experienced the same thing, and sir, the answer is yes. If you
look at all of the recent Congressional after-action reports
that have come out of major storms over the past couple
decades, all of them highlight debris contracting as a
significant issue coming out of major storms.
We saw significant differences in the negotiated pre-
disaster cubic yardage price some as low as, what, $5 whereas,
you know, after disaster hits negotiated prices go up--or
renegotiated prices were, you know, going up to $20 a cubic
yard.
We also saw a significant pressure being put on individuals
to try and suggest that the Army Corps should take over the
entire debris mission, some of which, you know, would have cost
taxpayers 10 times as much----
Mr. Rutherford. Exactly.
Mr. Maul [continuing]. With no significant expediency, you
know, increased time line because of the fact that many of the
same contractors were both in the pre-disaster contract----
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Maul [continuing]. Business and working for the Army
Corps. You know, I am very proud of the steps that our Governor
took to draw a line in the sand and to make sure that we
weren't creating a bidding war in our State and that we weren't
going to stand for those types of practices happening to our
citizens.
Moving forward, you know, I think we need to take a look at
this as a profession. I think that until kind-of States and
communities stand together with our Federal partners and say we
are not just going to stand for this anymore, it is going to
continue to happen.
I think that we need to work on more education and we are
in Florida with our local partners about the risks of some of
this and certain provisions and best practices for their
contracts.
I think we need to kind-of crack open the books on the
contracts we currently have and make sure the expectations that
have been set are actually going to be honored.
We need to be putting together, we are actually putting
together in some of our rural counties, teams of locals and
contractors who are willing to do the work for that county
themselves with internal capacity, which will help not only
with a faster response to the debris clean-up but also reinvest
that money in local communities.
Then last, I know the attorney general is taking a look at
it, but we ourselves are also working with communities to take
a look at last year's actions and see whether or not we were
dealing with any bad actors.
Mr. Rutherford. Very good. Thank you for that.
I have several other questions, but we don't have time for
that.
I do want to congratulate you, though. I think Florida had
a very good response. Some areas, obviously, that we needed to
look at and these storms clearly highlighted that need. So but
thank you for working with us.
Mr. Maul. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rutherford. I want to thank all the witnesses. My time
is up.
As I mentioned, I want to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of
the committee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses and we will ask you to respond to these in writing if
you don't mind?
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman, before you--
here I am.
Mr. Rutherford. Oh, I am sorry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. As a sitting Ranking Member I want to make
sure that I have an opportunity to close for a moment before
you gavel us out?
Mr. Rutherford. Shoot. Go ahead.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. First of all, let me thank our
Chairman and Ranking Member for this, I think, very thoughtful
and important hearing.
We know, Representative, that Puerto Rico had warehouses
where people were not there to process and so we know that
learning from all of you we can be better prepared, and we can
work together.
To Save the Children, let me thank you again for coming
under the new legislation, but more importantly, standing up
for children and certainly we saw you in the State of Texas. I
know that you were in many other places.
As it relates to Florida and Congressman Rutherford's
question, we thought the debris removers were leaving Texas to
go to Florida, so we have to get our handle around how we in
simultaneous hurricanes that we are able to address this
question because we were struggling. We were fearful that
everyone would move in that direction, but you needed help. We
all need help.
Let me thank Mr. Clay, and please convey to the Governor
and State officials the appreciation for their eagerness and
collaboration and constant contact.
I know that my county judge, a mayor in Houston and I know
the mayors and county judges throughout the State, were most
appreciative. We were huddled together in many meetings. We
were on tarmacs. We were in meetings in places that were
uncomfortable, but we know that our people are still
uncomfortable. So I just want to leave you with this to the
Governor.
We are grateful that we were able to send $89 billion or
$90 billion that we have a large share of. We need to work with
the Governor to help to expedite a number of projects. Greens
Bayou was already being worked on, but I would like it
expedited and then we are working on certainly some other
projects from Halls to others. So if you can help us with that.
Then if you would help us on the issue of working with FEMA
for them to address the denials. Denials have been done on
typos and we have too many people in need.
My last point is I think we should convene a meeting
shortly for the 2018 hurricane season. We may be lucky, all of
us may be lucky, but I think the idea of Members of Congress
sitting in that meeting and representative local officials in
that meeting would be very, very helpful because, as you well
know, we are still proceeding with appropriations. What do we
need to do? How do we need to prepare our communities?
We can't really predict the future. We can look at the
models, but it is evidence, I guess, the map is evidence that
we saw something in 2017 that we had never seen before.
So thank you to all of the witnesses in the first panel,
second panel. I think this is wake-up call for us to get
prepared as we go into 2018.
I thank you to the Chairman, and I yield back.
Thank you all very much. Please convey my appreciation to
all of the local leaders.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. I apologize for the oversight.
I----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Not at all, Congressman.
Mr. Rutherford. If you would, Mr. Maul, also let Governor
Rick Scott know that I am very appreciative of the great job
that he did at the State level. I am very proud of Florida's
response, both State, local, and Federal. Our National Guard
did a fantastic job, our Coast Guard, so thank them as well.
Mr. Maul. I will.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are really thanking everybody so let me
ditto the Coast Guard, the National Guard----
Mr. Rutherford. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [continuing]. And let me call out the
county judge in Harris County and our Mayor Turner, who did a
fantastic job. We all have to go home.
Mr. Rutherford. That is right. That is right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But they did a fantastic job. Thank you so
very much--and the Coast Guard. They are our wings of angels.
Mr. Rutherford. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rutherford. They are fantastic. So pursuant to
committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will be open for 10
days.
With that, without objection, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
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Map Submitted For the Record By Chairman Michael T. McCaul
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A P P E N D I X I I
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Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Donald E. ``Ed''
Jackson, Jr.
Question 1a. What is the status of the Corps' power line
restoration efforts in Puerto Rico?
Answer. As of March 15, 2018, approximately 93 percent of the
customers on the island that were able to receive power before the
storm now have electrical power. The Corps power restoration
contractors are working in parallel with the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA) and its contractors. As of March 15, 2018, the Corps
contractors have been assigned responsibility for installing 231
distribution lines, 114 Sub-transmission (38 kV) lines, and 26
transmission lines, or in total, 371 power lines. Corps contractors, in
coordination with PREPA, installed nine small power plants, or micro
grids, to provide temporary power to communities while grid power is
being restored. Currently, three micro grids are operational at
Arecibo, Culebra, and Vieques.
Question 1b. How well-equipped was the Corps to provide contract
support and oversight of the process?
Answer. The Corps has solicited and awarded three construction
contracts for the power restoration mission in Puerto Rico following
Hurricane Maria. To expedite the process, the Corps obtained Army
Senior Procurement Executive approval of Justification and Approvals
for Other than Full and Open Competition, in place of the normal
competitive procedures. The Corps assigned an engineer to monitor and
oversee performance of the contract awarded to PowerSecure, Inc. and
the two contracts awarded to Fluor Enterprises, Inc. In addition, the
Corps set up offices in Aguadilla and San Juan staffed with an engineer
responsible for contract oversight as well as other contracting and
quality assurance staff to monitor performance of contractor crews. The
Corps performs this work as directed by FEMA under Emergency Support
Function No. 3, Public Works and Engineering.
Question 1c. What is the status of the two major power restoration
contractors, PowerSecure and Fluor?
Answer. Fluor has demobilized all work execution assets from the
Island, and the period of performance ends on April 18, 2018.
PowerSecure's period of performance on its existing contract expires on
April 7, 2018, and a Justification & Approval has been executed and
approved to extend the performance through May 18, 2018.
Question 1d. Will the impending drawdown of contractors slow the
pace of the restoration effort?
Answer. No. The remaining crews available on the island are capable
of completing the power restoration efforts in accordance with the
current plan. On March 15, 2018, there were 846 Corps contractors
working on transmission, sub-transmission, and distribution lines. The
impending drawdown did not affect the pace of the restoration effort,
as that was taken into account during the planning phase of the
restoration effort and progress was monitored daily. Additionally, on
March 29, 2018, FEMA provided the Corps additional authorization to
modify the PowerSecure Inc. contract to continue work through May 18,
2018. This extension will allow PowerSecure to maintain personnel,
equipment, and materials on the island, in order to continue the repair
of hurricane-damaged electrical lines particularly in the hardest-hit
and most remote areas in accordance with the Unified Command Group's
plan.
Question 1e. When can we expect those still without power, 6 months
after the storm, to have it restored?
Answer. The Corps is working with FEMA, PREPA, and Puerto Rico's
Restoration Coordinator to restore power to the island. This joint
effort is guided by PREPA's Restoration Master Plan priorities. As of
March 15, 2018, approximately 93 percent of the customers on the island
that were able to receive power before the storm now have electrical
power. We also know that approximately 107,000 customers remain without
power, particularly in the hardest-hit and most remote areas, and we
are committed and are working to restore their power.
Question 2a. Restoration of power in Puerto Rico has been a
challenge since Hurricane Maria hit in September. What role did USACE
have in the procurement of electric grid component material for power
restoration in Puerto Rico?
Answer. FEMA tasked the Corps to procure all Bills of Materials
(BOM: wires, connectors, poles, transformers, etc.) to support
temporary repairs to system segments and to provide these materials to
Corps contractors, PREPA internal crews, PREPA contractors, the New
York State Contingent, and the Mutual Assistance utilities. The Corps
executed contracts through the Defense Logistics Agency to procure the
required materials, based on technical assessments executed by PREPA
and supporting contractors and utility companies. At this point,
material delivery is keeping up with the assessed needs.
Question 2b. Did USACE develop new procurement and contracting
arrangements or was the agency able to leverage existing arrangements?
Answer. While the Corps did not have any advance contracts in place
specifically for power grid restorations, it was able to utilize two
existing contractual arrangements and also issued one new contract for
this mission assignment.
First, under two existing contracting arrangements, which were in
place before Hurricane Maria, the Corps issued a Rapid Disaster
Infrastructure Multiple Award Task Order Contract (RDI MATOC) for
emergency power generation; and a Resilient Power and Mechanical
Systems Basic Ordering Agreement (RPMS BOA) for actual repair and
restoration of the power grid lines and associated structures:
Under the RDI MATOC, the Corps awarded two task orders to
provide immediate power on a temporary basis. The first was
awarded to Weston Solutions on October 8, 2017, to install and
operate 50 MW of emergency power generation at the Palo Seco
Power Plant near San Juan, PR. The second was awarded on
November 7, 2017, to Aptim for emergency power generation at
the Yabucoa Power Plant near Yabucoa.
Under the RPMS BOA, the Corps awarded two task orders to
repair the power lines and associated structures of the power
grid. The first was a noncompetitive task order valued at $240
million, issued to Fluor Enterprises, Inc. on October 12, 2017.
Due to the magnitude of the damage to the power grid, the value
of this task order was increased by $265 million to $505
million. The second was competed amongst the BOA holders and
resulted in an award of a second task order to Fluor
Enterprises, Inc. in the amount of $495 million.
Second, to further supplement power grid restoration efforts, the
Corps awarded a new sole source contract to PowerSecure, Inc.
(PowerSecure) in the amount of $40 million dollars on October 18, 2017.
The Corps subsequently increased the value and duration of the
PowerSecure grid restoration contract by modification to a value of
$370 million and a required end date of April 7, 2018. This
modification was effective on February 14, 2018.
Question 3a. How was procured material distributed or otherwise
shared across USACE contractors, the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA), and PREPA contractors?
Answer. The manner of procured material distribution changed
depending on the phase of response. The Corps used the Department of
Defense material invoicing and distribution process to account for
material distributed to Corps contractors, PREPA line crews and
contractors, and investor-owned utility companies supporting the repair
effort. The majority of procured material was sent by the Defense
Logistics Agency or vendor to one of three ports in the continental
United States for travel on ship or barge. Ports were located in Texas,
South Carolina, and Florida. From these ports the material was sent to
laydown yards or warehouses operated by the Corps in Puerto Rico. The
material was distributed to contractors or PREPA from these locations.
Prioritization for distribution of material was determined using
guidance from the Unified Command Group. This prioritization assisted
in determining how the Corps distributed material amongst PREPA and
contractors.
Prior to requisition, contractors and PREPA performed assessments
of damaged lines to determine the material needs. Once the contractor's
requisition was reviewed and approved, the materials were either
delivered to the contractor's lay down yard or the contractor would
pick up the requisitioned material from the Corps yards and warehouses.
Question 3b. What lessons can be drawn from the procurement of
materials and their distribution in Puerto Rico for future Federal
disaster response?
Answer. The Corps will participate in and contribute to discussions
among the Federal agencies on lessons learned from the disaster
response following Hurricane Maria, including on the procurement and
distribution of materials for use in an area like Puerto Rico.
Following the impacts of Hurricane Maria, PREPA's automated
inventory control and management system was inoperable. In addition,
prior to the storm, the utility did not have adequate records of its
equipment and supplies. Consequently, the Corps working with PREPA had
to conduct physical inventories of all materials in Puerto Rico in
order to determine what materials were already on hand and what
materials were needed to accomplish the task of repairing the
electrical grid. Moreover, due to the catastrophic nature of the
damages, individual line assessments of the entire grid system had to
be performed by PREPA, its contractors, as well as the Corps'
contractors to determine the actual requirements for each damaged line
segment for the emergency repair of the entire grid. This laborious
inventory process took weeks to establish the initial emergency order
of materials and the following months to finalize subsequent orders to
accurately and effectively order required materials as individual line
assessments were completed across Puerto Rico. Additionally, logistical
challenges to the island presented by the geographical separation from
the mainland, limited modes of transportation available for shipping in
much-needed materials. Though now largely overcome with refined needs
assessments, better visibility of PREPA stocks, expedited material
production and delivery, and the combination of factors above did make
the identification, acquisition, and delivery of materials (poles,
wire, transformers, etc.) a significant limiting factor. To date, the
Corps has received 30.96 million pieces of materials.
Due to other natural disasters in Texas, Florida, and California,
there was limited inventory of utility materials, especially in the
large quantities required. The Defense Production Act (DPA) was used to
expedite the manufacture and supply of materials used in the emergency
repairs of the electrical grid in Puerto Rico. In this case, DPA
authorities are available to support: Emergency preparedness activities
conducted pursuant to title VI of the Stafford Act; and protection or
restoration of critical infrastructure. Manufacturers are fabricating
supplies as quickly as possible and, as they fabricate the needed
materials, they are being shipped expeditiously to Puerto Rico. In
addition, there are a number of unique materials incorporated into
Puerto Rico's electrical grid system (insulators are unique with
limited manufacturers, transformers with multiple voltages, unique
conductor sizes, etc.), further complicating the resourcing and
acquisition, given the large quantities of the items required to
restore the system. An additional factor in material assessment and
acquisition was PREPA's delay in accepting industry recommendations for
acceptable substitutes; e.g., use of more available 69 kV post
insulators versus less available 38 kV post insulators and use of 1192
bunting (industry standard) versus 1192 ``Puerto Rican special''
bunting. The Corps and PREPA have also utilized partnerships with
industry to order supplies from their inventory.
Question 4. When the capacity and capabilities of Federal and State
agencies are nearly exhausted by natural disasters, the Department of
Defense (DOD) is a crucial partner in providing support through the
Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission. Are there any
lessons that you learned about how DOD can better assist civil
authorities when requested?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense pre-approved the deployment of
life-saving and life-sustaining support and authorized the transfer of
forces to the Commander, USNORTHCOM. This allowed DoD capability to be
provided as swiftly as possible. DoD will continue to maintain an
extensive network of embedded liaison officers at the Federal and State
level who enhanced unity of effort ensured visibility of requests for
assistance and set realistic expectations for mission accomplishment.
Question From Honorable Nydia M. Velazquez for Donald E. ``Ed''
Jackson, Jr.
Question. On October 18, 2017, USACE (Jacksonville District)
announced a $40 million contract award to PowerSecure Inc. for grid
restoration work in Puerto Rico (Contract No. W912EP-18-C-0003). On
November 11, 2017, USACE (South Atlantic Division) announced its intent
to increase PowerSecure's contract by $48 million, from $40 million to
$88 million. On Friday, March 23, 2017 at 8:12 p.m., USACE
(Jacksonville District) announced its intent to award a sole-source
modification to increase the PowerSecure contract ceiling by $200
million. The notice goes on to describe the existing contract as having
a current value of $390 million (excludes the proposed $200 million
increase). There is no public record of how and when USACE increased
the PowerSecure contract from $88 million to $390 million.
Please describe the procurement method USACE applied to increase
the PowerSecure contract from $88 million to $390 million, and identify
the statute and/or regulation authorizing this course of action.
Answer. On December 1, 2017, the Senior Procurement Executive for
the U.S. Army approved a Justification & Approval (J&A) to increase the
award amount of the PowerSecure contract from $88 million to $390
million.
The nature and extent of the damage to the power grid was not fully
known at the time of award in October 2017. Later, as the extent of the
effort that would be needed to restore power became more apparent, FEMA
directed several changes to the Corps mission assignment over the
course of the contract performance period. In response, the Contracting
Officer modified the PowerSecure contract to extend all distribution
line repair resources through April 7, 2018. The increases in value and
duration of the PowerSecure contract were made incrementally to allow
both the Corps and PowerSecure the ability to better plan, track, and
deploy resources. The Contracting Officer also improved PowerSecure's
on-site power grid restoration capability by mobilizing additional
transmission line repair personnel and equipment. Although the J&A
authorized up to $390 million, the contract itself was only increased
to $370 million. The remaining amount was held in reserve to settle
equitable adjustments and/or other differing conditions that may be
identified during actual performance of the power grid restoration.
The J&A was approved under the authority cited in Title 10 United
States Code (U.S.C.) 2304(c)(2) as implemented by FAR 6.302-2,
``Unusual and Compelling Urgency.''
The process followed for the approval and subsequent increase in
the contract value for PowerSecure is based on the authority cited in
the J&A. Specifically, FAR 5.202(a)(2) states that the notice that
generally would be required by FAR 5.201 is not required when proposed
contract action is made under the conditions described in FAR 6.302-2.
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John V. Kelly
Question 1a. Your office recently notified FEMA that 12 reports
related to FEMA's disaster response activities under the Obama
administration were being withdrawn because they ``may have lacked
sufficient and appropriate evidence to support conclusions in the
reports.'' How did this happen? And, what actions led to the discovery
of these substandard reports?
Answer. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
raised concerns about a specific DHS OIG audit report, FEMA's Initial
Response to the 2016 Catastrophic Flooding in Louisiana (OIG-17-80-D).
The committee's own investigation of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA) response to the flooding in Louisiana led it to
question the conclusion in our report that the initial response was
generally effective. We conducted an internal quality assurance review
of the audit and concluded that it was not compliant with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. We removed the report
permanently from our website and notified FEMA that it should place no
reliance on the report.
Because of the issues that we identified with the report, we
undertook a broader review of all reports of this particular type,
designed to evaluate whether FEMA's initial response to disasters was
effective. This broader review revealed that the reports may not have
adequately answered objectives and, in some cases, may have lacked
sufficient and appropriate evidence to support conclusions. In an
abundance of caution, we determined it was best to recall the reports
and not re-issue them.
We have already begun to implement corrective actions to address
known factors contributing to the deficiencies in these reports. We
continue to evaluate the broader circumstances surrounding these
reports to better understand what happened and why. We will be pleased
to report back to the committee when that evaluation is complete.
Question 1b. What steps are you taking to ensure the accuracy of
this kind of reporting going forward?
Answer. We have already taken a number of actions to improve both
the development of our staff and the quality of our work. As of October
2017, we reintegrated the Offices of Audits and Emergency Management
Oversight with the goal of providing staff greater diversity of work to
enhance the quality of their products. Additionally, we have developed
a new approach to how we will report on our activities when we deploy
auditors to disaster areas in the immediate aftermath of disasters,
known internally as Emergency Management Oversight Teams (EMOT). Rather
than attempting to report out on EMOT activities using traditional
audit reports conducted under Government Auditing Standards, we are
utilizing our authorities under the Inspector General Act to issue
management alerts to FEMA regarding immediate threats and emerging
risks we have observed in the field. We will also continue to identify
potential risk areas to be addressed by future traditional audits. We
are currently following this approach with our response to Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, Maria, and last year's California wildfires. You can find
alerts that we have issued in response to these disasters on our
website. As we move forward, we will continue to review and refine our
products and processes to ensure we are providing accurate and timely
information.
Question 1c. Can you assure this committee that these inaccuracies
are confined to Emergency Management Oversight Team reports? And, are
you taking action to review additional reports?
Answer. As an agency, we pride ourselves in the high quality of our
work and we have a proven track record of issuing hard-hitting, high-
impact reports addressing the most pressing issues facing the
Department of Homeland Security. Once we identified the issues with the
initial response EMOT reports, it was our responsibility to verify that
the inaccuracies are confined to this category of report. We are
proactively reviewing the audits related to or based on the recalled
reports so that we can confidently provide assurance to you that the
scope of the problem is limited. We will report back to you upon the
conclusion of that review.
Question 1d. How much time, resources, and money were wasted in
support of these now invalidated reports?
Answer. We do not believe time, resources, and money were wasted in
support of these reports. Rather, having audit staff deployed at each
location post-disaster served as a deterrent to fraud, waste, abuse,
and mismanagement. Our presence and fieldwork helped us identify,
deter, and prevent issues before they became multi-million-dollar
problems. The fieldwork associated with these reports identified
additional systematic issues that resulted in further reviews. For
example, our on-the-ground presence identified problems with FEMA's FQS
qualification system, instances where FEMA did no properly train
attorneys resulting in bad procurement advice, lack of safe rooms in
tornado areas, FEMA failures to spend mitigation money, and problems
with not having guidance in multiple languages.
We acknowledge that in the process of reporting our observations,
we did not always comply with applicable Government auditing standards.
Nevertheless, the staff hours associated with these reports were
productive. Staff hours includes activities such as: Teams attending
daily FEMA command meetings, State applicant briefings, conducting
interviews with key program FEMA and State officials, visiting disaster
recovery centers, evaluating whether Joint Field Offices were set up
appropriately, and receiving and referring potential fraud complaints
to the proper investigative offices.
Question 1e. Your internal review noted that answering objectives
with sufficient and appropriate evidence is required under Government
Auditing Standards or Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,
but it has been stated that future Emergency Management Oversight Team
projects will no longer be conducted under Government Auditing
Standards. How does the removal of these standards impact the quality,
importance, and integrity of future IG reports?
Answer. Moving forward, our goal is to produce reports that are
supported with the level of evidence required to meet the rigorous
auditing standards that auditors across the Federal Government follow.
We believe that our new approach will produce high-impact reports
adding value to the work we do.
We believe that deploying auditors as EMOTs are an important tool
that we can leverage to identify and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse
early on in FEMA's response. The IG Act provides the OIG with a variety
of tools that can assist us in effecting positive change. As such, we
have determined that using Government Auditing Standards is not the
most effective way to effect positive change immediately after a
disaster. As we go forward, the EMOTs will be conducted under Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation and the Inspector General Act,
Section 2. We will also continue to observe and identify potential risk
areas that will be addressed by future traditional audits or
inspections, if necessary.
Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation are very similar to
Government Auditing Standards, in that sufficient and appropriate
evidence must be obtained and documented so that a reasonable person
can come to the same conclusions as we did. Yet, these standards
provide more flexibility to rely on observations and discussions when
there is an absence of documentation, as is often the case immediately
after a disaster.
The OIG strives to improve its work product to meet the needs of
the agencies under review. We determined that by offering real-time
feedback based on observations and analysis of on-going efforts would
provide more benefit to FEMA, States, and disaster survivors--
identifying issues with FEMA's response before the money is spent and
they become multi-million dollar problems.
Question 2a. In your testimony, you noted that you are in the
process of reviewing agreements between Texas and FEMA related to
direct housing and the Partial Repair and Essential Power for
Sheltering (PREPS) program. What is the status of this review?
Answer. We are in the planning stages of the PREPS review.
Question 2b. When do you estimate it will be completed?
Answer. While still in its very early stages, our current estimate
is that we will complete the review and issue our final report late
this year or early in 2019. We will update committee staff in the event
that estimate changes.
Question 3. After Hurricane Katrina, FEMA instituted controls to
combat the high level of waste, fraud, and abuse in the Individual and
Households Program. You noted work you are undertaking to assess fraud
in that program in your testimony. Have there been improvements in
FEMA's ability to combat fraud?
Answer. We currently have an on-going audit regarding FEMA's fraud
prevention efforts in the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). The
objective of our review is to assess the effectiveness of FEMA's Fraud
Prevention and Investigation Branch in identifying and reporting
potential fraud, waste, and abuse of disaster assistance funds provided
under the IHP. Additionally, we are conducting a review of FEMA's
verification of applicant insurance benefits for applicants for
assistance under the IHP. The objective of our audit is to determine
whether FEMA's IHP for home repair and reconstruction has the necessary
controls in place to verify applicants' insurance coverage. Upon
completion of these reviews, we should be able to assess whether there
have been improvements in FEMA's ability to combat fraud.
We previously reviewed FEMA's process for verifying applicant's
insurance information in a report, FEMA Faces Challenges Verifying
Applicants' Insurance Policies for the Individuals and Households
Program (OIG-16-01-D). We noted that because FEMA relies on individuals
to self-certify and does not have an adequate system in place to verify
the information, this poses significant risk of fraud, waste, and
abuse.
At present, we have nearly 400 FEMA-related investigations open,
which represents 30 percent of our agency-wide caseload. The vast
majority of these investigations involve FEMA benefits fraud. We also
support our FEMA investigations with specialized complaint intake,
computer forensics, and fraud assessment capabilities.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John V. Kelly
Question 1a. On October 3, 2017, FEMA awarded a $156 million
contract to Tribute Contracting LLC to provide 30 million meals to
Puerto Rico. FEMA terminated the contract on October 19 after Tribute
delivered only 50,000 meals. Is your office conducting a review of this
contract award?
Answer. Yes, we are currently conducting a review of FEMA's
terminated Tribute Contracting LLC contract.
Question 1b. Do you know whether a FEMA contracting officer conduct
a responsibility determination for Tribute Contracting LLC prior to
awarding a contract?
Answer. We are looking at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and
other guidance to determine if FEMA followed all relevant laws,
regulations, and procedures in awarding the terminated contract. One of
the areas we are looking into will determine whether FEMA followed the
intent and spirit of FAR part 9.104-4--Subcontractor Responsibility.
Particularly FAR part 9.104-4(a) states ``generally, prospective prime
contractors are responsible for determining the responsibility of their
prospective subcontractors . . . A prospective contractor may be
required to provide written evidence of a proposed subcontractor's
responsibility.'' However, FAR 9.104-4(b) further states that ``when it
is in the Government's interest to do so, the contracting officer may
directly determine a prospective subcontractor's responsibility (e.g.,
when the prospective contract involves medical supplies, urgent
requirements, or substantial subcontracting).'' In this case, the same
standards used to determine a prime contractor's responsibility shall
be used by the Government to determine subcontractor responsibility.
Question 1c. What more must FEMA do to prevent this situation in
the future?
Answer. We will make recommendations to FEMA once our on-going
review is complete.
Question 2a. As part of the law creating the Public Assistance
Alternative Procedures, your office was required to assess the
effectiveness of the alternative procedures for permanent work
projects. However, this report is now overdue. Can you provide an
estimate of when you will complete this important review?
Answer. We estimate our final report will be published during May
2018.
Question 2b. Has the DHS OIG conducted any audits of past Public
Assistance projects that revealed concerns about how the Alternative
Procedures function?
Answer. In October 2015, we reported that FEMA's program guide for
the Alternative Procedures pilot program and letters of undertaking
provided acceptable guidance in most areas to ensure compliance with
Federal rules and regulations.\1\ However, our review of seven large-
dollar-value projects valued at $3.0 billion identified weaknesses in
five areas of guidance:
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\1\ Clearer Guidance Would Improve FEMA's Oversight of the Public
Assistance Alternative Procedures Pilot Program (OIG-16-03-D).
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1. estimating project costs;
2. responding to Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits;
3. managing cash responsibly;
4. applying insurance proceeds; and
5. obtaining insurance for future losses.
These weaknesses put Federal funds at greater risk of fraud, waste,
and abuse. Correcting these weaknesses will better ensure that
participants in the pilot program will follow Federal requirements when
spending Federal funds. FEMA concurred with the three recommendations
in the report and implemented the recommended changes.
Question 2c. Do you have any concerns about the required wide-
spread use of Alternative Procedures in Puerto Rico?
Answer. We have not conducted any audit work related to Alternative
Procedures in Puerto Rico; having not evaluated the specific issue in
Puerto Rico, it would be premature for us to express concerns. We do
plan to begin an audit shortly and look forward to sharing our results
with you when the audit is complete.
Question 3. What would you say are FEMA's top challenges in
addressing the aftermath of storm season 2017?
Answer. The top challenges FEMA's is facing in addressing the
aftermath of the storm season 2017 are the following:
improper procurement practices;
duplication of benefits;
mismanagement of disaster costs;
privacy vulnerabilities;
limitations in the ability to quickly protect survivors'
homes and property from further damage;
obstacles with accurate and timely home inspections;
incomplete controls when providing Federal funds to high-
risk entities; and
inconsistent contract oversight.
Unmitigated, these challenges could delay survivors' recovery and
put billions of dollars of Federal funds at risk. Thus, we have
identified numerous observations and concerns and issued several
lessons learned reports concerning FEMA's disaster preparedness,
response, and recovery efforts. This work highlights on-going concerns
FEMA must address to ensure it effectively meets its mission and
improves the efficiency and effectiveness of its programs and
operations.
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Reed Clay
Question 1. In your testimony, you made clear that one of the most
valuable lesson learned from Hurricane Harvey is that we must rebuild
stronger--to ``future proof'' or mitigate against future damage from
storms. Can you explain the importance of mitigation projects to the
future of Texas and the entire country?
Answer. Of the many lessons learned following the devastation of
Hurricane Harvey, the most significant tropical cyclone rainfall event
in United States history both in scope and total rainfall, two lessons
are perhaps the most valuable in preparing for future natural
disasters.
The first lesson learned is a reaffirmation of the bonds of our
humanity. The worst of storms brought out the best in humanity; Texans
helped Texans, Americans helped Americans, and lives were saved.
The second lesson learned is perhaps more critical as the beginning
of hurricane season again nears, with storms typically occurring
between June 1 and November 30. While we cannot control Mother Nature,
nor predict with certainty the path or extent of potential destruction,
there are critical actions we can take--and should take--to prepare for
natural disasters, to mitigate the threat to human life, our first
priority, and to minimize the risk of damage to infrastructure,
property, and the economic health of this State and our Nation.
Under Governor Abbott's direction, the State of Texas is focused on
``future-proofing'' as we rebuild in our communities impacted by
Hurricane Harvey along the Texas Gulf Coast and in Houston and beyond.
The State of Texas is already deploying Hazard Mitigation Grant funds--
made available under the Stafford Act--throughout the affected region,
prioritizing the investments in five primary areas:
Buyouts and elevations of flood-prone properties
Drainage and reservoir projects that eliminate future
flooding
Projects to lessen the frequency or severity of flooding
Flood-risk reduction projects (dams, retention basins,
levees, and floodwalls)
Large-scale channeling of waterways.
The Gulf Coast region of Texas represents a vital cog in the
National economy, with our substantial petrochemical complex,
international ports, and the world's largest medical center, as well as
one of the Nation's most populous and economically vital cities.
Many of the projects needed to truly future proof the region will
require significant Federal assistance. Much of the damage from the
devastating storm and subsequent historic rainfall could have been
prevented or mitigated by Federal projects that have been considered
for years, such as a third reservoir in the Houston area or deepening
waterways authorized for improvement. And other projects being
considered--like deepening our ports and the coastal spine--may prove
visionary, as they protect assets that are indispensable to our
Nation's economy and National defense during the next storm.
Question 2. FEMA Administrator Long presented the committee with a
strategic plan to enable FEMA to better prepare and respond to future
disasters. Administrator Long constantly stresses that ``success is
best delivered through a system that is Federally-supported, State-
managed, and locally-executed.'' How do you think FEMA's strategic plan
and disaster recovery system will enable Texas to better respond to
future disasters?
Answer. Texas' response to Hurricane Harvey was remarkable and
demonstrates the point made by Administrator Long. Though the disaster
was unprecedented in recent history, so too was the aggressive advance
action and close coordination of local, State, and Federal emergency
management resources and personnel in the 53 Texas counties in the
Presidential Disaster Declaration and 60 Texas counties in the State
Disaster Declaration.
Disasters occur locally. Citizens themselves are the first line of
defense, and the can-do attitude displayed during the worst of the
storm and the subsequent flooding was remarkable. Reinforcing a culture
of disaster preparedness is critical to ensure even more lives are
saved in future storms. As we saw in each community, from our smallest
coastal communities to our largest city, it was because of the courage
and calm leadership of local emergency managers, elected officials, law
enforcement, and first responders that so many more lives were spared.
All resources of the State of Texas were also leveraged as State
agencies stepped in when asked to fill the gaps and provide needed
personnel, equipment, and expertise.
But responding to a major disaster such as Hurricane Harvey is not
possible without Federal support. From the State of Texas' perspective,
the administrator's strategic plan provides a vision that would enable
Texas to respond even more effectively in the future.
First, invest today to mitigate damage from the storms to come
tomorrow. That is the direction set by Governor Abbott, driving the
prioritization of hazard mitigation projects across the Texas Gulf
Coast and the rest of the impacted region. We must ``future-proof'' as
we rebuild to preserve lives, infrastructure, and property--and to
safeguard the economic health of the State and our Nation.
Second, remove bureaucracy. In the housing recovery initiative in
particular, State and local governments already have the legal
infrastructure in place to administer short- and long-term housing
recovery; an additional layer of Federal requirements only serves to
slow the process down. FEMA and the Federal Government should consider
relaxing the regulations contained in 2 CFR for the exigent period
immediately following a major disaster (e.g., 30 days), and when the
Federal Government asks the State to assume responsibility and complete
the housing mission, the State must be freed from FEMA regulations and
permitted to execute the program itself. Such a system permits the
flexibility of a locally-run program that meets the unique needs of
each community. A cookie-cutter approach just doesn't work: What works
in New York may not work in Texas. This streamlining also removes a
layer of bureaucracy to speed up the recovery and meet our ultimate
goal of getting people back in their homes more quickly.
Third, incentivize local governments to create a culture of
preparedness by ensuring there is adequate personnel who are trained
and who understand disaster recovery and FEMA's processes. This will
facilitate the integration of existing personnel into the disaster
recovery framework. But local entities must be incentivized through
grants and other opportunities to create and maintain that
infrastructure.
It is the balance of a locally-executed, State-managed, and
Federally-funded disaster and recovery framework that will help improve
the delivery of service to our citizens when they need our assistance
the most.
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